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# WORLD POLITICS

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# THE CONTRIBUTORS

ROBERT L. AYRES is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. During the 1975/1976 academic year, he was an International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations and a Guest Scholar at The Brookings Institution. He is currently conducting a study of World Bank lending in Latin America.

HENRY A. LANDSBERGER is Professor of Sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. From 1961 to 1965, he was a Visiting Professor at the University of Chile. He has written extensively on Latin American labor and peasant movements. TIM MCDANIEL obtained his M.A. at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is at present completing his doctorate in the Department of Sociology of the University of California at Berkeley.

WILLIAM E. ODOM is Associate Professor of Political Science at West Point, and Senior Research Associate at the Research Institute on International Change, Columbia University. He is the author of *The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organization* (1973).

ANDRZEJ KORBONSKI is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He has written on various aspects of East European politics and economics.

KUANG-SHENG LIAO is Lecturer of Government and Public Administration at United College, the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is currently working on a book on internal politics and external behavior in China.

ROBERT A. KANN is Professor of History in the Graduate School of Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. He will be Visiting Professor at the University of Vienna in 1976/1977. His books include *The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918* (1964); *The Problem of Restoration: A Study in Comparative Political History* (1968); and *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918* (1974).

WILLIAM STUECK's Ph.D. dissertation in history at Brown University is entitled "American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950."

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# ABSTRACTS

## The "Social Pact" as Anti-Inflationary Policy: the Argentine Experience Since 1973

By R. L. AYRES

Inflation has long been a fact of economic and political life in Argentina. The Peronist government which assumed office in mid-1973 attempted to control inflation through the so-called Social Pact, a wage-price agreement of two years' duration involving the leading labor union organization, a leading businessmen's organization, and the Argentine state. An awareness of the principal issues of the economic situation is essential to an understanding of the crisis of contemporary Argentina, and a description of the evolution of the Social Pact reveals some of the essential contours of the economic debate. But the importance of the Social Pact extends beyond mere economic considerations. The study of the latest Argentine experience with anti-inflationary policy suggests some generalizations about the nature of populist political movements, the symbolic functions of economic policy initiatives, and the functions of such policies in co-opting private economic actors and legitimating governmental interference with free market forces. It also reveals some important characteristics of Argentine politics, especially concerning relations between the state and private economic groups. With economic and political implications of comparative significance, the Argentine Social Pact is an important case study in political economy.

## Hypermobilization in Chile, 1970–1973

By H. A. LANDSBERGER and T. McDANIEL

The accelerating mobilization of Chile's working class from 1965 onward appears to support Huntington's cautious evaluation of the effects of that process rather than Deutsch's more optimistic one. Instead of resulting in more massive support for Dr. Allende's minority-based UP government (which, needing support, stimulated even further a process that had been noticeable from at least 1965), increased mobilization resulted in (a) heightened but unattainable economic demands; (b) increased support for the extreme left (a severe threat to the regime's policies and even existence, as Allende recognized); (c) increased support for the opposition Christian Democrats; (d) a general de-authorization of all institutions, including those tailored specifically to working-class needs. In some situations, mobilization may sweep away the remnants of an old regime. But where that is not possible or not the real issue, it may overwhelm rather than aid an already weak government, even if it is change-oriented.

## A Dissenting View on the Group Approach to Soviet Politics

By W. E. ODOM

In the struggle to find a successor to the totalitarian model for study of Soviet politics, the interest-group approach has won significant support. Yet this concept fails to meet all three of Huntington's criteria for a "useful" model. First, the group concept emphasizes the peripheral at the expense of what is of critical importance. Second, as a comparative concept it introduces errors in logic as well as a myriad of ambiguities in definition and taxonomy. Third, it is more likely to obscure than to clarify the dynamic character of the Soviet system. The group approach does not promise, as some assert, to bring the study of Soviet politics into the mainstream of comparative political theory.

In contrast, the totalitarian model still goes far toward meeting Huntington's criteria. When supplemented by the notion of political culture and by middle-range concepts of organization theory and bureaucracy, the totalitarian model retains great heuristic value as an ideal construct from which Soviet realities diverge in various ways.

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## Détente, East-West Trade, and the Future of Economic Integration in Eastern Europe

By A. KORBONSKI

The paper attempts to examine the impact of East-West trade on the process of economic integration in Eastern Europe, carried out under the aegis of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The discussion is focused on the proposition that, other things being equal, the continued growth of East-West trade is at the present time incompatible with the increase in the level of economic integration in that part of Europe.

The problem is analyzed in the context of several factors: the process of regional economic integration; the attitude of the Soviet Union and of the East European political and economic elites toward both integration and East-West trade before and after détente; the influence of economic reforms in Eastern Europe; and the impact of the energy crisis and of the developing global shortage of raw materials.

The conclusion emerges that, on balance, the chances of economic cooperation if not integration in the region are today better than in the past, albeit at the expense of closer economic relations between Eastern Europe and the West.

## Linkage Politics in China: Internal Mobilization and Articulated External Hostility in the Cultural Revolution 1967–1969

By K. LIAO

Studies on the relationship between internal politics and external behavior present many contradictions. This paper attempts to modify previous research methods by focusing on the relationship between internal mobilization and articulated external hostility in China during the period of the Cultural Revolution, 1967–1969.

The findings suggest that during times of authority crisis, domestic mass mobilization tends to be associated with increased antiforeign verbal accusations and mass protests. The Maoists manipulated the expression of external hostility for the purpose of mobilizing internal support for their own domestic programs. Some suggestions concerning the study of China's international behavior and about cross-national research on the linkage of internal politics and external behavior are provided.

## Alliances Versus Ententes

By R. A. KANN

The advantages and disadvantages of rigid alliances with predictable consequences versus more flexible kinds of international agreements similar to the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904 are discussed. A partner of an alliance not directly threatened by aggression against his ally usually wishes to interpret the obligations arising from the *casus foederis* as loosely as possible. In more flexible, entente-like agreements, on the other hand, the lack of firm commitments may induce both partners to follow the reverse course, namely to define their mutual interests more closely. These and other considerations of predictability and of dogmatism versus pragmatism in the history of international relations are evaluated. While general trends may move in the direction of more elastic agreements, the tensions of the contemporary world do not allow states to dispense with the concept of formal alliances.

## The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Korean War

By W. STUECK

Despite recent efforts by revisionists, the traditional view of the Soviet role in the outbreak of war in Korea on June 25, 1950—i.e., that the Kremlin approved and had foreknowledge of the North Korean attack on South Korea—remains the most plausible. In *The Strained Alliance*, Robert Simmons asserts that the Soviet Union, although involved in arming North Korea's military forces and in planning their offensive across the 38th parallel, was taken by surprise when war erupted in June. The Kremlin had approved a military campaign for the following August, but indigenous political pressures led North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung to advance the invasion date. This hypothesis is open to attack on both empirical and logical grounds. Simmons is persuasive, however, in arguing that the North Korean regime took the initiative in proposing the move to its sponsor in Moscow.

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# THE "SOCIAL PACT" AS ANTI-INFLATIONARY POLICY: The Argentine Experience Since 1973

By ROBERT L. AYRES*

ARGENTINA has long been known as one of Latin America's foremost examples of an inflationary economy. Argentina's inflationary process is of interest in terms of economics because it has been unaccompanied by substantial rates of economic growth: the country has long experienced the "stagflation" which has recently beset the industrialized states. Politically, the inflationary process in Argentina has had numerous ramifications. It has been a prime factor in the country's political instability because of its propensity to pit social groups against one another in the battle for their share of income. It has given rise to several extremely controversial "stabilization" plans, which have provoked the wrath of labor unions and small-scale industrialists, and which have generated considerable foreign intervention in Argentine economic and political affairs. The search for the causes of the inflation has been one of the perennial themes of Argentine politics since World War II, and at least one observer has implicated inflation in the chronic tendency toward coups d'état.[1]

The return of Peronism to power renewed interest in these themes, for the political economy of Peronism has always had as three of its central emphases: (a) an increase in the share of the national income for the Argentine working class; (b) a strengthening of the economic position of the "national bourgeoisie"; and (c) the fulfillment of Argentine economic destiny (*grandeza* and *la Argentina potencia*). None of these objectives is likely to be achieved in the presence of perennially rampant inflation. It is not surprising, therefore, that one of

* I would like to thank the Center for Latin American Studies and the Committee on Research, both of the University of California at Berkeley, for financial support which made this research possible. I would also like to thank the Centro de Investigaciones en Administración Pública, formerly of the Instituto Torcuato di Tella, for providing me with library and other facilities during my field research in Argentina (June-November, 1974).

[1] Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies 1973), chap. III. This view, however, has been disputed by Mario S. Brodersohn in a recent review of O'Donnell's book. See Brodersohn, "Sobre 'Modernización y Autoritarismo' y el Estancamiento Inflacionario Argentino," *Desarrollo Económico,* XIII (October-December 1973), 591-605.

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the major policy innovations of the recent Peronist government was the so-called *Pacto Social*, or Social Pact, between organized labor, entrepreneurial associations, and the Argentine state. The Social Pact was a wage-price program of two years' duration, designed to control inflation, redistribute income in as nonconfrontational a manner as possible, and mitigate socioeconomic tensions.

In this paper I attempt to describe the Peronist Social Pact which became the linchpin of Argentine economic policy in June 1973. I first outline the basic terms of the agreement and then devote attention to the most important developments in its evolution during the subsequent two years. Then I analyze and evaluate this latest Argentine experiment of instituting an anti-inflationary policy. I attempt to locate the successes and failures of the pact, and to account for the economic and political variables most conducive to them. I endeavor to ascertain what the Social Pact says about the nature of contemporary Argentine politics: about, for example, the character of the Argentine state, the relations between private and public economic actors, and the nature of Peronist political economy. This descriptive and analytical exercise has intrinsic importance for the study of present-day Argentina, and illuminates more general themes—system-level themes in the study of Argentine politics and comparative themes in the study of public policy.

## The Social Pact: Major Contents and Evolution

From May 1972 to May 1973, the Argentine cost-of-living index had risen 75.8 per cent, providing the context for a renewed anti-inflationary effort.[2] On May 25, 1973, Héctor Cámpora, a Peronist, assumed the presidency of Argentina, ending almost seven years of uninterrupted military rule. A week later, representatives of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), the General Economic Confederation (CGE, an association of businessmen), and the Argentine state signed the *Acta de Compromiso Nacional* (roughly translated as "Act of National Commitment"), giving birth to the Social Pact.

The Social Pact provided a "shock treatment" for dealing with the inflationary spiral. After permitted adjustments for increases in the prices of public services, the prices of all goods and services were frozen at existing levels. Prices of some basic consumer goods were even rolled back. But wages and other remunerations were allowed to rise. Specifically, the agreement provided for a 40 per cent across-the-board increase

[2] Foundation of Latin American Economic Research (FIEL), *Indicadores de Coyuntura* (Buenos Aires: FIEL 1973), 15.

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in family allowances and a similar across-the-board wage increase of 200 pesos per month (the equivalent of $20 at the then-prevailing official exchange rate). The across-the-board nature of wage increases in effect meant that the lower-paid workers benefitted proportionately more than the higher-paid workers—i.e., that the agreement entailed some redistribution of income *within* the working class. It explicitly prohibited firms from increasing prices so as to pass on the increased labor costs; the increases in wages and family allowances were to be absorbed by businesses. The agreement thereby signified some redistribution of income from businessmen to workers, i.e., *between*-class redistribution in addition to within-class redistribution.[3] To assist firms who might have financial difficulty in meeting the increased wage bill, special credit lines were to be opened by the Central Bank, providing loans at interest rates below then-prevailing rates. Wages were to be revised on June 1, 1974, and June 1, 1975, in accordance with the increase in the average economy-wide productivity rate. In addition, and in case prices rose despite the intended freeze, a new bureaucratic organ—the National Commission on Prices, Incomes, and Standard of Living (CONAPRIN), composed of representatives of the three signatory parties—was to guarantee that the real purchasing power of wages would not fall below the level estimated at the time of the agreement. If such a drop should occur, the executive branch would "proceed to adopt the measures which will assure the maintenance of the present purchasing power." CONAPRIN was also to monitor business costs and profits in order to determine the need for any modifications in the general price freeze.[4]

The Social Pact was to be of two years' duration—from June 1, 1973, to June 1, 1975. It should be noted at the outset, however, that the pact did *not* go unmodified during this period. The general freezing of prices did not last anywhere near the stipulated two years, nor did wage adjustments await productivity increases. The first revision of the pact

[3] The three-year plan announced in December 1973 made this goal more explicit. Specifically, wage- and salary-earners were to see their percentage participation in national income rise from 42.5% in 1973 to 47.7% in 1977. The latter figure had been their share in 1955, the year of Perón's overthrow. The goal for the longer range was to increase their participation to 52% by 1980. See República Argentina, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, *Plan Trienal para la Reconstrucción y la Liberación Nacional, 1974–1977* [hereafter cited as *Plan Trienal*] (Buenos Aires 1973), 21, 48.

[4] This description of some of the essential points in the Act of National Commitment is based upon the original text of the document as published in República Argentina, Presidencia de la Nación, Secretaría de Prensa y Difusión, *Política Económica y Social: Ruptura de la Dependencia* (Buenos Aires 1973). The quotation is found on pp. 54-55. The translation, as well as all subsequent translations from Spanish sources, is the author's.

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took place in March 1974, when wages were increased by an average 13 per cent (an across-the-board raise of 240 pesos); part of this increase was transferred to prices (the beginning of the so-called "flexibilization" phase of the agreement). In June 1974, wages were effectively raised again, this time through the device of the *medio aguinaldo adicional*, a one-shot wage bonus. This increase was not to be transferred to prices, and special credits were again provided for those firms experiencing difficulties in paying the bonus. November 1974 brought the "Third Social Act," shortly after a new Minister of Economy and a whole new "economic team" had assumed office. Wage increases averaged 15 per cent (an across-the-board raise of 300 pesos), but little was said about the transferal of such increases to prices. In fact, there was official recognition of the need for a "realistic and rational" price policy, and the wage increases stemming from this modification of the Social Pact were rapidly consumed by subsequent price increases. In late February and early March 1975, the fourth modification in the form of an across-the-board increase of 400 pesos per month was decreed, and the freezing of all prices was reinstituted. This latest adjustment was made necessary by a new round of inflation. From November 1974 to February 1975, the cost-of-living index had risen by an estimated 22 to 24 per cent.[5]

The Social Pact was extremely vague on the procedures for its implementation. As a practical matter, most of the detailed monitoring of prices was entrusted to the Secretariat of Commerce within the Ministry of Economy. This secretariat was responsible for the gathering of information on the cost structure of firms, for authorizing the price increases of individual firms, for overseeing the situation regarding critical inputs, and so forth. CONAPRIN apparently did not function effectively. It has recently been described as "just another dependency of the governmental machine."[6] The major modifications of the Social Pact were undertaken by the *Gran Paritaria Nacional*, a national-level body consisting of high-ranking officials of the CGT, the CGE, and the state (Minister of Economy, Minister of Labor, and others). For most of the life of the Social Pact, the work of the so-called "collective work conventions" was suspended. These are the joint labor-management negotiating councils charged with the formulation of wage agreements between individual unions and the firms in specific branches of the economy. At the resumption of their work, in early 1975, these

[5] *La Nación* (international edition), February 24, 1975, p. 6.
[6] A CGT official, quoted in *La Nación* (international edition), April 21, 1975, p. 2.

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councils numbered more than 1,000; they were to produce agreements to take effect upon the termination of the Social Pact.

In practice, the major modifications of the Social Pact seem to have had relatively little to do with formal institutional prescriptions. The convening of the *Gran Paritaria* was invariably the result of political pressures brought upon the Minister of Economy and the President by the CGT and the CGE, especially the former. The CGT, arguing deterioration in workers' real incomes, successfully lobbied for changes in the agreement. The CGE, arguing deterioration in profit rates and complaining about such things as worker absenteeism, acceded to demands for convoking the *Gran Paritaria*. All of this seemed to have little to do with the calculations being made by the Secretariat of Commerce.

## Principal Participants in the Social Pact

As noted, there were three principal participants in the Social Pact: the General Confederation of Labor, the General Economic Confederation, and the Argentine state.

Organized labor has long been an important actor in Argentine politics; the General Confederation of Labor has been regarded as perhaps the strongest and most militant labor organization in Latin America. Despite this importance, it is difficult to obtain reliable data on the extent of unionization and union activity. The most rigorous investigation of the matter, using data from the 1964 Census of Professional Associations, concluded that approximately 36 per cent of all wage- and salary-earners were unionized. The figure fluctuated greatly according to economic sector; in the manufacturing industries, it reached 60 per cent.[7] The most recent estimate of the number of wage- and salary-earners is 7.1 million in 1973.[8] If we take the most commonly cited estimate of the total number of union members (2.5 to 3.0 million), the current unionization rate is between 35 and 42 per cent.[9]

Although one cannot ascertain with any precision what proportion of all unionized workers are members of CGT unions, it is certain to be an overwhelming majority. Furthermore, CGT affiliates include the

[7] Juan Carlos Torre, *La Tasa de Sindicalización en Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato di Tella, Centro de Investigaciones Sociales 1972), 11.

[8] *Plan Trienal* (fn. 3), 53.

[9] The estimate is contained in Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Labor Law and Practice in Argentina* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor 1969), 24.

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largest and most important unions in Argentina, such as the Metal Workers' Union, the Commercial Workers' Confederation, the Railroad Workers' Union, the Civil Service Employees' Union, the Textile Workers' Association, the Construction Workers' Union, and the Light and Power Workers' Federation. These and other large unions have been key participants in the Argentine system of collective bargaining —especially since contracts negotiated by them extend to all workers in the industry or enterprise involved, whether or not they are members of a union.[10]

A history of internal strife has characterized the Argentine trade union movement. Initial competition among Communists, Socialists, and Syndicalists gave way to a predominantly Peronist orientation in the 1940's, but the term "Peronist" covers a multitude of tendencies. After Juan Domingo Perón's fall in 1955, the CGT was rent by factionalism of a personal nature and by conflicting orientations toward anti-labor governments (particularly after 1966). Such divisions culminated in an open break between two rival factions in 1968, but by the time of Perón's return, surface unity had been restored. The principal unions were in the hands of Peronist labor bureaucrats, but these were under attack by a small but strident minority of "classist" or "combative" leaders of a more avowedly Marxist persuasion.[11] Peronist dominance of the labor-union bureaucracy, moreover, did not prevent frequent and bitter outbreaks of internecine conflict among contending partisans, all putatively "Peronist."

The businessmen's signatory to the Social Pact was the General Economic Confederation. Choice of the CGE represented an important political move on the part of Perón. The situation was not comparable to the labor sector where the CGT represented the vast majority of unionized workers: the CGE was one of two nationwide businessmen's organizations—and, in strictly economic terms, it was the less important one. Its chief rival, the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA), claimed in 1967 that its firms accounted for 90 per cent of all industrial sales and

[10] Torre (fn. 7), 15; Bureau of Labor Statistics (fn. 9), 32. This statement refers to periods of "normal" collective bargaining under the terms of Law 14.250 (1953). At various times, government enactments have in effect suspended such bargaining. This was the case during most of the administration of Juan Carlos Ongañía (1966–1970), when compulsory arbitration and governmental imposition of wage ceilings were common. It was also the case, though for quite different motivations and reasons, in the period under consideration here—when the Social Pact suspended the wage-determination functions of the "collective work conventions" for a two-year period.

[11] The internal politics of the CGT have not been systematically studied from the perspectives of sociology or political science. For a chronology of some of the divisions referred to here, see Santiago Senén González, *Breve Historia del Sindicalismo Argentino* (Buenos Aires: Alzamor Editores 1974).

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employed 95 per cent of all industrial workers.[12] The UIA had 176 "collective associates" as of 1973–1974, and its affiliated associations and chambers included most of the largest and economically most powerful of Argentine businesses.[13] It was founded in 1887, and is generally considered the representative of the larger, more technologically advanced firms, in many of which foreign capital has a substantial or controlling interest.[14] The CGE, on the other hand, claims to speak for "national capital," small- and medium-scale industrialists, and firms in the interior of the country.[15] Although available data are not very reliable, it appears that the CGE represents a numerical majority of Argentine industrial firms (without weighting by economic importance). According to one estimate, 58 per cent of the national total of all firms are affiliated with the CGE; a former president of the Confederation has stated that its 1,520 chambers represented 20,000 individual business leaders and embraced 90 per cent of all national businessmen.[16] The three constituent confederations of the CGE were founded in 1951, and the constitution of the general confederation took place in 1953.

In 1973, Perón's preference of the CGE over the UIA was nothing new. Indeed, in 1946, following a running dispute with the leadership of the UIA, he had deprived that organization of its juridical status (*personería jurídica*).[17] Later, the CGE "became an officially sponsored nationwide association of employers under the Perón administration, during which its component affiliates were the only ones recognized by the government."[18] Perón's choice of the CGE as the business representative in the Social Pact meant CGE representation in the organizations created

[12] Jorge Niosi, *Los Empresarios y el Estado Argentino, 1955–1969* (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno 1974), 162.

[13] Unión Industrial Argentina, *Memoria y Balance 1973–1974* (Buenos Aires: UIA 1974); list of affiliates on pp. 63-77.

[14] Gary W. Wynia, "Economic Policy-Making Under Stress: Conflict and Exchange in Argentina," Latin American Development Administration Committee (LADAC) Occasional Papers, Series 2, No. 11 (Austin, Texas: Institute of Latin American Studies 1974), 23.

[15] It is difficult to identify "small- and medium-scale industry" precisely. The principal publication of the recently created Corporation for the Development of Small- and Medium-Scale Business eschews a quantitative definition of "small" or "medium" but estimates that there are 1.3 million Argentine firms deserving such a classification. These represent 90% of the total number of firms in the country. See Corporación para el Desarrollo de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa (COPYME), *Informe Sobre la Labor Cumplida por COPYME, 1973–1974* (Buenos Aires: COPYME, n.d.).

[16] Wynia (fn. 14), 23, cites the 58% figure, although it appears that the percentage should refer to businessmen's associations (*entidades de primer grado*) and not to individual firms. The other estimates are from an address by José Ber Gelbard and cited in Niosi (fn. 12), 170.

[17] See Dardo Cúneo, *Comportamiento y Crisis de la Clase Empresaria* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleamar 1967), 174 ff.

[18] Bureau of Labor Statistics (fn. 9), 27.

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under the aegis of the pact (most importantly the *Gran Paritaria*). In addition, businessmen long associated with the CGE assumed important positions in the Ministry of Economy and elsewhere in the executive branch. Although business firms affiliated with the UIA were subject to the price-control provisions of the Social Pact and to subsequent dictates of the *Gran Paritaria*, they were not themselves signatories. This was a somewhat anomalous situation, given the economic preponderance of the UIA, and it may in fact account for some of the problems encountered by the pact. Some rectification came in mid-1974, when the UIA formally merged with the General Industrial Confederation (CGI), one of the three principal confederations of the CGE.

The third major participant in the Social Pact was the Argentine state. The state performs numerous economic functions in Argentina. State corporations supply essential public goods and services, including electricity, petroleum, railroad transportation, and telephone service. The state determines interest rates, purchase prices for numerous agricultural commodities, prices of basic items in the family budget (*canasta familiar*), import and export duties, and so forth. In addition, the state is the largest employer in Argentina. In 1973, total employment in the public sector was approximately 1.2 million, out of an economically active population of 9.97 million.[19] Total public investment in 1973 was 32.2 per cent of all gross domestic investment, and total government consumption was 11.9 per cent of the gross domestic product.[20]

It should be emphasized that these economic functions of the Argentine state do not necessarily mean that the state is "strong" vis-à-vis private economic actors. In fact, it often appears weak when compared to Brazil and Mexico, where state authorities seem better able to define and implement state goals, and where state control of the actors in civil society seems to be tighter. The formal endowment of the Argentine state with a wide array of economic participation and powers has not freed it from the welter of conflicting private economic interests which has long characterized Argentine society. In Argentina, therefore, "the state" has more frequently appeared as the transitory representative of whatever groups happened to enjoy momentary ascendancy rather than as a structure with its own interests, goals, and the means of their attainment.

[19] *Plan Trienal* (fn. 3), 66. This figure represents the total of all employees of the national, provincial, and municipal governments, as well as employees of all state enterprises.

[20] *Ibid.*, 40, 42.

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## The Social Pact: Principal Outcomes

### (1) Renewed inflation after a lull of several months

The rollback of some prices and the freezing of others for a while made Argentina "the only country in the world without inflation."[21] During a honeymoon period of approximately six months, cost-of-living indicators showed little or no rise. As of November 1, 1973, retail prices were actually below the level of June 1973.[22] But the situation changed drastically in 1974, particularly after the first quarter. The cumulative inflation rate for the second half of 1974 was 29.3 per cent, and in the month of December alone it reached 12.7 per cent. The upward spiral did not slacken in 1975; the cumulative rate for the first quarter of the year was 15.6 per cent. By June 1975, the annual inflation rate was higher than it had been in May 1973.[23]

Explanations for the resurgence of inflation are numerous. Price increases of crucial industrial inputs were one obvious problem. Despite the emphasis on import-substituting industrialization, much of Argentine industry is crucially dependent on imports of capital and intermediate goods for the production of final products. During the initial period of the Social Pact, the prices of many such imports rose drastically. Producers of goods with a high import component suffered accordingly, since they were prohibited from transferring such cost increases to prices. This situation was impossible to sustain indefinitely, and eventually it was necessary to permit the higher cost of imported inputs to be reflected in higher domestic prices. Some of the price increases during 1974 and 1975 were, therefore, attributable to "imported inflation."

Another principal explanation is linked to the redistributional implications of the Social Pact. In a manner historically characteristic of Peronist political economy, the state paid more attention to demand than to supply, more attention to consumption than to investment.[24] The Social Pact had generally negative consequences for business

[21] "El único país sin inflación?" *Mercado*, November 1, 1973, p. 13.

[22] *Ibid.*, 18

[23] Various sources have been used in the compilation of cost-of-living data, including the relatively recent *Carta Política*; *Indicadores de Coyuntura*, the monthly publication of economic data from FIEL; the weekly economic summary in *La Nación* ("Al margen de la semana"); and the business publication *Mercado*.

[24] According to Marcelo Diamand, "national populism" (i.e., Peronism) is characterized by "the conviction . . . that an increase in popular well-being is incompatible with an increase of advantages for capital." Diamand, *Doctrinas Económicas, Desarrollo e Independencia* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos 1973), 428.

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profits and investments, thus reducing incentive and ability to expand productive capacity. When the increased purchasing power of workers came to play upon the relatively inelastic supply, the result in some sectors was analogous to what occurred in Chile following the heyday of Allende's redistributional efforts.

An additional factor working against increasing supplies was the export boom. During the first year of the Social Pact, exports soared to unprecedented levels. The total value of exports was $1.78 billion between July and December 1973, up from $1.03 billion in the comparable period of the previous year. Between January and June 1974, exports totalled $1.84 billion, up from $1.49 billion in the comparable period of 1973.[25] Particularly significant was the increase in exports of manufactured products. These nontraditional exports were stimulated by a promotional scheme on the part of the government, as well as by the rise in prices in international markets—and by the comparison between international prices and the prices that could be obtained domestically. One of the indirect and unintended consequences of the Social Pact, therefore, was to increase exports, and to do so at some cost to the domestic supply of certain products—a distinctly "un-Peronist" policy.[26] Among the additional consequences of supply shortages were the growth of a sizable black market which diverted large quantities of merchandise into unofficial channels, and an increase in contraband trade, especially with neighboring Paraguay. The Secretariat of Commerce tried, but does not seem to have been able to remedy the situation.

Yet another, and perhaps the most important, explanation for the ultimate failure of the Social Pact to contain inflation emphasizes the state's inability to police the agreement. With its limited administrative competence and its relative debility in the face of powerful private holders of economic power, the Argentine state was unable to enforce total compliance with the wage and price strictures of the Social Pact.

These considerations do not exhaust the explanations for the recrudescence of inflation in 1974 and 1975, but they do serve to indicate that complex economic and political factors were involved. The state authorities, however, persisted in advancing an explanation that was a radical oversimplification. According to Perón, the renewed inflation could be attributed to disloyal members of the labor unions, to irresponsible and unscrupulous businessmen, and—especially—to a group of

[25] *Mercado*, November 7, 1974, p. 16.

[26] Diamand has pointed out that "national populism has traditionally identified an increase in exports as antipopular since it appeared to be an alternative to domestic consumption." Diamand (fn. 24), 426.

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parasitic intermediaries and speculators. However inadequate for explaining the complex of factors leading to a renewal of the inflationary spiral, this simplistic attitude is not without its importance for an understanding of the latent functions of the Social Pact and the tendencies of Peronist political economy.

### (2) EFFECTS ON LABOR: THE DEBATE CONCERNING REAL WAGES

For numerous reasons, it is a difficult task to characterize the evolution of real wages since the signing of the Social Pact. The reliability of official economic data is always open to question in Argentina; that problem was compounded during the period of the Social Pact by the increase in transactions taking place at unofficial prices, under- and over-invoicing, and so forth. As a leading Argentine economist put it, "only God knows what the increase in inflation has been this year, or what the increase in the real wage has been."[27] In this situation, when the *Gran Paritaria* sat down to calculate what wage increases should be, it was frequently obliged to pull figures out of the air. A second problem involves the great variability of real wages from month to month, making an indicator of such wages extremely difficult to manage statistically.[28] A third problem is that an indicator of real wages is generally a summary statistic; some effort must be made to differentiate between various categories within the Argentine wage scales and between different kinds of laborers.

The question of the evolution of real wages is of such importance that, despite these difficulties, attempts at estimations have been made and can be reported. The across-the-board nature of wage increases under the Social Pact denoted considerable differences in increases experienced by different categories of workers. The initial increase of 200 pesos, for example, meant a 19.2 per cent rise in the wages of the industrial *peón* (common laborer), but an increase of only 11.0 per cent in those of workers in the "intermediate" category of the wage scales.[29] An investigation of the evolution of real wages from December 1973 to March 1975 concluded that the minimum wage had risen 22.7 per cent in real terms, and the "basic" wage (*salario básico de convenio*) had risen 6.9 per cent. But the wages of those in the "intermediate" category had fallen 8.0 per cent, and those of workers in the upper reaches of the wage scales had fallen 13.3 per cent.[30]

[27] Interview with Juan Carlos de Pablo of FIEL, November 12, 1974.
[28] On this problem, see *Mercado*, September 19, 1974, p. 13.
[29] *Carta Política*, No. 20 (April 1975), 36.
[30] *Carta Política*, No. 21 (April 1975), 43.

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The problem was that wage increases stemming from the various adjustments to the Social Pact were still rapidly being consumed by new price increases. In April 1974, for example, the average real wage rose 11.6 per cent as a consequence of the wage agreements reached by the *Gran Paritaria* the previous month.[31] But the average real wage promptly fell 4.4 per cent in May and 4.0 per cent in June. Then, in July, the average real wage rose 5.1 per cent as a consequence of the special wage bonus. But a renewed deterioration immediately set in, the average real wage falling 10.0 per cent from August to October. In November 1974, the "Third Social Act" raised the average real wage 14.3 per cent, but this time the immediate deterioration was particularly severe. The average real wage plummeted 18.4 per cent between December 1974 and February 1975.[32]

The consequence of this situation was that each adjustment of the Social Pact lasted fewer months than the previous one. Ten months passed before the first modification; this endured seven months; the modification of November 1974 lasted only four months; that of March 1975, only three months. By May 1975, the index of real wages, as measured by basic wages, was 4.2 per cent below the average for 1972, 9.6 per cent below the average for 1973, and 17.1 per cent below the average for 1974.[33] For higher wage categories, of course, the deterioration was still greater.

### (3) EFFECTS ON BUSINESS: PROFITS

Businessmen began to complain about deteriorating profits shortly after the inception of the Social Pact. Their complaints were not unfounded. An examination of quarterly profit data on forty firms listed on the Buenos Aires stock exchange revealed an adverse trend throughout the first year of the Social Pact. Twenty-five of the firms are considered to be large-scale and fifteen medium-scale; the results were similar for both.

Profits apparently began to decline in the period immediately following the signing of the pact. In the third quarter of 1973, operating profits of the twenty-five large-scale firms fell from 138.8 million to 15.6

[31] This refers to "the average of the single wage earner and the married wage earner with a typical family." It is based on data of FIEL and cited in *Mercado*, June 20, 1974, p. 14.

[32] Data from April 1974 to August 1974 are from *Mercado* (various issues), and refer to "the average of the single wage earner and the married wage earner with a typical family." Subsequent data are from *Carta Política* (various issues), and refer to the single common laborer (*peón*).

[33] *La Nación* (international edition), June 16, 1975, p. 6.

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million pesos in comparison with the comparable quarter of 1972; the average profit margin (profits as a percentage of total sales) fell from 5.6 to 0.4 per cent. For the fifteen medium-scale firms, operating profits fell from 22.3 million to 4.4 million pesos, and the average profit margin fell from 5.8 to 0.8 per cent. Moreover, profits declined despite greatly increased sales stimulated by the consumptionist and distributionist tendencies of the Social Pact.[34]

The picture was similar in subsequent quarters, and the issue of business profits became particularly acute in the first quarter of 1974, that is, in the final months of the period of frozen prices and before the initiation of the period of "flexibilization" announced in April. In that quarter, operating losses of the twenty-five large firms were 78.7 million pesos, and the average profit margin was a *negative* 1.9 per cent. Operating losses of the fifteen medium-size firms were 21.0 million pesos, and their average profit margin was a *negative* 3.3 per cent. Twenty-six of the forty firms in the sample showed operating losses for the quarter.[35]

Complaints about the level of profits were somewhat less frequent in late 1974 and early 1975. After a new "economic team" assumed office in November 1974, a more "realistic" economic policy was announced. One of the features of the new realism was to permit the transferal of much recent cost (including labor cost) increases to prices —which became one of the reasons for the burgeoning inflation rate of December 1974, and the following months. Finally, a renewed price freeze was imposed—a decision that met with a bitter denunciation by the CGE. Recalling the profit situation that had prevailed during the first year of the Social Pact, the president of the organization greeted the new price freeze with "astonishment and indignation," argued that it created "confusion and uncertainty" among businessmen, and concluded that it would upset the investment and production plans of many firms.[36]

### (4) EFFECTS ON BUSINESS: INVESTMENT

The Social Pact is alleged to have had adverse effects on private investment, particularly in 1974. It is difficult to demonstrate an unambiguous relationship between the Social Pact and investment levels, because investment plans are not solely determined by anticipated or actual

[34] All data in this paragraph are from *Mercado*, January 3, 1974, p. 33.
[35] *Mercado*, August 15, 1974, pp. 25, 26.
[36] On these recent developments, see *La Nación* (international edition), March 10, 1975, p. 5.

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profit rates. The political climate, the existence of excess capacity, differences in sectoral demand, and the planned introduction of new products all play a role.[37]

Nevertheless, a decline in private investment does seem to have been one of the results of the Social Pact. A recent survey of 250 industrial firms, representing approximately one-third of total industrial production in Argentina, indicated that industrial investment in construction, machinery, and equipment had declined 32 per cent in 1974 by comparison with the level of 1973. Investment as a percentage of gross sales of these firms was 7.5 per cent in 1972, 6.5 per cent in 1973, and only 4.1 per cent in 1974. Curiously enough, the figures indicate that the drop in investment was greatest in those sectors where the increase in consumption was most pronounced—especially in nondurable consumer goods.[38] The arguments of most businessmen are summarized by a journalistic commentary: "The policy undertaken in 1973 sought to dynamize the economy by stimulating consumption, in accordance with the principle that under normal conditions the expansion of demand constitutes an essential stimulus for investment. Reality demonstrated that if the increased demand is brought about by drastically diminishing the profits of firms, an opposite reaction is produced—conditioning investment decisions and arresting the stimulus of greater consumption."[39]

### (5) EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE STATE

The interest of the Argentine state in the Social Pact was more than strictly economic. But in economic terms, the state certainly did not benefit from the shortages of basic commodities, the operating deficits of state corporations, the decline of investment levels, the black market in commodities and dollars, and so forth. Perhaps the best indicator of the state's economic problems during the period is the fact that the budgetary deficit and the consequent amount of deficit financing increased greatly as a result of the periodic wage increases. The deficit of the national treasury in 1974 was 43.2 per cent greater in constant pesos than the deficit in 1973. The Central Bank financed 88 per cent of the 1974 deficit, compared to 78 per cent in 1973. The increase in budgetary disequilibrium, moreover, was largely attributable to current (as opposed to capital) expenses. Current outlays increased 55.6 per cent,

[37] *Mercado*, August 22, 1974, p. 15.
[38] The survey was conducted by FIEL; the results were reported in *La Nación* (international edition), May 26, 1975, p. 6.
[39] *Ibid.*

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while capital outlays increased only 6.2 per cent.[40] When the budgetary deficit is computed as a percentage of gross domestic product, the figures show an alarming rise in 1973 and 1974. In 1973, the deficit was 5.2 per cent of gross domestic product; in 1974, it was 5.6 per cent. In 1972, it had only been 2.0 per cent, and in the halcyon years of the military government (1967 to 1969) only 1.7, 0.7, and 0.6 per cent, respectively.[41] The tendency toward deficits continued in the first months of 1975: the deficit for February 1975 was 63.6 per cent greater in constant pesos than that for February 1974; deficit financing by the Central Bank was up 6.4 per cent in this period.[42]

By early 1975, familiar demands were heard in Argentina: that the state adopt an austerity budget, that the Central Bank stop its inflationary financing of budget deficits, that the state enterprises sharply improve their productivity, and so forth. An "emergency economic plan" was drafted, but debate over the plan's implementation brought down another Minister of Economy.[43]

### (6) EFFECTS ON THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

The role of agriculture in Argentine economic development had been a highly conflictual issue during the first Peronist governments, and has remained so ever since. One observer refers to Peronist "agricultural policy debacles";[44] another states that "during 1945-55, domestic policies further depressed the outlook for rural activities producing exportables."[45] Agricultural pricing policy, the freezing of tenancy contracts, and the lack of investment in agricultural technology were all matters of great political debate. The Peronist governments, however, did not attempt anything resembling a thoroughgoing agrarian reform.

The principal agricultural interest groups were not signatories to the Social Pact, but in August 1973, the government concluded an "Act of Commitment With the Countryside." This agreement, signed by all but one of the major rural groups, reiterated the government's good intentions toward the agricultural sector and contained clauses promising to increase minimum commodity prices, agricultural credit, and

[40] In real terms, of course, this signified a sharp decline in capital outlays.

[41] Data on the 1974 deficit are from *Carta Política*, No. 16 (February 1975), 31. Data on the proportion of the gross domestic product represented by the deficit are from *Carta Política*, No. 12 (December 1974), 45.

[42] *Carta Política* (fn. 29), 39.

[43] See the reports in *La Nación* (international edition), May 26, 1975, p. 1, and June 2, 1975, pp. 1 and 5.

[44] Wynia (fn. 14), 63.

[45] Carlos F. Díaz Alejandro, *Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1970), 206.

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tax incentives. The institutional arm of policy toward the agricultural sector was the National Commission of Concerted Agricultural Policy, composed of representatives of the state and the leading interest groups in the sector. From the start, this commission (a sort of *Gran Paritaria* of the agricultural sector) ran into difficulties. The principal subjects of heated debate concerned the officially established prices of agricultural commodities (many reductions in such prices had occurred concomitant with the announcement of the Social Pact) and the planned introduction of a scheme designed to tax "potential productivity." Fears were also frequently expressed with regard to the draft of an agrarian reform bill providing for the expropriation of unutilized properties, although plans for agrarian reform were specifically disavowed by the Minister of Agriculture.[46]

Data on the level of agricultural prices do seem to show some justification for complaints. In 1974, for example, the ratio of agricultural to nonagricultural wholesale prices fell to 106.0, from 120.7 in 1973 (1960 = 100). Perhaps more relevant in terms of the Social Pact is the relation between prices received and prices paid (for agricultural inputs) by the agricultural sector. The ratio of agricultural wholesale prices to the general level of prices paid by farmers fell from 129.9 in May 1973 (commencement of the Social Pact) to 93.3 in October 1974 (the last month for which these types of data are available).[47] Furthermore, the ratio of wholesale prices of agricultural products to nonagricultural products fell 21.5 per cent between March 1974 and March 1975.[48] It is interesting to note, however, that gross agricultural production actually increased 9.3 per cent in 1974 over the total for 1973.[49]

Gary W. Wynia estimated that the success of the Social Pact would depend in large part on the Peronists' "capacity to satisfy and sustain labor's support while at the same time resisting the temptation to extract high costs from the rural and industrial sectors."[50] In the case

[46] See the interview with Horacio Giberti, Minister of Agriculture, in *La Opinión*, August 10, 1974, pp. 12-13.

[47] *Carta Política*, No. 13 (December 1974), 39, 45.

[48] *Carta Política*, No. 22 (May 1975), 34.

[49] *Carta Política*, No. 19 (March 1975), 43. This indicates the validity of Díaz Alejandro's observation: "the correlation between aggregate rural output and the overall rural terms of trade is not a close one, and the apparent price elasticities that emerge are generally low and/or statistically insignificant. Although prices no doubt influenced producers by affecting their expectations about future rates of return in farming, they cannot provide the whole answer to the question of rural stagnation." Díaz Alejandro (fn. 45), 169, 171.

[50] Wynia (fn. 14), 63.

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of the agricultural sector, it was clear by mid-1974 that the principal interest groups in the sector (with the possible exception of the Argentine Agrarian Federation, an affiliate of the CGE) felt that this temptation had not been resisted.

### (7) DID EVERYONE LOSE, DID ANYONE GAIN? INTENDED AND UNINTENDED BENEFICIARIES, PARADOXES, AND CONTRADICTIONS OF THE SOCIAL PACT

With wages rising and prices frozen, it would appear that firms in which labor costs are a relatively large percentage of total costs would—*ceteris paribus*—suffer. Such firms in Argentina tend to be those of small- and medium-scale industrialists, those in the interior of the country, and those that are technologically less advanced. If labor costs were a greater percentage of total costs, these firms would appear to be disadvantaged by the Social Pact—an apparent contradiction, given their support for the Peronist government and their representation by the CGE. Actually, an effective control of the prices of such firms simply was not instituted. More effective price monitoring took place with regard to the largest, most technologically advanced firms. In early September 1974, for example, the Commerce Secretariat, in announcing new rules for price policy, required the 426 leading firms to solicit the explicit authorization of the secretariat when contemplating price increases, but no such provision applied to smaller firms.[51] The relative distribution of benefits and burdens was not solely determined by factor intensities and changes in factor costs. It had as much to do with the extent to which different firms could evade official regulations. A redistribution of income took place—from firms which had to comply with such regulations to firms which did not have to comply. This aspect of the redistribution may have been in accord with the interests of firms supportive of Perón.

Similar considerations obtained in the labor sector. The substantial increases appeared to benefit the poorer, less organized workers more than the relatively well-off, better organized workers who formed the backbone of the Peronist movement. But such organized workers were often able to negotiate wage increases with individual employers outside the context of the Social Pact. Although this was not supposed to happen, it did occur with some frequency. The average "voluntary" increase of wages was estimated at 10 per cent between November 1, 1974 and February 1, 1975—a period during which wages were theoretically frozen. The workers most favored by these "voluntary" agree-

[51] *La Nación*, September 7, 1974, p. 1.

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ments were those in the textile, chemical, petrochemical, metallurgical, and paper industries.[52]

The sorting out of the distributional benefits and burdens of the Social Pact thus becomes extremely difficult. For an individual firm, or for a group of firms in the same branch of industry, the balance would seem to have depended on: the proportion of labor costs in its total costs; the number of "voluntary" agreements it entered into; whether the firm could effectively evade the regulations of the Commerce Secretariat; the proportion of imported inputs to total inputs; whether the firm was a net importer or net exporter; whether the firm could sell its goods on the black market; and so forth. It seems unlikely that some clear *political* meaning can be established on the basis of this thicket of possible variables. For example, it is difficult to confirm that Perón intended some specific group of firms to suffer and therefore they suffered, or that he clearly intended some other group to benefit and therefore they benefitted. Certainly not all chambers of the CGE were happy with the Social Pact, nor were all chambers of the UIA unhappy with it. In an analysis of tangible benefits and beneficiaries of the Social Pact, it is possible to speak only of tendencies. The less skilled, less well-paid workers tended to benefit; much small- and medium-scale industry tended to benefit; exporters tended to benefit; commercial intermediaries tended to benefit. Attempts to speak with quantitative precision on the extent of such benefits are fraught with difficulties. Furthermore—and this is the really important point—the benefits stemming from the Social Pact were by no means limited to tangible gains measurable by the tools of economic analysis. The conferral of symbolic rewards, the significant (even if only temporary) amelioration of class conflict, and the political gains accruing to the Argentine state were as important as any calculus of purely economic winners and losers.

## Some Political Lessons and Meanings of the Social Pact

The analysis of the Social Pact provides material for the elaboration of important themes in the study of comparative politics, because the political meanings of the Social Pact transcend a recitation of its economic effects on the principal actors in the Argentine economy. The study of the Social Pact illustrates some of the characteristics of "populist" governments. It emphasizes the necessity of viewing any governmental attempts at social control (e.g., wage-price schemes, national

[52] *La Nación* (international edition), March 3, 1975, p. 6.

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planning) in their sociopolitical contexts. It also raises some central points concerning the relations between private and public holders of power in different political systems. Moreover, it is an excellent illustration of the symbolic nature of many political activities and decisions. And, finally, it provides some insights into characteristics of Argentine politics that may be of comparative relevance to other countries undergoing the trials of inflation in the context of a relatively "modernized" society.[53]

### (1) POPULISM AND ITS EXPLANATIONS FOR INFLATION

According to official governmental explanations, the principal culprits responsible for the renewed inflation were speculators and intermediaries. That may be expected of a "national popular" government.[54] It is characteristic of such governments to denounce (a) the hostility of the external world as a cause of economic stagnation and (b) speculation and excessive intermediation as the causes of inflation.[55] According to Angus Stewart, "the 'solutions' offered by populism frequently depict the stress situations in which the movement's followers find themselves as arising from conspiracies of one sort or another."[56] Much of this scapegoating is a functional necessity for populist movements, since "populism avoids class war in the Marxist sense,"[57] and "populism has emerged when ideologies and movements which more directly confront industrialization and its consequences have come to be regarded as alien or inappropriate or both."[58]

In his last public speeches (delivered on June 12, 1974), Perón analyzed developments pertaining to the Social Pact from such a populist perspective. He attributed the principal problems associated with the pact to "irresponsible minorities," "speculators," and "government officials who have violated the agreement." Other factors seen as ob-

[53] For a lengthy discussion of this question with reference to Argentina, see O'Donnell (fn. 1).

[54] Gino Germani, the noted Argentine sociologist, explains: "If I have called Peronism a populist movement (*a national popular movement*, to be more precise), this is because it was made possible and acquired its peculiar form through an implicit 'class alliance' between workers and the new industrialists, with the participation of a political leadership of distinct origins—including many fascists—which locates Peronism in a category eminently different from that of parties of the 'working class' as these are commonly conceived." Germani, "El Surgimiento del Peronismo: el Rol de los Obreros y de los Migrantes Internos," *Desarrollo Económico*, XIII (October-December 1973), 446; italics in original.

[55] Diamand (fn. 24), 16.

[56] Angus Stewart, "The Social Roots," in Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, eds., *Populism* (New York: Macmillan 1969), 192.

[57] P. J. D. Wiles, "A Syndrome, Not a Doctrine: Some Elementary Theses on Populism," *ibid.*, 167.

[58] Stewart, *ibid.*, 181.

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structing the task of national reconstruction were "bastardly personal interests," "incomprehensible sectarianisms," and "sabotage by pigmies." In general, there existed "a psychological campaign of the negative elements of [Argentine] nationality, allied with foreign interests engaged in annulling the 'take-off' of Argentina. . . ."[59] Similarly, the government's economic team placed the blame for the renewal of economic problems on "the violation of the Social Pact by small dissident groups and by unscrupulous businessmen who want to push the entire socioeconomic plan toward the abyss." Those hindering the fulfillment of the Social Pact were classified as "enemies of the workers" and "enemies of democracy."[60]

What is missing in these Peronist explanations of the failure of the Social Pact is what one would expect to be missing, given populism's attempts to paper over class antagonisms: an acknowledged awareness of the social and political context of the Social Pact and, in particular, of the structure of Argentine class relations into which it was inserted. Such a structural focus takes explanations of the ultimate failure of the Social Pact (and Argentine economic policy in general) beyond the realm of scapegoating and the search for hidden, ill-defined enemies. In the view of Oscar Braun, an Argentine economist, all of the measures of the Peronist government demonstrated weaknesses which can be explained by the analysis of four or five basic contradictions. This means that "[Argentine] economic policy is nothing more than a mechanism for stopping, as rapidly as possible, the immediate tensions which arise; i.e., the economic plan is no longer coherent and is transformed into something akin to a group of firemen which go to put out the fire wherever they are needed."[61] The evolution of the Social Pact certainly had much of this quality. What, then, are the tensions and contradictions which may help to account for the failure of the Social Pact more adequately than the explanations offered by Peronist demonology?

First, the state cannot extract too much economic surplus from domestic capitalists; this situation conflicts with the investment demands of the long-term growth strategy (as embodied in the Peronist three-year plan). Second, the large landowners cannot be attacked severely,

[59] *Mercado*, June 20, 1974, pp. 48-49.

[60] "Declaración del Equipo Económico," *ibid.*, 52.

[61] Oscar Braun, *El Plan Económico del Gobierno Popular* (Buenos Aires: Editorial El Coloquio 1974), 39, 36. Braun is referring to the post-Ongañía experience, and particularly to the government of General Alejandro Lanusse, but his subsequent analysis of contradictions in the Peronist movement makes it apparent that his observations apply to Peronist economic policy as well.

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for they have great influence over two crucial variables—the balance of payments (through agricultural exports) and the level of real wages (through the impact of food supplies on food prices). Third, the tenuous relations between the "national bourgeoisie" and the working class are well illustrated during the evolution of the Social Pact in the frequent debates about the level of real wages and the profit situation of businessmen. Finally, Braun argues that the government had "a mountain of political debts to pay" in a situation in which the inability or unwillingness to attack the interests of the capitalists and the landowners worked against the required accumulation to pay them.[62]

Seen in this light, the failure of the Social Pact speaks to an important theme in the study of Argentine politics: the relative weakness of state authorities vis-à-vis the holders of private power. Persistent pressure by landowners ultimately led to the abandonment of an agrarian reform project, the moderation of projected increases in agricultural taxes, and increases in beef prices and other consumer staples. Such pressure from organized labor led to accessions to union wage demands that outran productivity considerations, and to modifications of working conditions that increased business costs (such as those contained in the new labor law). Such pressure from organized business led to price increases at variance with the initial terms of the Social Pact, the granting of concessionary loans to finance increased labor costs, and the authorizing of imports deemed critical by businessmen. None of these concessions would have been inevitable in more "state-centric" systems (e.g., Brazil), but Argentina was an example of a political system in which "policy-making, instead of being a calculated act of selection designed to exert rational control within feasible limits over known problems, becomes an act of coping and experimentation designed first of all to ensure survival in the face of threatening forces of unknown magnitudes. . . ."[63]

The Social Pact, that is, floundered not only for valid economic reasons such as the international inflation and its repercussions in Argentina. It also floundered because of the heterogeneity of its social support, the translation of such heterogeneity into seemingly contradictory policies, and the debility of even the Peronist Argentine state in the face of private demands. No important social sector in Argentina was

[62] *Ibid.*, 43-49.

[63] Philippe C. Schmitter, "Notes Toward a Political Economic Conceptualization of Policy-Making in Latin America," paper delivered at the Conference on Public Policy and Its Impact in Latin America, Buenos Aires, August 12-17, 1974, p. 57. The conference was sponsored by the Social Science Research Council and the Center for Research in Public Administration (CIAP).

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willing to pay the price of redistribution or the cost of economic growth, and the state was unwilling (or unable) to force them to pay. These facts, rather than the machinations of speculators, account for the demise of the Social Pact, as they also account for many of the previous failures of Argentine stabilization policy.[64]

The Social Pact thus illustrates the danger of making overly generalized arguments about the "failure" of governmental attempts at social control such as wage-price schemes or national economic planning.[65] Judgments about such governmental interference with the "normal" functioning of the economy cannot be rendered without consideration of questions regarding the nature and exercise of state power. The power of state authorities, their capacity to define state goals, and the means at their disposal for pursuing them—these obviously differ from country to country. This apparently elementary point is often overlooked in examinations of the state's economic role. In the United States, given the nature of the state and the existence of numerous strongholds of private power, it should come as no surprise that governmental attempts at wage-price controls or national programs of social engineering would "fail." Nor is it a surprise that the wage-price scheme embodied in the Social Pact "failed" in "non-state-centric" Argentina.[66]

But these observations do not mean that *all* such attempts, anywhere and everywhere, are doomed to failure. In Argentina, there were profound obstacles to "Brazilianization," i.e., to the fashioning of a bureaucratic-authoritarian system that would break the stalemate of forces in civil society and the consequent immobilization of the state. One analyst of Argentine class relations has pointed to the "enormous political veto power" of private socioeconomic groups in Argentina; this veto power was a substantial impediment to an Argentine replication of Brazilian authoritarianism and the "Brazilian economic miracle."[67] It was also a common theme in the evolution of the Social Pact. At the same time, such groups in Argentina do not possess sufficient power

[64] For a general discussion of several previous stabilization schemes, see Wynia (fn. 14). Also see Aldo Ferrer and others, *Los Planes de Estabilización en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos 1974).

[65] For an example of such arguments, see Aaron Wildavsky, "If Planning is Everything, Maybe it's Nothing," *Policy Sciences*, IV (June 1973), 127-53.

[66] By a "non-state-centric" system, I mean one in which "civil society"—private actors, intermediary interest associations, and so forth—is dominant, such that the primary role of the state is to react and respond to the demands and supports emanating from the civil sphere. A "state-centric" system is one in which the state retains the primary policy initiative. For a lengthier and provocative discussion of these matters, see Schmitter (fn. 63), 40 ff.

[67] Juan Carlos Portantiero, "Clases Dominantes y Crisis Política en la Argentina Actual," in Oscar Braun, ed., *El Capitalismo Argentino en Crisis* (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno 1973), 106.

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to impose a "project" of their own. Perón's Social Pact tried to accommodate itself to these features of Argentine class relations and the historical role of the Argentine state. From one perspective, this accommodation may be seen as the brilliant design of a policy instrument appropriate to Argentine politics and society. From another, it may be seen as an utter failure, precisely because of its accommodationist nature and its seeming unwillingness to deprive any important group of power and status.[68]

### (2) SOME SYMBOLIC MEANINGS OF THE SOCIAL PACT

From the foregoing, it follows that the Argentine experience with the Social Pact cannot be adequately analyzed only from the standpoint of its *economic* successes or failures. The *symbolic* significance of the Social Pact also requires emphasis. Much of the meaning of the Social Pact is best understood in terms of political symbols, political ritualization, and the latent functions of collective bargaining and industrial relations decision making. The Social Pact may be interpreted as an almost classic example of political ritualization, if what is meant by ritual is "a set of stylized procedures that both signal aggression and reassure both sides that it will be held within acceptable limits. . . ." Ritualization "involves a tacit agreement regarding the terms of value allocations, rationalized in terms of the public interest through formal, and essentially banal, procedures and routines." Abstract and ritualized conflict serves to "immobilize large groups of people who might otherwise be expected to use their political resources in common for an instrumental objective."[69]

An interpretation of the Social Pact in these terms takes one closer to its real significance. Perón inherited a conflict-ridden society in which divergent attitudes toward Peronism were one source of the conflict. The Social Pact provided Perón with a symbolic instrument of legitimation. It enabled him to pose as the unifying leader in a society where such leaders had been notoriously absent. It also enabled him to cloak a tangible payoff to his most important constituency—the redistribution of income to the wage earners—in the mantle of "national interest." Opposition to the Social Pact was made difficult initially because it contravened the basic policy instrument of the new consensual Argentina and conspired against the task of "national liberation and

[68] That has certainly been the standard leftist critique of the Social Pact. Curiously enough, it could just as easily be a rightist critique addressed to the failure to control labor's demands.

[69] Murray Edelman, *Politics as Symbolic Action* (Chicago: Markham 1971), 142, 176, 177, 23.

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reconstruction." The Social Pact also served, therefore, as an instrument of demobilization. Most notably, it demobilized the forces of "combative unionism," i.e., those segments of the Argentine labor movement which were moving in a Marxist direction, toward the increased polarization of worker-owner struggles, and toward claims on economic resources which could not be satisfied without profound alterations in the structure of the Argentine economy and society. Such labor leaders were deprived of legitimacy by the "corporatist" tendencies of the Social Pact. The loyalty of the CGE was maintained for longer than might have been expected in view of the apparent discrepancy between its support and the adverse effects of the pact upon business profits and investment. In the words of a leading Argentine businessman, "better a lower profit rate than the People's Revolutionary Army!"[70]

These functions of the Social Pact helped Perón to achieve one of his principal objectives: to avoid the "Allende effect." (Perón took office on October 12, 1973; Allende had only recently been overthrown, on September 11, 1973.) The Allende approach to income redistribution had been overtly confrontational. Workers' incomes were to make rapid gains at the direct expense of industrial monopolists and rural latifundists. Allende, in a remark frequently quoted by his political opposition, had contended that he was not the president of all Chileans.[71] Such exclusivism was to be expected in a Marxist president and a Marxist political movement, but it was not part of Peronism in 1973. As Perón proclaimed in one of his last official discourses: "I returned to the country to unite Argentines and not to foment disunion among them."[72] The principal instrument of such unification was the Social Pact and the whole style of economic policy making that goes by the name of "*política de concertación*." It may have been irrational from a strictly economic point of view, and much of it could not have been expected to survive Perón's death, but it was also an excellent illustration of "symbolic leadership," of "a dramaturgical performance emphasizing the traits popularly associated with leadership: forcefulness, responsibility, courage, decency, and so on."[73]

The Social Pact, in short, resembled some aspects of collective bargaining in the industrialized countries, a major function of which is

[70] Interview with a president of one of the principal chambers of the UIA, October 16, 1974.
[71] *El Mercurio* (international edition), February 1-7, 1971, p. 1.
[72] *Mercado*, June 20, 1974, p. 48.
[73] Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1964), 81.

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"to provide a ritual which must be acted out as a prerequisite for the quiescent acceptance of higher prices and higher wages by those not directly involved."[74] The diversified array of pressures brought to bear upon the Social Pact ultimately spelled its undoing, but this does not detract from some of its initial successes at demobilization and symbolic consensus building. Given the contours of the traditional economic debate in Argentina, the employment of resources by the major economic interest groups, and the bitter legacy of economic conflict, what is perhaps noteworthy is that the "*política de concertación*" lasted as long as it did.

### (3) THE CO-OPTATIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE SOCIAL PACT

It may also be said of the Social Pact that it facilitated the merger of the UIA and the General Industrial Confederation (CGI). This merger, resulting in the National Confederation of Argentine Industry (CINA), marked an important change in the configuration of business interest groups in Argentina, for the two organizations had previously been intense rivals.

Interpretations of the merger are many and various. According to some, there have been genuine changes in the composition and ideology of the UIA. One observer of business groups argued that "since 1958, we have witnessed the lineal increase of contradictions within the entrepreneurial groups. At some point, the multinationals were displaced from UIA leadership in favor of the large national firms."[75] In another account, the UIA was said to be "the only one which changed its position—from liberal to nationalist."[76] A more prevalent view relates the development to pragmatism on the part of the UIA. An official of the UIA, for example, told a prominent Argentine economist that the merger was simply a marriage of convenience on the part of the organization, a device to gain access to power in the present context.[77] The "present context" was that of the Social Pact, which had legitimated the CGE as the sole representative of the industrialists. In the *Gran Paritaria*, in the tripartite sectoral commissions organized under CONAPRIN, and in CONAPRIN itself, it was the CGE (and not the UIA) that shared representation with the state and the CGT. This

[74] *Ibid.*, 60.

[75] Interview, September 30, 1974, with Roberto Martínez Nogueyra, staff member of the recently created National Institute of Public Administration (INAP) and former subsecretary (1970–1971) of CONADE, the Argentine national planning office.

[76] *La Opinión*, August 3, 1974, p. 20.

[77] Interview, September 20, 1974, with Javier Villanueva, staff member of the Centro de Investigaciones Económicas of the Instituto Torcuato di Tella, and a former secretary (1971) of CONADE.

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restructuring of decision making obliged the UIA to move closer to the CGE, and the eventual merger of the two organizations facilitated Perón's bureaucratic style.[78] According to one observer, Perón viewed his administration as a general staff, in which he as chairman related to several dependent chieftains in different policy-making realms.[79] The role of chieftain of the economic realm was played by José Ber Gelbard, Minister of Economy, and founder and former president of the CGE.

The Social Pact, then, encouraged the merger of the two leading businessmen's associations, compromising both in dependent relations with the bureaucracy and facilitating the Peronist goal of the centralization of economic policy making. The story is completed by noting that the change did not benefit the CGE as much as might be supposed. According to a prominent official in the CGE, the ascension of the Peronist government was not all that advantageous for the organization. Operationally, the CGE was not in power. Most key decisions were allegedly taken by a group of technocrats in the Ministry of Economy who were hostile to the CGE, placing the CGE in the ironical position of being "of the government but not in it."[80] The Social Pact, then, in addition to performing the symbolic functions to which I have alluded, served as an instrument of co-optation. That such co-optation was more successful with regard to business groups than with other interest groups provides another significant generalization about Argentine politics, viz., the relative weakness of business interest associations as compared to organized agriculture and organized labor.

### (4) THE SOCIAL PACT AND THE LEGITIMATION OF STATE INTERVENTIONISM

The earlier Peronist administrations (1946–1955) had been characterized by manifold state interventions in the Argentine economy. Such interference with free market forces is a common characteristic of "national popular" governments. Under Perón, the Argentine state was involved in the fixing of agricultural prices, the export trade in agricultural commodities, the distribution of cheap credits to national industries, the nationalization of banking deposits, the granting of wage bonuses to workers, the manipulation of a complex multiple exchange rate system, and so forth. Such interventionism performed some valid economic functions; for instance, the significant redistribution of in-

[78] It should be noted, however, that Perón's death intervened before the merger.
[79] Interview with Villanueva (fn. 77).
[80] Interview, October 4, 1974, with Marcelo Diamand, President of the Chamber of Producers of Household Goods, an affiliate of the CGE.

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come which accompanied the early Peronist years is unlikely to have resulted from the unfettered operation of free market forces. It also served the important *political* function of building the Peronist political edifice. There is no doubt that Peronist interventionism was accompanied by much arbitrariness, corruption, favoritism, inefficiency, and irrationality (from an economic point of view). The apparent excesses of Peronist interventionism enabled the proponents of liberal orthodoxy to question the entire rationale of such state participation in economic decision making, and to blame excessive state intervention for budgetary deficits, inflation, the low national savings rate, and so forth.

When Perón returned to govern Argentina in 1973, the country was emerging from seven years of essentially "liberal orthodox" policies.[81] The adverse effects of these policies (such as "denationalization" of much of the economy and increasingly regressive income distribution) were widely perceived, but the legacy of Peronist excesses in the economy was by no means a dead issue. Under such conditions, it was necessary to legitimize (or relegitimize) the need for renewed state intervention. This was done by linking the need for such intervention to two other principal tenets of the political economy of Peronism—economic independence and a more egalitarian distribution of income. State control of beef and grain exports, stricter state controls on foreign investment, and state commercial agreements with socialist-bloc countries were legitimized on the grounds that such state involvement reduced Argentina's external "dependency" and increased the economic independence of the country. In the domestic realm, such involvement was legitimized by the Social Pact with its professed aims of more egalitarian income distribution and the promotion of economic stability (and, ultimately, economic growth). In its relations with the external world, Argentina required "national liberation." Domestically, it required "national reconstruction." The key to both was greater state control of economic activity, but such control had to be legitimized and separated from its connotation of political meddling. The Social Pact—with the national-interest language and symbolism of the initial document, with the stylized meetings of the *Gran Paritaria*, with all the elaborate (if perhaps bogus) calculations of "real" wages and "real" profit rates, with its cultivation of the image of a strong state guarding workers and owners alike from selfish speculators—was an instrument of such legitimation.

[81] For a highly useful discussion of the economic ideology of "liberal orthodoxy," see Diamand (fn. 24), chap. 1. Also see O'Donnell (fn. 1), chap. III.

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## An Evaluation of the Social Pact

From some points of view, the Social Pact was a failure. It did not succeed in containing Argentina's notorious inflation, except for a period of a few months, and then in a highly arbitrary fashion. It also seems incontestable that the pact had adverse effects on private investment and business profits. These were translated into supply difficulties, shortages, and a burgeoning black market. If they had been allowed to continue, such developments would have had serious consequences for long-term economic growth in Argentina. Workers undoubtedly fared better than businessmen in some overall assessment of the effects of the Social Pact, but substantial gains were confined mostly to the lowest-paid laborers. The effects on agriculture were generally seen as negative by the principal interest associations in that sector. The state's economic position, as measured chiefly by the size of the budget deficit, did not emerge unscathed either.

But, as I have argued, that is not the whole story of the Social Pact. In the first place, some of the failures commonly associated with the Social Pact have also been present in other experiences with anti-inflationary policy in Argentina; therefore, to compare the Social Pact with some other set of successful policies is to compare it with a strawman. Other major economic policy initiatives in postwar Argentina, in addition to their eventual demise in purely economic terms, were generally political disasters as well. The same cannot be said so unambiguously of the Social Pact. It was replete with meanings that could not be grasped from a strictly economic perspective. Since the Social Pact was relatively successful in stylizing economic conflict, in demobilizing the forces of combative unionism, in equating Peronist policy emphases with the national interest, in co-opting the CGE on behalf of policies from which it did not manifestly benefit, in legitimating the interventionist tendencies of Peronist political economy, it turns out that a summary judgment on the overall "success" or "failure" of the pact cannot be a simple verdict.

Upon the formal termination of the Social Pact in late June 1975, the Argentine economy faced a highly uncertain future. The renewal of collective bargaining produced no easy agreements on wage demands in key economic sectors. The inflation rate showed no promise of falling to even tolerable levels. A new crisis in the foreign sector—long crucial in Argentine economic performance—threatened to send the country into a recessionary tailspin, something that had been totally absent throughout the years of the Social Pact. A governmentally de-

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creed rollback of collectively negotiated wage increases, businessmen's openly avowed fears of a recession and of the application of traditional austerity measures, several large devaluations, the reappearance of workers' street demonstrations, and the possibility of general strikes—all began to sound like a renewal of the earlier, depressing Argentine political-economic scenario. With the reappearance of unmediated economic conflict, the Social Pact may well be evaluated less harshly by those who have been its most vigorous critics.

It is quite possible that the study of the Argentine Social Pact is of considerable comparative significance, though perhaps not for obvious reasons. Based on the apparent economic failures of the Social Pact, the obvious reason would argue that wage-price schemes are inevitably failures, that attempts to intervene with free market forces in the determination of wages and prices are bound to produce more harm than good, and that such attempts are tantamount to resigning a country's economic fate to the arbitrary and capricious whims of bureaucrats. My position has been that such sweeping generalizations are of dubious validity, because the economic consequences of policies like the Social Pact are likely to vary with the nature of the political regime; the success or failure of any social pact could thus be expected to vary accordingly.

But my interest in the comparative significance of the Argentine Social Pact relates to less obvious generalizations. A social pact, as I have attempted to demonstrate, can facilitate scapegoating and the simplistic identification of enemies. It thus assists in avoiding a direct encounter with the root or "structural" causes of a country's economic ailments. Such a device can serve as an instrument of political quiescence and symbolic reassurance, immobilizing potentially troublesome individuals and groups. It provides the leader adept at "symbolic leadership" (Nixon, Perón) with the script for a dramatic performance. It offers the image of action and decisiveness where in fact drift may prevail. It may provide beleaguered governments with room for maneuver, at least for a time. It legitimates governmental economic initiatives in the name of sacrifice and the national interest. Under such conditions, it would not be at all surprising if leaders in other economically troubled countries (such as Great Britain or Italy) had recourse to similar devices. That such devices do not deal with the fundamental causes of "Argentinization," that they do not even "work" economically, may be of decidedly secondary importance to governments whose principal goal may be simply to remain afloat in the troubled waters of economic and social conflict.

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# HYPERMOBILIZATION IN CHILE, 1970–1973

By HENRY A. LANDSBERGER and TIM McDANIEL

## Mobilization, Revolution, and Development

DR. ALLENDE'S death and the violent end of his presidency on September 11, 1973, were tragedies not only in themselves. They were also part of a larger, more complex tragedy as his attempt to lay the foundations for a future socialist society came to a bloody halt. The exact sequence of events and, above all, their causes will surely be discussed for decades to come, just as are those of the Spanish Civil War, with which the Chilean situation had startling parallels.[1]

Major roles in these events were, of course, played by those who always had been—and those who over time came to be—the bitter enemies of the *Unidad Popular* (UP), the coalition of parties of the left whose successful candidate Dr. Allende had been in the 1970 presidential elections.[2] We can take for granted, for purposes of this paper, the role of the regime's internal and external enemies.

The focus of this paper, both descriptively and analytically, is on sectors supposedly supporting the UP. Specifically, it is on labor—both as an aggregate of individuals and in its organized form—as trade unions and a constituent unit of several political parties. Labor, al-

[1] Reputedly, this ominous parallel was recognized by Chilean intellectuals of the left months before the coup. Largo Caballero's role in pulling the Spanish Socialists away from a moderate stand toward left extremism, thereby helping to polarize the political situation, was played, in Chile, by Carlos Altamirano, General Secretary of the Socialist Party (PS). The unnecessary alienation of small landholding peasants in Spain (see Edward Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain* [New Haven: Yale University Press 1970]) had a direct parallel in Chile. It also had a broader one in the sense that in Chile the entire bourgeoisie was alienated at a time when, according to Marxist analysis, the working class did not yet have enough power by itself to implement Dr. Allende's program. For a frank appraisal of the errors of "petit bourgeoisie ultra leftism," see the analysis by Rene Castillo (the *nom de plume* of a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Chile), "Chile: Ensenanzas y Perspectivas de la Revolución" (Prague: Editorial Internacional Paz y Socialismo 1974).

[2] *Unidad Popular* could be translated, awkwardly, as "Popular Unity." The more graceful "Popular Front" cannot be used because in 1938, a coalition with that exact name came to power. In both 1970 and 1938 the Socialist and Communist Parties were key elements in these coalitions. But in 1938 they were overshadowed by the Radical Party, whereas in 1970 the much-diminished Radical Party was but one of several minor members of the coalition. The doctrinal position of the Socialist Party in 1970, although it covered a wide range, was on the whole distinctly to the left of the Communist Party (PC). Dr. Allende, a Socialist, was for the most part right-of-center of his party, i.e., relatively close to the Communists; he was accepted as a presidential candidate with considerable reluctance by his own party, and with much greater alacrity by the PC.

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though in a broad and vague sense basically in favor of the kinds of objectives and policies pursued by the UP, played an important part in aggravating the mounting difficulties which Dr. Allende's government faced almost from the very beginning of his presidency. These difficulties were only briefly obscured by the successes of his first year in power. While the UP's desire may have been to be "the government of the workers,"[3] some of the ways in which the workers responded presented the government with severe problems. It is the aim of this paper to undertake a preliminary analysis of what these working-class responses to the UP government were; what their causes and consequences were; and to place this analysis of one country into a much broader perspective.

An analysis of the role of the working class in Chile before September 11, 1973, raises several critical issues. One set of issues views the working class statically, and inquires into the nature of working-class consciousness and unity at certain stages of development. Put more dramatically, we ask whether "the working class" can be said to exist as a unified actor at all. More specifically, to what degree and on what issues can working-class consciousness be described as "revolutionary" or "radical"?

Our thesis will be that—unfortunately for the UP's policies—the Chilean working class was not united behind *any* ideological position and that it certainly was not, in so far as an "average" can be struck, very revolutionary. And this despite the fact that the Chilean working class, as we shall see below, was an exceptionally politicized and, in that sense, mature one for an "underdeveloped" country. Similarly, in 1918, the German working class may have been an exceptionally knowledgeable and experienced one in comparison with those of other, then *developed*, countries—the working classes of France, Britain, the United States. It was therefore of exceptional analytical and practical importance that the German working class failed to be either sufficiently united or radical to put itself massively behind the revolutionary attempts of December 1918 to January 1919. Lenin and the Russian Communist Party took years to assimilate this fact, if they ever did.

And so, too, is it of exceptional significance for the analysis of the *underdeveloped* countries that a working class as relatively mature as the Chilean, showed itself—on the key issues on which it mattered most in practical terms, such as productivity—to be so unsupportive of

[3] This phrase and others similar to it were frequently used by high officials of the government. An example may be found in Gonzalo Martner, ed., *El pensamiento del gobierno de Allende* (Santiago: Editorial Universitario 1971), 119.

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its own (relatively moderate) government. Nor was it any more united behind a more extreme, revolutionary alternative available to it. (The role of the "revolution-now" *Spartakists* who, in the Germany of 1918–1919, were highly critical of the German Social Democrats, was played in Chile by the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the MIR, which was highly critical of Dr. Allende and the UP government, regarding them as merely reformist.)

Marxist thought, beginning with Marx himself, displays a peculiar duality in its assessment of the unity and revolutionary potential of the working class. On the one hand, it is one of the basic tenets of Marxism, and certainly of the "Young Marx," that the working class—symbolizing in its most extreme form the alienation in fact suffered in varying degrees by all humanity—will come to a clear revolutionary consciousness of the state of society. Yet the later Marx certainly was fully aware that parts, or even the entirety, of the working class of one or another country failed to move in the direction of a truly Marxian understanding of the situation. This was true, at one end of the spectrum, of the backward Spanish working class, partly seduced by Bakuninist anarchism. It was true also, at the other extreme, of the highly advanced British (and American) working classes, bourgeoisified by prosperity, and split by ethnic and racial divisions (in the case of Britain, the presence of Irish laborers).

Precisely in order to prevent the working class from losing its way, Lenin and his followers emphasized the role of the Communist Party in indoctrinating and orienting the working class in backward countries, in which—rather than in the metropolitan countries themselves—imperialist exploitation was now seen as most likely to produce a revolutionary crisis. Thus, while Lenin continued to accord the working classes (and, increasingly, the peasantry) of developing countries a key role in any revolution, he was more systematically aware than Marx had been that this role would be played only if the working classes were properly guided. With such guidance, however, the outcome still seemed secure to Lenin.

More recent non-Marxist radicals have reverted *de facto* to Marx's more straightforwardly optimistic assessment. Left-wing Catholics such as the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire appear to be guided by the assumption that "conscientization," and the mobilization of the poor in all its forms, will lead to relatively unproblematic support by the lower classes for change-oriented groups and regimes. Many of those seeking moderate changes share the same optimistic premise. For ex-

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ample, Eduardo Frei, the Christian Democratic President who preceded Dr. Allende in the period 1964–1970, argued that:

> the broadening of the electoral base to include youth in the political process, the recognition of the role of unions in the micro- and macro-economic decisions, the new organization of the people into Neighborhood Committees, the creation of mechanisms for participation at various levels of decision of the state, agrarian reform, social promotion, the necessary reform of the constitution to eliminate vices incompatible with the very survival of democracy . . . all these are steps toward real popular participation to preserve our liberty and to promote economic and social progress.[4]

It is our thesis that although this hypothesis may be true in a very broad sense, it neglects to distinguish among the various forms that the mobilization of the underprivileged may take, and therefore the different consequences which it may have. Some of these forms can present severe practical problems even to a government sympathetic to changes favoring the underprivileged, especially when its power for propelling major social changes is limited.

Western social scientists have also been interested in what has been termed the "mobilization" of the lower classes in the developing nations. And although their theoretical orientation has hardly been Marxist, their assessment of the effects of mobilization has shown very much the same wavering between optimism and caution.

Karl W. Deutsch, who introduced the concept "mobilization" into the literature in the early 1960's, saw the process in highly positive terms: an essential prerequisite for modernization. He defined mobilization as "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded . . . and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior . . . including potential or actual involvement in mass politics."[5] He goes on to emphasize the subsequent stage of "new levels of aspirations and wants," in which "actual participation" rises. The process, then, has both a subjective aspect, with increasing economic, political, and cultural aspirations, and a behavioral one: actual attempts to participate, to obtain greater rewards, to share authority, to have more leisure, to behave less respectfully to traditional authority, and to demand more respect.

Of late, however, second thoughts have set in about the benefits of

[4] Frei, *Mensaje del Presidente, May 21, 1969*, Presidencia de la Republica, Santiago, Chile; translations here and elsewhere in this article are the authors'.

[5] Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 55 (September 1961), 493-511; quote from p. 494.

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mass mobilization. Unlike Lenin, who merely wanted to be sure that it was channeled in the right direction, political scientists such as Samuel P. Huntington do not want too high a level of it. Arguing that change requires power, and that power is manifested through strong, effective institutions, Huntington sees mobilization as a threat to effective institutional functioning. The rising expectations which mobilization entails almost by definition imply greater discontent with any given level of institutional performance. And discontent undermines the perceived legitimacy of institutions on which they in part depend for their power. Moreover, participation in its behavioral form is likely to represent a difficult challenge to new, weak, and still not very flexible institutions, resulting in violence, instability, and ineffectiveness.[6]

Latter-day wisdom therefore holds that political change requires some degree of control of mobilization. That this belief is not simply a conservative prejudice is evident from Fidel Castro's remark that in democracies the people "begin trying to satisfy all their needs as quickly as possible. Then, since the tremendous problem is precisely that there are not enough resources to satisfy their needs, since the resources available do not reach far enough, all kinds of conflicts arise."[7]

The foregoing brief review of some perspectives on mobilization leads us to believe that it is a double-edged sword. Its consequences depend not only upon the form it takes, but on the political context in which it operates: it may either support or weaken change-oriented social actors (including organizations). Accordingly, our theoretical task is to suggest conditions under which mobilization may have negative implications for social change in developing countries. Our conclusions must be tentative. We hope that they will nonetheless be of some value, both theoretically and practically.

## The Chilean Background

### I. Working-class institutions: parties and trade unions

If one is to understand the relationship between "labor" and the government of Dr. Allende in the years 1970–1973, one needs to know the historical evolution of the Chilean trade-union movement; the history of the two main parties sustaining the government (the Social-

[6] Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1968).

[7] Castro, "Plan for the Advancement of Latin America" in Paul E. Sigmund, ed., *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations* (New York: Praeger 1963), 262-66; quote from p. 263.

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ists and Communists), which were also the dominant parties in the trade union movement; and the role of the Christian Democrats and Radicals who, while weaker in the labor sector than the Socialists and the Communists, were strong enough to play very important parts. We also insist that "labor" be understood as an aggregate of individuals: trade unions, like parties, do not in any simple sense represent all their members. Opinion surveys and voting statistics can help us determine coincidences as well as divergencies between members and organizations. Such analysis is especially necessary for crisis situations, when the relation between member and organization (be it union or party) is put under particular strain. It is clearly impossible, within the confines of this article, to even attempt a historical summary of these elements.[8] We will limit ourselves to pointing out the most important characteristics of the situation up to 1970, for it is our thesis that the characteristics which had by then evolved into salient ones illuminate many of the difficulties which the UP government encountered in its relationship with labor.

The Chilean trade union movement was both old (dating back to the nineteenth century in one form or another) and mass-based. Angell estimates that by the late sixties, about 30 per cent of the organizable labor force was unionized; as much as 70 per cent in manufacturing establishments with more than 25 workers. The law made organization difficult in smaller plants, so these figures are fairly impressive.[9] As to the political parties of the left, the PC (Communist Party) was formally established in the 1920's, but had precursors earlier; the PS (Socialist Party) was formed in 1932. These two parties, together with the Christian Democrats (PDC) and Radicals (PR), between them represented a very substantial sector of Chilean labor. Thus, in a general sense, Chilean labor was organizationally committed and politically highly conscious.

But it was also divided, and its strength vis-à-vis its opponents was thereby reduced. This division also implied (though this was not foreseen clearly) that no government, not even a friendly one, would ever be able to count on the unified support of labor. Indeed, the fact of division, together with labor's high organizational commitment, implies that opposition within its ranks to the efforts of any one group—extreme left, center left, or center—would be strong and at least partially

[8] This has been done admirably by Alan Angell in his *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile* (London: Oxford University Press 1972).

[9] *Ibid.*, 45-47.

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effective. Not only was there understandable hostility inside the union movement between the representatives of the two old established Marxist parties on the one hand, and, on the other, the recently arrived Christian Democratic Party (PDC), with its very different vision of "the good society" and how to reach it. (The PDC, though founded in 1938, did not acquire a large following until the late fifties.) In addition, there was a long record of feuding (at its height in the 1940's) between the PS and the PC, both in the political-electoral and in the trade union sphere, which is understandable in view of their competition for the same clientele (workers, peasants, intellectuals), as well as in ideological terms. There would be no need for two basically Marxist parties if they did not believe that their differences were difficult to reconcile. Indeed, the Socialist Party itself had always been a heterogeneous collection of ideological (and partly opportunistic) groups, not much subject to party discipline. One of the frequent party splits of its forty-year history played a role in a most embarrassing and costly confrontation between labor and the Allende government: the strike of copper workers in Chuquicamata in March 1972.

Moreover, in terms of "pure" organizational efficiency—i.e., a well-functioning means of formulating policy and implementing it, speed and accuracy of communication, rational division of labor, and specialization of tasks within the union—the Chilean labor movement (like most labor movements) was weak. This weakness was due not only to political rivalries, but also to the labor code. It facilitated bargaining primarily at the plant or company level, severely inhibiting the strength of industry-wide unions, not to mention the growth of a single central body such as the CUT (*Central Unica de Trabajadores*). In a country where almost half the labor force works in establishments of ten persons or fewer, it meant that plant unions were often small, weak, and isolated. During the years 1970–1973, there was consequently no single body, or limited group of entities, with whom the government could arrive at an agreement *and* know that it would be adhered to. Although the Allende Government did sign annual wage agreements with the CUT, these were partly nullified by separate industry and company agreements that went beyond the wage increases envisaged by the master agreements.

In the absence of strong bodies of a purely trade-union type, the political parties belonging to the UP might in theory have performed an orientating role for labor, especially since a substantial proportion of labor was—in the abstract, and in the voting booth—favorable to the

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government (though to a lesser extent than one might think, as we shall see below). But in practice, the long chain that extended from a party's central committee to its trade union department,[10] through the union leader loyal to the party, down to the rank and file, was not strong enough to act as an effective guide and control of labor action—even in the absence of party rivalries and contradictory policies. The symbiotic relationship between unions and leftist parties was held together not by firm, legitimated interorganizational controls, but by much vaguer elements, such as mutual sympathy, ideological affinity, and overlapping concrete interests. The inability of political parties to control unions definitively is, of course, an old story in pluralistic parliamentary democracies, beginning with Britain, France, and Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

We appear to have contradicted ourselves in the previous discussion: we began by highlighting the strength and maturity of the Chilean labor movement but thereafter emphasized its division and organizational weakness. Actually, there is no contradiction, because two different criteria were used. There was substantial mass-participation of workers in union organizations and political parties; through such organizations, workers certainly had a voice in political and economic affairs. But the potential control of this mobilization was insufficient, both because of political differences and because of organizational deficiencies. In Huntington's terms, the institutions called upon to channel workers' mobilization were simply too weak. And controlled mobilization was precisely what a minority government needed as it sought to embark on immensely ambitious schemes of social and political change. Otherwise, it could not count on the kind of support from its friends which would allow it the freedom to deal with its enemies.

Let us now examine more closely the all-too-facile assumption that even in a general sense labor was committed to the UP. In the literature about the radicalism of the Chilean working class as an aggregate, two views are to be found. One, associated with writers committed to the far left, emphasized—with reservations, of course—that the working class either was, or could very readily become, a "cohesive force that can be politically and socially mobilized by the Left."[11] The other view,

[10] Typically, Chilean parties with a labor constituency had a trade-union department that served as a two-way contact point between the party and the union officials "out there" who were party members.

[11] This is a summary statement by James W. Prothro and Patricio Chaparro of the position of Maurice Zeitlin and James Petras, who have written extensively on the Chilean working class. See Prothro and Chaparro, "Public Opinion and the Movement of

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to which we subscribe, as do Prothro and Chaparro, and Rodriguez and Smith, is that although industrial workers may be the core of the Socialist and Communist Parties, the class taken as a whole shows a wide range of opinion. "Things are not as clear-cut as we are often led to believe."[12]

## 2. WORKING-CLASS ATTITUDES

As individuals, Chilean workers were spread over a wide ideological range, and a vast majority were certainly not ready for violent activism. A study conducted in the early 1960's revealed that 23 per cent of the presidents of industrial union locals were Christian Democrats, and only twice as many (43 per cent, still fewer than one-half) were Socialists and Communists. That was at a time when the Christian Democrats had only begun to penetrate the trade-union movement. Moreover, this amount of non-Marxist affiliation was found in a part of the working class (blue-collar, industrial) where the PDC's strength was likely to be smallest (as compared with white-collar and service sectors).[13] The "economist" orientation of even the Marxist union officials was evidenced by their choosing the economic betterment of their members as the most important long-term (five year) goal for their union, rather than "awakening the political conscience of workers" (59 per cent as against 8 per cent).[14] The impression is reinforced that these working-class leaders, and even the Marxists among them, were not as ideologically committed as might have been expected. Only 42 per cent of the Marxist leaders wanted a "total and immediate restructuring of society;" 13 per cent were even satisfied with a "gradual evolution of the present structure."

Alejandro Portes surveyed 382 slum dwellers in the late sixties. Since many of the urban land invasions which took place at that time were made by slum dwellers, there is no *a priori* reason for thinking of them as less radical than industrial workers. In any case, given the small size of the industrial working class, no party could base itself on it alone and claim to be broadly representative. The left parties, the PDC,

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Chilean Governments to the Left, 1952–1972," *Journal of Politics*, XXXVI (February 1974), 2-43.

[12] José Luis Rodriguez and Brian Smith, S.J., "Political Attitudes and Behavior of the Chilean Working Class, 1958–1968" mimeo (Dept. of Sociology, Yale University 1973), p. 6.

[13] Henry A. Landsberger, Manuel Barrera and Abel Toro, "The Chilean Labor Union Leader," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, XVII (April 1964), 399-420.

[14] Landsberger, "Do Ideological Differences Have Personal Correlates?" *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XVI (January 1968), 219-42.

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and any party that lays claim to representing "the masses," very much include slum dwellers in their clientele. Table 1 shows the results of Portes' study which are relevant to us. Sixty-two per cent of these slum dwellers thought a popular revolution would be bad or very bad for Chile; only 6 per cent thought it would be "very good"; and 27 per cent thought it would be "good." They wanted the electoral route to be adhered to, and did not want to see force used. They were *not* anti-U.S., nor overly pro-Cuban. On the other hand, a hefty majority (over 60 per cent) *did* want the property of the rich to be under state control.

TABLE 1

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION ON PORTES' SEVEN-ITEM "LEFT RADICALISM INDEX" FOR A SAMPLE OF 382 SLUM DWELLERS

| *Item* | *Categories* | *Percentage (N = 382)* |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Do you believe that a popular revolution would be: | Very good for Chile | 6 |
| | Good for Chile | 27 |
| | Don't know | 5 |
| | Bad for Chile | 49 |
| | Very bad for Chile | 13 |
| 2. A progressive government should break diplomatic relations with the United States | Should not be done—Not very important | 77 |
| | Very important that it be done | 23 |
| 3. A progressive government should establish friendly relations with Cuba | Should not be done—Not very important | 60 |
| | Very important that it be done | 40 |
| 4. A progressive government should expropriate the properties of the rich and put them under state control | Should not be done—Not very important | 38 |
| | Very important that it be done | 62 |
| 5. John says: A social change must be revolutionary. It is necessary to sweep away the past. | John | 27 |
| Peter says: A social change should not be revolutionary. It is necessary to maintain many things from the past. | Neither / Don't know | 3 |
| Who is right? | Peter | 70 |

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TABLE 1 (*Continued*)

| *Item* | *Categories* | *Percentage (N = 382)* |
|---|---|---|
| 6. Tom says: The best way for a progressive government to attain power is through elections. Paul says: The best way for a progressive government to attain power is through a popular revolution. Who is right? | Tom | 75 |
| | Neither / Don't know | 2 |
| | Paul | 23 |
| 7. Jim says: Force does not lead anywhere. To achieve true social changes it is necessary to seek the cooperation of all. Bill says: To achieve true social changes it is necessary to use force against the powerful. Who is right? | Jim | 66 |
| | Neither / Don't know | 2 |
| | Bill | 32 |

Source: Adapted from Alejandro Portes, "Political Primitivism, Differential Socialization, and Lower-Class Leftist Radicalism," *American Sociological Review*, XXXVI (October 1971), 820-35; Table 1, p. 824.

Reinforcing Portes' findings are those of Goldrich and his collaborators. Their study, conducted in 1965, shows that between 51 and 76 per cent of slum dwellers in Santiago agreed "strongly" that "our system of government is good for the country"; that the interviewees were very heavily against "social changes which provoke disorder," as well as the use of violence (percentages ranged from 61 to 85). Yet, at the same time, between 44 and 62 per cent agreed strongly that "only if things change very much will I be able to affect what the government does."[15]

Obviously, our point is not to deny that Chilean workers and the lower classes in general leaned to the left. They clearly did so, but to different degrees, depending on the exact nature of the issue. Specifically, they did not want to see violence. Further, even though the per-

[15] Daniel Goldrich, Raymond B. Pratt and C. R. Schuller, "The Political Integration of Lower-Class Urban Settlements in Chile and Peru," in Irving L. Horowitz, ed., *Masses in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press 1970), 175-214.

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centage among the working class whose vote was committed to Marxist parties is probably in the range of 45 to 65 per cent (which leaves a sizeable minority), being a Marxist may not mean the same to a member of the lower classes as it does to a middle-class intellectual, especially in the matter of readiness to use force, and concerning matters of foreign policy, including anti-U.S. policies.

These pluralistic tendencies continued during the Allende years. Let us take the 1970 presidential elections, and focus, as does Petras, on the male vote in the mining zones (coal, copper, and nitrate).[16] With the exception of the three coal districts (Coronel, Lota, and Coranilhue), where Dr. Allende's vote was in the 70 to 80 per cent range, his vote in the remainder was in the 50's and low 60's. Votes of 69 and 71 per cent are offset by 43 per cent in Chuquicamata and 41 per cent in Lagunas. These are not overwhelming percentages, and Petras's unusual ratios ("Votes for Allende for each 100 votes for . . .") may be rather confusingly high, because the remaining vote was split. Even in San Miguel (a large working-class district of Santiago) Allende obtained only 52 per cent of the vote. In Chile as a whole, he obtained only 36 per cent of the vote, 3 per cent less than in 1964.[17]

Finally, in a survey conducted by *Ercilla* in September 1972, the lack of lower-class unanimity is again highlighted. Dr. Allende did not receive, from *lower-class respondents*, even 50 per cent of their hypothetical "votes": 48 to 42 per cent when matched against Frei, 46 per cent when matched against the 1970 candidates. Seventy-five per cent of the *lower class* believed that there was a climate of violence in Chile in 1972; 18 per cent believed the government was to blame for it; 22 per cent believed that both government and opposition were to blame; and 35 per cent thought that the opposition alone was to blame. In other words, 40 per cent saw the government as having full or partial responsibility for creating the climate of violence which other surveys—those conducted by Portes, and by Goldrich *et al.*—had shown to be anathema to them. Only 27 per cent of *lower-class* respondents evaluated the government's performance as "good"; 32 per cent thought it "bad"; 41 per cent fair. And almost as many *lower-class* persons opposed Dr. Allende's proposal to reform the constitution (by instituting a unicameral system) as supported it (41 to 44 per cent).[18]

In sum, the working class was incapable of acting as a strong, united

[16] James Petras, *Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1970), 272ff.

[17] Calculations by the authors based on figures from the official *Dirección del Registro Electoral*.

[18] *Ercilla*, September 13, 1972, p. 10.

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bulwark of the Allende government for a variety of reasons, including the weakness of its organizations and the plurality of its members' preferences. Neither was there much likelihood of government control over its activities, due to interparty divisions within the UP coalition and the weakness of the parties in the union organizations themselves. The UP government ultimately had to depend upon exhortation and good will, both from its supporters and its opponents in the working class. It was not always forthcoming from either. Let us now look in greater detail at the actual process of the mobilization of the working class, and at its consequences.

## Worker Mobilization in Dr. Allende's Chile

### 1. the goals of the UP

When in November 1970 the UP assumed the reins of government, it did so with a variety of objectives—political, social, and economic, long-term and short-run. Many were mutually reinforcing, others profoundly contradictory. Its overall, relatively cautious, objective was to lay the groundwork for a more pronounced movement toward a Socialist society after the 1976 presidential elections. From the beginning, the UP was plagued by internal differences (particularly the radicalism of the left-wing Socialists as contrasted with the caution of the PC), and the circumstance of its almost accidental, and in part internally unexpected,[19] rise to power with a minimal margin of votes. Still, there was for a time at least general (but again, not specific) agreement on the need to broaden its support among the working class. This support was urgently needed in view of the municipal elections that were to take place in April 1971, the results of which would be interpreted as showing how much of *el pueblo* ("the people") really were behind the government. Specific short-run steps were taken by the UP to achieve "instant mobilization."

Insofar as general policy toward the working class was concerned, there was on the one hand the desire to improve its living standards and increase its share of the national income. The UP believed in this in principle; it also hoped to reap advantages in terms of short-run and long-run increases in political support. In other words, the distribution of economic benefits among the working class was seen in part as a mechanism for mobilizing support. Yet, there were limits to this

[19] It was widely accepted, by members of the UP as well as by its enemies, that detailed plans were far less worked out in 1970 than they had been in 1964—partly because there was less expectation that the election would be won, partly because the parties could agree neither on general principles nor, therefore, on specific plans.

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distribution: the profits of the socialized sector (which was expected to be established out of nationalized foreign enterprises and national monopolies) were supposed to be used for investment, i.e., economic development, rather than for consumption. Moreover, since the government expected to maintain a healthy private sector at least temporarily, wage increases could not be big enough to discourage private entrepreneurs either economically or politically. Were the institutions to which the UP had access—its parties and those sectors of the trade union movement in which it was strongly represented—under sufficient control to achieve restrained rather than unlimited distribution? Could a balance be maintained between giving much and giving too much?

The problem was aggravated by a second objective on which, within the UP, there was only agreement in principle, but not on specifics: that of increasing worker participation, both at the level of the firm and in economic planning and policy formulation generally. Dr. Allende had promised to "strengthen popular power and consolidate it . . . by making the unions more powerful with a new awareness, the awareness that they are a fundamental pillar of the government, but that they are not dominated by it, but that, aware, they participate in, support, help, and criticize its action."[20]

The objective of stimulating worker and/or union participation[21] represented a sincere commitment to a doctrinal point. But it was also conceived of as an instrument, hopefully, *both* to mobilize working-class support *and* to make labor "responsible" by eliminating its traditional adversary posture. The hope was both to mobilize, and to control mobilization. Once again the question arises: were the institutional tools available to the UP sufficiently strong to control the mobilization that was about to be fostered? If not, the danger would be, as in the case of indirect mobilization through economic benefits, that attainment of various economic objectives (for instance, in the short run, control of inflation; in the long run, investment) would be impaired, and that political objectives would be threatened at the same time. The middle class would feel particularly alienated by an all-out drive for workers' participation. As the Communist Party realized early, uncontrolled takeovers by workers of privately owned medium-size and small factories were to be particularly feared as a symptom of hypermobilization,

[20] Salvador Allende, *Su pensamiento político* (Santiago: Editorial Nacional Quimantu 1972), 98.

[21] The ambiguity was a source of conflict within the UP: the PC wanted the unions to be agents of the workers as a participant; a large faction of the PS wanted to build up participation mechanisms separate from and independent of the established trade unions.

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because of their effect on those parts of the middle class that might still be persuaded not to adopt a posture of total opposition to the UP government. In 1970 and early 1971, the middle class was not as committedly anti-UP as it was later to become.

### 2. THE CUT AS A CONTROL MECHANISM?

The key organization to mediate between the working class and the UP government was the CUT, the Central Labor Federation. Fortunately for the government, it was controlled more by the moderate Communist Party than by the more volatile Socialist Party, insofar as it was "controlled" at all—or, to express our caution more accurately, insofar as control of the CUT mattered at all. For as in most countries, so also in Chile: the central labor organization, whether the TUC in Britain or the AFL-CIO in the United States, is not really in a position to control its constituent unions and their key locals or branches. It is in the latter that the real action takes place. Still, in Luis Figueroa, the experienced general secretary of the CUT, the UP had not just a good friend, but someone from its own inner circle. Figueroa, a moderate and disciplined Communist, became Minister of Labor for a few months in 1972; other officials of the CUT occupied a variety of Cabinet posts during Dr. Allende's presidency—notably Rolando Calderón, more fiery in speech than Figueroa, but not much less moderate in practice.

In the CUT, then, Dr. Allende by and large had substantial support for the policy of controlled mobilization. Even there, of course, the situation was more complex, since opposition sectors of unionized workers—Christian Democrats—were represented in the CUT; moreover, the repeated defense of the government's policy of wage and other restraints would alienate even workers who were politically sympathetic to the UP. In our opinion, at least as important a limitation on the CUT's ability to control mobilization was that the entire process of mobilization is of too great a depth to be switched on and off at will by any agency. It can probably be more easily stimulated than stopped once it is in progress. Even superficial demobilization generally requires severe repression, such as Chile is experiencing now with a right-wing military regime; and as the Soviet Union's workers and peasants experienced from Kronstadt (1921) onward, when Lenin withdrew from the policy of "All power to the Soviets," which was fine for prerevolutionary purposes, but not beyond.

Even the original process of mobilization is not easily controllable: neither the efforts of an official body, nor those of a group of unofficial

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"agitators" can produce it unless the "mass" is ripe for it; when it is, neither is absolutely necessary, though each no doubt facilitates the process.

### 3. UNIONIZATION AS AN INDEX OF MOBILIZATION

The Allende years saw the continuation of a trend toward greater working-class unionization that had begun during the presidency of Eduardo Frei (1964–1970). For tactical reasons, majority elements in both the UP and the PDC saw fit to emphasize the differences that distinguished their platforms, their underlying philosophies, and their actual achievements. In particular, the UP was eager to point to evidence which would show that the period after the election of Dr. Allende differed dramatically from that of his Christian Democrat predecessor, and marked a qualitative watershed. Typically, the acceleration in the pace of expropriation of privately owned farms was cited to make this point, as well as structural changes such as the nationalization of banks, the "intervention" of companies, and the creation of a socialized sector.

There is no doubt that some of these deliberate structural changes were unique to the UP government and that the pace of all was accelerated. The somewhat more autonomous evolution of underlying social processes, such as the process of mobilization, is not as clearly delimited by specific electoral dates, and certainly not by the year 1970. In Table 2, we present figures on unionization. This index is particularly relevant when the mobilization of labor is under discussion, as it is in this paper. After a period of decline (1955–1960), followed by very slow growth (1960–1964), a real explosion of union membership took place in the years 1964–1970—i.e., during the presidency of Eduardo Frei. Membership in professional (craft: both blue- and white-collar) unions increased at an annual rate of about 15 per cent; membership in industrial (blue-collar, plant) unions at an annual rate of 6.4 per cent. In the agricultural sector, the growth was phenomenal. Overall, union membership as a percentage of the labor force practically doubled between 1964 and 1970, growing from 10.3 to 19.4 per cent.

We have no particular interest in demonstrating that the rate of expansion slowed down in the two subsequent years, 1971 and 1972 (i.e., the years of the UP regime). For one thing, it inevitably becomes more difficult to organize workers after the easy cases are "picked off." We merely wish to show that mass mobilization—at least as indicated by these figures—took a quantum jump long before the election of September 1970. The earlier growth can be attributed partly to the fact that

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## Table 2

Number of Unions and Members by Type; Percentage of Increase over Previous Years; and Percentage of Labor Force in Unions, 1955–1972

| | *Professional Unions*[a] | | | *Industrial Unions*[b] | | | *Agricultural Unions*[a] | | | *Total*[a] | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Year* | *No.* | *Members* | % *Increase*[c] | *No.* | *Members* | % *Increase*[c] | *No.* | *Members* | % *Increase*[c] | *No.* | *Members* | % *Increase*[c] | % *Union Labor Force* |
| 1955 | 1,495 | 140,373 | — | 660 | 162,937 | — | 22 | 1,877 | — | 2,177 | 305,192 | — | 12.1 |
| 1960 | 1,144 | 108,687 | — 22.4 | 608 | 122,306 | — 24.9 | 18 | 1,424 | — 24.1 | 1,770 | 232,417 | — 23.9 | 10.1 |
| 1964 | 1,207 | 125,929 | 15.9 | 632 | 142,958 | 16.9 | 24 | 1,658 | 16.4 | 1,863 | 270,542 | 16.4 | 10.3 |
| 1966 | 1,679 | 161,363 | 28.2 | 990 | 179,506 | 25.6 | 201 | 10,647 | 542.2 | 2,870 | 350,516 | 29.6 | 12.8 |
| % Annual Increase over 1964 | | | 14.4 | | | 12.8 | | | 271.0 | | | 14.8 | |
| 1970 | 2,569 | 239,323 | 28.1 | 1,440 | 197,651 | 10.1 | 510 | 114,112 | 971.2 | 4,519 | 551,086 | 57.2 | 19.4 |
| % Annual Increase over 1964 | | | 15.0 | | | 6.4 | | | 1,130.0 | | | 17.3 | |
| 1972 | 3,511 | 282,181 | 17.9 | 1,781[c] | 213,777[c] | 8.2 | 709 | 136,527 | 19.6 | 6,001 | 632,485 | 14.8 | 22.2 |
| % Annual Increase over 1970 | | | 9.0 | | | 4.1 | | | 9.8 | | | 7.9 | |

[a] From Tables 2-4, *Mensaje Presidente Allende Ante Congreso Pleno*, May 21, 1973, pp. 793-94.
[b] From Table 5, *Mensaje del Presidente Allende Ante El Congreso Pleno*, May 21, 1972, p. 861.
[c] Calculated by authors.

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there was little difference between the PDC and the UP on the issue of mobilization and participation. The labor code was substantially changed in 1967, but even before that, the old code had been more sympathetically administered by the Frei administration. But our point here is really to argue that mobilization was due to forces for which *neither* the Christian Democrats *nor* the leftist parties of the UP were solely responsible: the growing political awareness of the working class, which was only to some extent caused by the efforts of the parties to develop it as a clientele; the greater level of education among workers; the impact of the mass media; and the rapid growth of the cities because of rural emigration. Laws could slow down or facilitate the process; they could not produce it out of thin air.

Since, as we have seen, the largest single sector of organized labor supported the UP, Dr. Allende's government looked at this form of mobilization in the most favorable light. In Allende's words, "to create more and more unions and link them to the CUT is to strengthen the workers' movement in Chile and thus strengthen the base that sustains this government." But at the same time he presented a qualification: though he wanted the workers' organization to have "the most ample freedom," he hoped it would be accompanied by "the awareness that this government is its government and that, therefore, its critical contribution is an autocriticism."[22] In calling upon the workers to identify their interests with those of the administration, Allende was asking that the workers' increased power be exercised with increased responsibility, i.e., that he be given exactly the support he needed.

### 4. STRIKES AND "ECONOMISM" AS INDICES OF UNCONTROLLED MOBILIZATION

The strike activity of labor (see Tables 3 and 4) is at least as revealing an indicator of mobilization as labor's degree of unionization. In interpreting strike statistics, we are going to be treading on treacherous ground because beyond a certain level, they may indicate uncontrolled or hypermobilization—a concept that may not be altogether popular.

To keep Tables 3 and 4 short enough to be meaningful, we do not present statistics for each year. 1959 and 1960 are the first two years of the Alessandri administration, corresponding to 1965 and 1966, and to 1971 and 1972, the first two years of the Frei and Allende administrations respectively. Presidential election years (1964 and 1970) are not included because they are divided between different administrations, and are in any case atypical. 1963 and 1969 are included because they

[22] *El Mercurio*, May 13, 1973, p. 13.

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were the last full years of the Alessandri and Frei presidencies. The middle years of the Alessandri and Frei regimes were omitted for reasons of brevity, and because there are no corresponding years for the Allende presidency.

Concerning the believability of these statistics, it should be noted that Chile has for decades had a reputation for possessing a well-functioning bureaucracy, and a strong state generally. Information on strikes is collected by the national police (*carabineros*), to whose precinct stations employers are legally required to report all work stoppages. (They have considerable self-interest in actually doing so.) The police forward to the Ministry of Labor a standard form about each strike, on which the Ministry bases the official statistics published by the government. In turn, these are the statistics used in the Annual Messages to Congress on which Table 3 is based.

TABLE 3

STRIKES 1959–1972

| Year | *Col. (1)* *Number of Strikes* | *Col. (2)* *% Increase over previous date, on per-annum basis* | *Col. (3)* *Total Number of Workers Involved* | *Col. (4)* *% Increase over previous date, on per-annum basis* | *Col. (5)* *Total Number of Man-Days Lost* | *Col. (6)* *% Increase over previous date, on per-annum basis* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1959 | 204 | — | 82,188 | — | 869,728 | — |
| 1960 | 245 | 20 | 88,518 | 8 | N.A. | — |
| 1963 | 416 | 23 | 117,084 | 11 | N.A. | — |
| 1965 | 723 | 37 | 182,359 | 28 | N.A. | — |
| 1966 | 1,073 | 48 | 195,435 | 7 | 2,015,253 | 19 |
| 1969 | 977 | —3 | 275,406 | 13 | 972,382 | —16 |
| 1971 | 2,709 | 88 | 302,397 | 5 | 1,414,313 | 23 |
| Number, and as % of total, in public sector* | (332; 12%) | | (50,431; 17%) | | (132,479; 10%) | |
| 1972 | 3,289 | 21 | 397,142 | 31 | 1,654,151 | 17 |
| Number, and as % of total, in public sector* | (815; 25%) | | (135,037; 34%) | | (476,965; 29%) | |

* Separate subtotals for the public and private sectors were given only in Dr. Allende's presidential messages. If the totals for previous years did not include public sector strikes—and we believe they were included—then this table exaggerates the increase in strike activity between 1971 and 1969. Even then, however, the very high strike activity in 1971 and 1972, and the high and increasing percentage of it taking place in the public sector, are revealing. See text.

Sources: 1959–1969; *Mensaje del Presidente*, May 1970, pp. 366, 368-69; 1971: *Mensaje del Presidente*, May 1972, pp. 853-54; 1972: *Mensaje del Presidente*, May 1973, pp. 788-89.

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TABLE 4

SECONDARY STATISTICS ON STRIKES, 1959–1972

| Year | *Col. (1)* *Workers per strike*[a] | *Col. (2)* *Total number of days per strike*[b] | *Col. (3)* *Days per strike per worker*[c] |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1959 | 402 | 4,263 | 10.6 |
| 1960 | 361 | — | — |
| 1963 | 281 | — | — |
| 1965 | 252 | — | — |
| 1966 | 182 | 1,878 | 10.3 |
| 1969 | 281 | 995 | 3.5 |
| 1971 | 112 | 522 | 4.6 |
| (Public Sector) | (152) | (399) | (2.6) |
| 1972 | 120 | 502 | 4.2 |
| (Public Sector) | (165) | (585) | (3.5) |

[a] From Table 3: col. (3) ÷ col. (1).
[b] From Table 3: col. (5) ÷ col. (1).
[c] From Table 4: col. (2) ÷ col. (1).

Since some of the figures in Table 3 may appear puzzling, we calculated some derivative statistics, which are shown in Table 4. It may appear strange that there was a 16 per cent *decrease* per annum in the number of days lost in strikes over the three-year period between 1966 and 1969;[23] and that an increase of 88 per cent *per annum* in the number of strikes occurred between 1969 and 1971, with an increase of only 5 per cent in the number of workers involved (see Table 3). However, the calculations presented in Table 4 bring out that these are not aberrations, but represent consistent trends. Together, the two tables show the following:

(i) A sixteen-fold increase in the number of strikes: from 204 in 1959 to almost 3,300 in 1972; large annual increases (*with the exception of the core years of the Frei period, 1966–1969*): Table 3, col. (2).

(ii) A five-fold increase between 1959 and 1972 in the total number of workers involved: Table 3, col. (3).

(iii) The number of days lost increased also, but at more modest rates—mostly at 10-20 per cent per annum: Table 3, col. (6). Thus, between 1959 and 1972, days lost through strikes did not even double. This more modest growth in the number of days lost was due to two factors:

[23] Year-by-year statistics show a drop to 1.99 million man-days in 1967, but a surge to 3.65 million man-days in 1968 before another drop to .97 million man-days in 1969.

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(iv) The number of workers involved *per strike* dropped from 402 workers per strike in 1959 to around 250 in the 1960's, to 110-120 in the 1970's: Table 4, col. (1). This is no doubt another reflection of the fact that workers in smaller shops were being mobilized. Unionization spread to smaller shops. (Table 2 indicates that the number of unions grew faster than the number of members; i.e., the new unions were small ones.) Strikes spread to smaller places of work. The sluggish growth in "Total Number of Workers Involved," Table 3, cols. (3) and (4), also shows this (with the exception of 1963–1965 and 1971–1972, when there was a spurt upward).

(v) Strikes seem to have been of shorter duration: 10 days per worker in 1959 and 1966, but steadily below 5 days in later years: Table 4, col. (3). We believe that this statistic—in the context of other findings—can be interpreted as indicating a kind of spontaneous irritability, different from a deliberate long-term strike called by a union in support of its contract demands. By "the context of other findings" we mean, for example, the fact that the percentage of legal strikes to total strikes had dropped steadily: from 33 per cent in 1960, 19 per cent in 1966, and 21 per cent in 1969, to 7 per cent in 1971 and 4 per cent in 1972. By 1972, 96 per cent of all strikes were formally illegal —i.e., they did not occur at the end of the legally stipulated mediation and cooling-off period.

For our purposes, the dramatic changes in the period between 1970 and 1973 are of particular interest. The virtual disappearance of legal strikes between the late sixties and 1971 and 1972 is notable. So is the 31 per cent annual increase in the number of workers involved between 1971 and 1972. But most interesting is the large, and *increasing*, proportionate role played by strikes in the public sector (Table 3). Between 1971 and 1972, the ratio of strikes that took place in the public sector increased from 12 to 25 per cent; the number of workers involved went up to 31 per cent; i.e., one out of every three striking workers was employed in the public sector. The obvious answer—"yes, but the socialized sector itself increased"—is no answer, because it assumes that workers in the socialized sector would continue to be treated as before, and hence act as before. That was not what was being assumed and hoped for by the UP. Nor did the government give any indication that it thought strike activity—in the public or the private sector—was desirable. The cautious but obvious pleasure with which, in the May 1972 presidential message, a very slight decrease in strike activity in the first three months of 1972 was cited (such tentative evidence had never been used before) indicates how much concern the intense strike activity of 1971 had occasioned. And 1972 turned out to be anything but an improvement.

Working-class mobilization as revealed in strike activity—both in

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quantity and kinds of strikes ("quickies," illegal)—had clearly gotten out of the control of the CUT and the government, both of which showed deep concern. It can properly be labeled uncontrolled, or hypermobilization.

The encouragement of strikes was not government policy, or, at least, not Dr. Allende's. (Individual members of the government may not have been unhappy. Given the chronic divisions in the government, it is not easy to know what "the" government's position was.) But Dr. Allende and the PC realized that any decline in productivity would reflect negatively upon the government's overall performance and would cost it needed support. For example, when a few weeks after Dr. Allende's election, the copper miners in Chuquicamata went on strike for a wage increase of 70 per cent, Dr. Allende berated them as a "labor aristocracy." A year later, he visited Chuquicamata again, and complained bitterly that unauthorized strikes had cost $36 million in 1970 *after* settlement of the earlier strike; and that a further $12 million had been lost by the time he visited in 1971. The CUT, supporter of the UP campaign for greater production and controlled wage increases, also took a leading role in condemning strikes—not just those closely connected to political opposition, such as that of the copper miners in the El Teniente mine in mid-1973, but others as well. For example, the Provincial Council of the Santiago CUT criticized the paralyzation of work in the Volante company when "the people need it most": "This attitude is not compatible with their responsibilities and constitutes an act against the government and the workers as a whole."[24] The CUT's position on such issues drew attacks from both the right and the left; CUT was accused of being a traitor to the workers' interests.

A case could be made that the enormous number of strikes in the private sector, and of man-days lost there, showed increasing worker resistance to private enterprise. Although there is some truth in this interpretation, worker economism appears to be a more satisfactory explanation. Beginning with Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, continuing with Lenin, and contained in all Marxist writings ever since then, there is the clear recognition that workers, left to themselves (and the workers' own organization, the trade union, left to itself), would not become fully class-conscious, or aware of the need for revolution. Rather, workers and trade unions would fight for piecemeal economic improvements in the condition of specific groups of workers.[25]

Nowhere was this proved more dramatically than in Chile during

[24] *La Nación*, May 17, 1971, p. 15.

[25] See J. A. Banks, *Marxist Sociology in Action* (London: Faber and Faber 1970), chap. 4, pp. 47-55. Footnotes lead to the relevant writings of Marx and Lenin, and to secondary analysts such as Lozovsky and Hammond.

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the administration of Dr. Allende. We have already referred to the strikes at Chuquicamata, which were in large part economically motivated. In response to this situation, the President of the CUT declared that because of exaggerated requests for wage increases, the CUT had sent a number of "teachers from its union school" to train copper workers to understand their responsibility to raise production and have their profits go to all of Chile.[26] Dr. Allende himself had earlier criticized excessive economic demands in both the private and public sectors, urging workers not to ask for salaries higher than the possibilities warranted by the profits of their firms.[27] Such comments can be found fairly frequently in the leftist press; for example, Rolando Calderón, Socialist candidate for president of the CUT, admitted that almost all labor conflicts had been resolved at a higher wage level than the CUT-government agreement had specified.[28] Similarly, the plenary of CUT federations listed the limitation of salary increases (as well as of prices) as the first task of the workers.[29]

Dr. Allende himself made perhaps the strongest statements concerning this problem. His "Third Message to the National Congress," of May 21, 1973 (the equivalent of the annual State of the Union Message in the United States), very explicitly addressed itself to the problem of the workers' economic demands. Declaring that redistributive policy had gone beyond the capacity of the economy, the message continued: "The workers must make a decision: they must say whether we continue with an economistic policy whose symbol is El Teniente or if we go toward the sacrifice of having less money for the sake of greater progress and more prosperous development."[30] The reference to El Teniente—Chile's second-largest copper mine—was to the strike which had broken out in mid-April of 1973 and was to last for 75 days. Because of the manner in which their contract on the one hand, and the national annual wage adjustment law on the other, had been written, the miners claimed that they were entitled to a double raise. For political reasons, the PDC later supported the strike, as did various middle-class elements. But the original strike was economic, and when the miners marched to Santiago and occupied the Ministry of Mines in late April 1973, Dr. Allende made the following dramatic declaration: "If the workers do not understand the process of change through which we are living, I'll simply go, and then you'll see the consequences."[31] This discussion of workers in the mines is summarized by

[26] *Puro Chile*, December 5, 1971, supplement, p. 20.
[27] *El Mercurio*, April 1, 1971, p. 11.
[28] *La Nación*, March 1, 1972, p. 6.
[29] *La Nación*, October 30, 1972, p. 16.
[30] *Ercilla*, May 30, 1973, No. 1976, p. 8.
[31] *Latin America*, VII (April 27, 1973), 133.

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Petras, who states that "for the workers [nationalization] was seen as a means of substantially improving *their* economic levels—not as a stimulus to national development—although the national development outlook was being promoted by trade union leaders."[32]

Let us cite one further incident which highlighted the "economism" of workers, and the government's growing desperation in the face of it. We use the example because it comes not from the unique, "aristocratic" mining sector, but from the textile industry. This was located substantially in Santiago; it constituted one of the core areas of the newly socialized sector of the Chilean economy; and its workers had suffered more from mistreatment by their employers than the miners had. Here too, President Allende spoke out sharply several times. He took the extraordinary step in January 1973 of making his presidential headquarters for two days in *Sumar* (one of the textile factories around which, later, resistance was planned in case of a coup, since it was considered a UP bastion), in order to attempt to resolve labor problems there once and for all. Allende criticized the very high contract demands continually being made by the plant's workers. He was particularly annoyed by their demand that the amount of payment in kind (270 meters of cloth per year per worker) be increased. For purposes of wage calculations, payments in kind were valued at the low, official price, but the recipients were known to sell it on the black market at several times that price.[33] Minister of Economics Vuskovic had already drawn attention to this widespread practice in mid-1972.[34]

Dr. Allende also criticized the many political meetings that were being held during working hours, and the "contempt" (*desprecio*) that workers showed for all gains in working conditions except higher wages. Workers in *Sumar* had not only failed to increase output, but, according to *Latin America*, they had helped to incur losses equivalent to $1 million.[35] Dr. Allende stated that he had twice thought of resigning: a threat which, as we have seen, he repeated in connection with the El Teniente strike in April 1973. He was quoted as saying that "Neither revolutionary consciousness nor morality exists among the workers."[36] Half a year earlier, the Socialist president of the blue-

[32] James Petras, "Chile: Nationalization, Socioeconomic Change, and Popular Participation," in Petras, ed., *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution* (New York: Wiley 1973), 47.

[33] The government's announcement, a month later, that workers in the socialized sector would no longer be paid in kind ran into strong and vocal opposition. *Ercilla*, February 14, 1973, No. 1961, p. 16.

[34] *Ercilla*, June 14, 1972, No. 1926, p. 15.

[35] *Latin America*, VII (January 26, 1973), 29.

[36] *Ercilla*, January 24, 1973, No. 1958, p. 8.

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collar union had admitted that his party had taught workers to be "economistic," and that in order to change this in 1972, "we're letting the workers in on the problems of the plant. If they know how much is spent and produced, they'll know how much they can ask."[37] Given the shortness of time and the galloping inflation (officially admitted to be 163 per cent in 1972), it is understandable that worker restraint and understanding were not forthcoming.

We have no intention of morally condemning the workers' economism. There were certainly plenty of features in the general Chilean context, and especially in UP policy, to make it understandable. To begin with, there was the historical tradition of encouraging economic demands as the best means available to the trade unions for gaining support. The unions' organizational fragmentation also militated against the formulation of moderate and uniform wage increases across different industries; there were no objective standards. The rising inflation that plagued the country from late 1971 onward also made reasonable settlements difficult to achieve.

Just as important were certain aspects of the government's own policy. First, it was clearly inconsistent. For example, the "readjustment of a readjustment" i.e., the double raise which it so vehemently denied to the El Teniente workers, was granted as a matter of course to the Chuquicamata miners, even though their production record was much less impressive than that at El Teniente.[38] There is also an element of sad irony in the fact that one of the UP government's own first acts served to stimulate both the workers' economism and the inflation on which the economism later began to feed in a kind of vicious circle. Soon after taking office, the government decreed a 35 to 40 per cent wage increase while freezing prices. The measure was intended partly as an economic one: to stimulate demand and thereby increase production through the utilization of idle resources, especially unemployed human resources. But as the UP's Minister of Economics, Dr. Pedro Vuskovic, was to declare some fifteen months later, "a central objective of economic policy is to widen political support for the government"[39]—that is, the increase was also intended to augment the UP vote in the upcoming municipal elections of April 1971. Very likely,

[37] *Ercilla*, July 26, 1972, No. 1933, p. 27.

[38] Raul Ampuero, "Politica y sindicatos: la huelga de El Teniente," *Panorama Economico*, No. 279 (August 1973), 2-4.

[39] Pedro Vuskovic, "The Economic Policy of the Popular Unity Government," in J. Ann Zammit, ed., *The Chilean Road to Socialism* (Austin: University of Texas Press 1973), 50.

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it did play a part in raising the vote for the UP from 36 to almost 50 per cent. But it not only distorted the economy, it also whetted the workers' appetites for more.

### 5. THE FAILURE OF WORKER PARTICIPATION AS A FAILURE OF ONE FORM OF CONTROLLED MOBILIZATION

At the very heart of the UP's program was its plan for the establishment of a socialized sector of the economy which was to consist of 90 strategic companies. These firms were to be "the property of all Chileans," with the profits plowed back into investment for economic development. There was never any intention that the workers in the socialized sector were to be the sole or major beneficiaries of nationalization. It was Dr. Allende's policy to bring great changes to their lives in the form of greater participation in economic and social planning at the plant, regional, and national levels. This program, as well as being central to the UP's Socialist vision, was meant to instill a greater sense of responsibility among the workers, and thus encourage productivity and curtail excessive wage demands.[40]

In fact, the socialized sector grew to be much larger than anticipated. By early 1973 it consisted of approximately 250 firms and controlled 80 per cent of industrial production and 50 per cent of GNP.[41] By the middle of 1973, another 250 firms had been taken over. Some of the companies had been sold by their owners (some under greater or lesser *de facto* duress, financial and otherwise); others were "intervened" and "requisitioned" following labor disputes, and production or financial difficulties. In some cases, a reluctant government was presented with a *fait accompli* by workers (or others), who were sometimes led by MIR and left Socialist outsiders. In other words, all kinds of things happened, and no one knows what the proportion of different kinds of takeovers was.

The famous *convenio* (agreement) between the CUT and the government had been signed on December 7, 1970. The first point dealt with the participation of workers, both at the planning level (national, sectoral, regional) and at the level of the enterprise.[42] It was a complicated system of assemblies and committees, in only one of which the plant union as such had a substantial role. Any evaluation of the suc-

[40] Allende (fn. 20), 398.

[41] *The Economist*, February 24, 1973, pp. 14-15.

[42] Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT), *Depto. de Educación y Cultura: Normas Básicas de Participación de los Trabajadores en la Dirección de las Empresas de las Areas Social y Mixta* (Santiago: *Central Única de Trabajadores* 1972).

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cess of this participation program must be tentative at this time,[43] but there was widespread agreement that it did not work well on any level.

Petras's account does not leave one with the impression that enthusiasm for a broad conception of participation (as distinct from an economic one) was widespread.[44] He believes that union leaders and skilled workers had the greatest appreciation for the institutional changes involved. Even on the plant level, relatively few schemes of participation were ever instituted. According to the CUT, no more than 30 per cent of the socialized companies had created participatory committees by the middle of 1972.[45] The estimate of Zimbalist and Stallings is even lower: they consider genuine worker involvement to have taken place in only 35 enterprises.[46] Luis Figueroa, president of the CUT, confessed in mid-1972 that "participation is still weak. Sometimes because the executives or 'intervenors' of the firms of the socialized sector do not understand the importance of allying themselves with the workers. . . . Other times, because the union leaders think that the Councils of Administration have come to supplant their union work."[47] Corroborating this view, Ramón Fernandez, head of the Participation Section of the CUT, declared that participation was "only a pretty word" and that "all of us have some guilt here."[48] He acknowledged that there was no effective worker participation at the level of government planning either. Further, there was general dissatisfaction with the functioning of those systems of participation that had been formed: workers had only an advisory capacity in the management of socialized firms, always being outnumbered by management and the government's representative; and union leaders were prohibited from occupying posts in the participatory structure. Although Dr. Allende gave assurances that "there is no antagonism between the job of the management committee and union leaders,"[49] the existence of these new workers' organizations was bound to lead to a decrease in the power of the unions, especially since the new participation organizations were to take over many of the unions' functions.[50] Instead of the kind of controlled mobil-

[43] Several studies have been completed or are in the process of being written about the participation experience. Peter Winn (Princeton); José Luis Rodriguez (Yale); James Wilson (Cornell); and Andy Zimbalist (Harvard) are among those working on manuscripts.

[44] Petras (fn. 30), pp. 9-60, passim.

[45] *Ercilla*, May 24, 1972, No. 1973, p. 13.

[46] Andy Zimbalist and Barbara Stallings, "Showdown in Chile," *Monthly Review*, xxv (October 1973).

[47] *El Siglo*, Supplement, April 9, 1972, pp. 8-9.

[48] *El Siglo*, April 22, 1973, p. 7.

[49] Allende (fn. 20), p. 361.

[50] Manuel Barrera, Complementary material to: "El cambio social en una empresa del APS," mimeo (Institute of Economics, University of Chile, Santiago 1973), 7.

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ization that a successful system of worker participation in decision making might have represented, the UP was increasingly faced with a form of uncontrolled mobilization which it clearly did not want: a widespread refusal to obey any kind of institutionalized and previously legitimate authority, and a rise of "indiscipline."[51]

## 6. UNCONTROLLED MOBILIZATION: REJECTION OF AUTHORITY AND "BREAKDOWN OF DISCIPLINE"

The "breakdown of authority" became a matter of intense concern during the period 1970–1973; already before then, many professionals —engineers, doctors, managers—had started to complain that a breakdown of "hierarchy" was occurring. The brain drain among engineers (which had always been present to some degree) accelerated rapidly after 1970. It was partly attributed to the fact that their orders were not carried out in factories, so that their lives became extremely frustrating. Accusations—which could be proved by examples, but not by systematic statistics—were rife that many engineers and managers had been dismissed after takeovers, not only at the insistence of new government-appointed managers, but of workers. Indeed, there was said to be a general climate of outright insubordination, hostility, and aggressiveness against educated persons, especially those in authority, in part explicitly encouraged by extreme left political groups. In late August 1973, doctors presented a "bill of demands" to the government, which included a demand that the campaign of *desprestigio* (contempt against them) be stopped. In early June of 1973, there had been a 48-hour work stoppage by doctors in Santiago because of "aggression to colleagues and a disregard of authority in the Hospital del Salvador."[52]

But it was said to be in the socialized industrial sector (APS: area of social property) that workers who had long had to obey the authority of private employers now went to the opposite extreme. Their "indiscipline" included corruption; stealing; absenteeism; costly carelessness in the use of machinery, including neglect of maintenance; simply not working; carrying on vendettas (partly based on political allegiances); and so forth.[53] Extreme caution, and a total readiness to reverse one's

[51] We put this and similar phrases in quotation marks to indicate that they were widely used at the time to describe the process. No value judgment on our part is to be read into them.

[52] *Ercilla*, June 6-12, 1973, No. 1977.

[53] Dismissal of PDC trade union leaders, activists, and sympathizers was repeatedly charged—e.g., at the *Sumar* textile plant in September 1971, and after a strike of bank employees (as part of the "general strike of bosses") in October 1972. The firing of PDC civil servants from the agrarian reform agency was also an issue. Who exactly was to blame is not possible to determine: it was a sign of increasing polarization.

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view if other evidence appears, is obviously necessary when one accepts this kind of critical description at face value. We do so, temporarily, only because no one—not even government supporters—appeared to be saying anything to the contrary. As early as the beginning of 1971, Allende criticized the high absenteeism in some firms, calling it criminal (*delictual*).[54] In *Chile Hoy*, a left-Socialist weekly, some workers complained of high absenteeism because others had left to sell goods on the black market.[55] At Yarur, Chile's most famous textile plant, absenteeism supposedly rose from 6 to 14 per cent after nationalization, and dropped back to 10 per cent only after a struggle between the union and the factory's Administrative Council had been won by the latter.[56]

In Chuquicamata, the government's attempts to reimpose some discipline triggered one of the major strikes. It involved the suspension of a lower-level supervisor who had walked off the job half an hour early, as a result of which a smelter had been badly damaged (the third such accident in a month).[57] There was, however, a great deal more behind the strike: (1) A party political fight between a Socialist splinter group (not belonging to the UP) and the PC. The new manager was a Communist, and a good engineer, but supposedly abrasive, and without experience in mining. (2) The resignation, because of disgust at the many political appointments, of the respected production manager, who had been appointed by the UP government. (3) Worker protest against inflating the payroll with high-salaried outside personnel who had no productive function (the 'public relations' department had increased three-fold in this nationalized industry). (4) A demand by workers that there be more genuine participation by them in decision making. (5) General demoralization due to technical chaos—a result of the departure not only of U.S., but of Chilean technical personnel, and the shortage of spare parts. (6) Finally, the possibility of C.I.A. influence definitely must be allowed for, but it cannot produce a strike out of the blue.

By mid-1972, the government was considering the imposition of more severe penalties for indiscipline: dismissal, and loss of rights to severance pay and seniority.[58] But a year later, a government report still mentions the same chaotic conditions. Another measure designed to

[54] *El Siglo*, April 1, 1971, p. 9.
[55] *Chile Hoy*, August 4-10, 1972, pp. 16-17.
[56] *Ercilla*, December 22, 1971, No. 1901, p. 11.
[57] Norman Gall, "Copper is the Wages of Chile," American Universities Field Staff, West Coast, South America Series, XIX, No. 3 (August 1972), 1-12, pp. 7-10.
[58] *Ercilla*, August 2, 1972, No. 1933, p. 21.

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end indiscipline was the enactment of an agreement between CUT and DIRINCO (the state distribution agency) to form Committees of Vigilance in the socialized sector of the economy. These committees, which had been organized much earlier in the private sector, had the function of supervising production and curtailing speculation and the black market. There are no indications that this program was successful.

Without going into root causes, we can offer some suggestions as to why the participation schemes worked out so poorly and why indiscipline was so rampant. The participation program faced a number of obstacles: the untried nature of the system; its Byzantine complexity which inhibited effective organization; a shortage of skilled managerial staff, made more acute by the unexpected size of the socialized sector of the economy; political rivalries within the UP coalition, which led to the appointment of managers on the basis of party quotas instead of competence;[59] and prolonged ideological debates about participation within the UP, and between it and other parties and factions, which had the effect of dividing opinion.[60] Many of the factors responsible for worker indiscipline probably had their sources in more subtle and general social and cultural changes, and are thus more difficult to trace. We refer to the breakdown of old value systems and general patterns of social hierarchy, which can be found in many other modern societies. But whatever combination of the above causes, the participation program neither resulted in, nor was it the consequence of, the kind of "mobilization" helpful to the UP government. And it is this we wish to establish. In addition, the very failure of the participation policy probably led to considerable cynicism and opportunism, with respect both to individual companies and the government program as a whole.

[59] This handicap bedeviled the entire UP regime, especially at the level of cabinet, ministerial, and subministerial appointments. It was known as the *cuoteo* (quota system).

[60] The basic approach to what participation should be, and to the larger issue of how industries were to be administered, was the subject of heated debate between various parties and different ideological groups. (Their perspectives are well summarized by Rodriguez). This debate did not help the system to function at the grassroots level, where the various groups were contending. Thus, the PDC wanted the state to play a small role in running industry, and placed emphasis on worker ownership as well as joint control with management (and private owners). The left feared that worker ownership would lead to converting workers into bourgeois conservatives (as would small ownership in the countryside). There was, moreover, a distinction between the more extreme left, which also did not want the state to have too much of a role (fearing incipient bureaucratization and a failure to mobilize working-class consciousness fully), and the more orthodox PC, which felt that for reasons of rational economic planning, plant autonomy would have to be severely limited.

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### 7. MOBILIZATION AND THE DIVISION OF THE WORKING CLASS: THE STRENGTHENING OF THE ULTRA-LEFT

According to the National Council of the CUT, the working class's "principal responsibility is to increase its unity, so that united, it can further the consolidation of the process of change."[61] But in reality, mobilization led to dissatisfaction with many aspects of the UP's policy, and to growing support among workers for opposition groups on both the left and right.

Those who are acquainted with the evolution of Chilean politics since the mid-1960's are aware of the MIR—the Movement of the Revolutionary Left. Initially mostly limited to students (including sons and daughters of high party leaders from the PDC and leftward), it specifically denied the possibility of a bloodless, democratic road to socialism. Hence, the MIR was skeptical of the entire UP posture, and especially of the more cautious coalition members. The PC was a particular target of the MIR. By the end of 1971, the Secretary General of the MIR voiced the belief that the state and the judicial system "play their historical role, they defend the interests of the bosses against the workers."[62] Accordingly, at the level of action, the MIR sought to force the pace by stimulating and organizing *tomas* (takeovers) of both farms and factories. To enable it to do the latter, and as part of its general policy of mobilizing and radicalizing the working class, it attempted to gain working-class support. Indeed, it soon sponsored its own trade-union organization, the FTR (Front of Revolutionary Workers). The degree of its success will partially indicate how revolutionary and radical the working class in Chile was.

The findings are not simple, and cannot be made so. There is no question about the direction of the statistics of union elections. In a highly publicized press conference in late May 1972 (the purpose of which was to warn against disunity *within* the UP over what stance to take vis-à-vis the MIR), the general secretary of the PC, Luis Corvalan, pointed out that in the construction union, the FTR polled 300 votes against 800 for the PC and 6,000 for the PS. At the textile plant near Concepción where the FTR was founded, it could not gain even one seat on the executive committee of the plant union. In elections during the Sixth National Congress of the CUT, the MIR received less than 2 per cent of the vote. (This figure has to be treated with some caution. It took six weeks to count the votes, and the final

[61] *El Siglo*, February 25, 1971, p. 5.

[62] *Punto Final*, November 9, 1971, p. 2.

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results were clearly "negotiated" between the major parties, none of which wanted to see the MIR make a strong showing.)

Nevertheless, there were certain ways in which the MIR represented at least the spirit of some groups of workers, and represented it as well as, or better than, the more established trade unions, and especially the CUT. As a result, the CUT was caught between its desire to be loyal to the government, i.e., to restrain itself and go slow, and its need not to appear to be outflanked on the left.

Admittedly, the extent to which even the "foot soldiers," let alone the leadership, in factory takeovers were really workers—as distinct from "young bourgeois adventurers" as the PC called them, or persons living in neighboring slums (*pobladores*)—is a matter of doubt. Not only the Communist Party, but Hugo Blanco, a Peruvian Trotskyist, felt as late as June 1973 that the MIR had little support among urban workers in the establishment of the famous "industrial belts" (*cordones industriales*). His impression was that members of the MIR were young elitists, and were really based on the local community (*comandos comunales*), not on the factory workers.[63] Nevertheless, without at least some working-class support they could not have had even such partial successes as they did in late March and early April 1973 (well before the abortive military coup of June 29), when the MIR announced its intention of organizing a series of takeovers, and did in fact occupy some factories as well as a government distribution center.[64]

Certainly both the CUT, and specifically Dr. Allende, regarded the threat of a parallel organization of workers as a very real one. After the takeovers of March and April 1973, Dr. Allende went on radio and television to ask workers not to take notice of "calls from ultra-left adventurers who want to discredit the government."[65] At the copper mine El Salvador, on July 11, 1973 (the second anniversary of nationalization), Dr. Allende said that "it must be understood that the leadership of the workers is in the hands of the CUT. . . . I am saying plainly that I will not accept powers parallel to and independent of the government of the workers." He went on to say that it is "a mistake for some members of the UP and of other revolutionary sectors outside the UP to stage strikes and occupations for petty reasons . . . something they did not do when they were under reactionary governments." And during the months of July and August 1973—after the abortive *tancazo*,

[63] Hugo Blanco and others, in Les Evans, ed., *Disaster in Chile* (New York: Pathfinders Press 1974), 250.

[64] *Latin America*, VII (April 13, 1973), 116.

[65] *Ibid.*

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the brief attempt at a coup by an armored batallion—the CUT began to take the threat of a "rival organization" very seriously, and tried hard, but with considerable difficulty, to capture command of the increasingly vigorous *cordones*.

It is our judgment that part of the increased "mobilization"—of workers in the narrow sense, and of the "lower class" in general to a somewhat larger extent—provided force and impetus to ideological currents to the left of a majority of the UP. This ultra-left sector of the working class made Dr. Allende's life very difficult, not only by its economic demands, but even more by permitting the opposition to state with some justification that the government was losing control, and that chaos and civil war were becoming ever more probable.

### 8. MOBILIZATION AND THE DIVISION OF THE WORKING CLASS: THE STRENGTHENING OF GROUPS TO THE CENTER

Many of the factors that prompted the defection of workers to the left increased worker support for groups to the right of the UP. Both sides, for example, advocated higher wage and salary readjustments. Ironically, the Department of Union Action of the right-wing National Party at one point asked its Political Commission to struggle for a higher wage increase—fifty per cent more than the government was offering. The CUT, it declared, was unwilling to defend the workers' interest.[66] Much the same kind of comment was frequently found in the MIR's newspaper, *El Rebelde*.[67] Hernán Morales, a PDC delegate to the CUT Congress, even remarked that in many areas of debate in the Congress, the Christian Democrats agreed with the FTR and the Revolutionary Communist Party.[68]

After the coup, *Ercilla* made an assertion which remains to be substantiated: that 80 per cent of the union elections in 1973 constituted defeats for the government, and that the General Directorate of Labor had withheld almost a thousand (unspecified) reports concerning new unions—presumably because their leadership was preponderantly anti-government. But in general the results of union elections do seem to show that the UP was losing out to more centrist elements, especially the PDC. For example, according to the left-Socialist *Chile Hoy*, the Christian Democrats did unexpectedly well in the 1972 CUT elections.[69] They are estimated to have obtained between 28 and 35 per cent of the votes cast. Here are examples of some of the last elections

[66] *Tribuna*, December 8, 1971, p. 6.
[67] See, for example, *El Rebelde*, February 8, 1972, p. 4.
[68] *Tercera de la Hora*, December 12, 1971, p. 13.
[69] *Chile Hoy*, No. 1, June 16-22, 1972, p. 8.

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before the coup: At the (nationalized) Pacific Steel Company, the PS and PC together obtained 2,049 votes; the opposition 2,638; the FTR and the Revolutionary Communist Party (a splinter) 191 votes; and the Radicals 559. About the same time, the UP lost control in the Chilean Airline, which had previously had a UP majority, with the PDC gaining a 3 to 2 majority on the executive committee. In Chuquicamata, in the white-collar employees' union, the PDC won 3 seats and the PN (National Party) 1, leaving the UP with only a single council member after February 1973. Previously, the UP had held 3 seats, the PDC 2, and the PN none. Among the blue-collar workers, the PDC went up from 1 to 2 in February 1973.

Of greater national importance were the January 1973 elections in the Union of Education Workers, Chile's largest union at the time. The Christian Democrats obtained 35,600 votes out of 73,000; the UP received 36,500. This gave the PDC 16 out of 41 seats on the national executive, where they had held only 3 seats three years earlier. Also of national importance were the elections in the National Federation of Health Workers in which the PDC and two smaller groups won a plurality (5,200 voters out of 13,000, or 40 per cent), partly because the Communists and Socialists went into the election with separate lists, obtaining over 3,000 votes each.

Not only did the Christian Democrats gain support numerically, but their opposition to the UP gradually hardened and became more effective. Partly this was due to what was called the UP's very sectarian policy. For example, in the CUT Congress of 1972, the UP coalition pushed through resolutions pledging unconditional support for the government and condemning the Christian Democrats' proposals for workers' control of plants.[70] Because of these political pronouncements (which were bound to be divisive in a pluralistic context), the National Council of the PDC considered the possibility of withdrawing from the CUT.[71] Similarly, when the CUT condemned the truckers' strike in October 1972, the Christian Democrat union leaders were emphatic in supporting it. The culmination of this process of polarization was probably reached in the miners' strike at El Teniente, which was accompanied by violent confrontations between Christian Democrat workers and UP supporters. Later on, in response to the "industrial cordons" of the left, the PDC workers began to create their own organizations dedicated to mass mobilization.[72]

Symptomatic of this whole process of heightened divisions within

[70] *El Siglo*, December 13, 1971, p. 3.
[71] *La Prensa*, December 12, 1971, p. 5.
[72] *Ercilla*, May 16, 1973, No. 1973, p. 8.

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the working class was the progressive loss of control by the CUT. It tried to be as loyal to Dr. Allende as possible and, as a result, left itself open to criticism from both ultra-left and more centrist elements. Most of the key figures of the CUT, especially Luis Figueroa, were loyal to the Allende line. In December 1972, for example, when the MIR-FTR sponsored the occupation of an electronics plant in Arica, in the far north of Chile, the local PC and a CUT delegation attempted to work out a compromise.[73] As we noted earlier, the CUT also entered into agreements with the government over national wage readjustments. But here the loyalists often ran into grass roots (and partly politically motivated) opposition. Throughout late 1972 and early 1973, the "regulars" of the CUT wanted to accept a government wage adjustment proposal which would have given smaller increases to those with higher pay, but several powerful confederations were both against the amount of the increase and the tapered percentage.[74]

Starting in mid-1972, PDC trade union officials had called the CUT nothing but "another party of the government," leaving "the workers defenseless."[75] When the regional CUT of the Province of Santiago (controlled by the PDC) called for a demonstration against price rises in August 1972, the national CUT did not dare take a stand against it.[76] Figueroa's calls for the return of illegally occupied industries and his attacks against leftist adventurism made very little difference.[77] The CUT was also incapable of restraining the militant MIR-controlled *cordones industriales*. Thus, even though the CUT represented the most solid organizational support of the Allende line among workers, its inherent weakness was aggravated by grass-roots pressure and by political assaults from right and left.

In sum, there was no longer any question of a unified and organized working class. The PDC, to the right of the UP, had grown increasingly vigorous. The MIR-FTC, on the extreme left, was capable of drawing upon groups of workers for acts defying Dr. Allende's policy (even though these same workers would not vote for the MIR). In addition, many of the workers were imbued with heightened economic aspirations, aggravated by inflation. With all this, the proportion of workers on whose support the government could count for several crucial issues was apparently diminishing. A general preference on the part of a majority of workers for the UP government was very prob-

[73] *Ercilla*, December 6, 1972, No. 1951, p. 13.
[74] *Ercilla*, March 29, 1973, No. 1967, p. 24.
[75] *Ercilla*, March 22, 1972, No. 1923, p. 13.
[76] *Ercilla*, August 23, 1972, No. 1936, p. 8.
[77] *El Siglo*, July 15, 1973, p. 3.

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ably present, since without such a majority, the UP could not have obtained more than 40 per cent of the national vote, as it did in March 1973. The CUT was capable of calling huge demonstrations in support of the government, including demonstrations against striking workers whom it regarded as traitors. No matter how genuine in their own right, however, such acts were offset by continuing wage demands, by absenteeism and low productivity, and by sporadic takeovers of industries. It is on these practical issues that loyalty was not strong enough—as Dr. Allende stated very explicitly on many occasions.

## Conclusion: Mobilization as a Double-Edged Sword

Let us attempt to draw some general conclusions concerning the process of mobilization which one might reasonably base on the particular case of Chile.

First, as many Marxists have recognized with their insistence on "objective conditions": the process of consciousness raising (equivalent in many ways to the subjective aspect of mobilization) may be helped or hindered by the deliberate policy of the state or of nonofficial groups and strata; but it is fundamentally a more profound process. Basically, it is not under any one's purposive control, either to start up, or to slow down. Indeed, even astute observers often do not recognize when it is occurring. Most revolutions have taken by surprise even highly intelligent revolutionaries: witness the Russian events of 1905, and Lenin's and Trotsky's astonished reaction to them. Others—like Guevara, who felt sure that objective conditions are always propitious because, in his view, the masses were always miserable and exploited, and therefore always ready to be mobilized—were disappointed when the masses were unwilling to respond to their call to action. Very occasionally, however—as in Chile—the estimate of various interested political elites is partly accurate. For reasons no one really fully understands (though *ex post facto* a convincing list can be drawn up), the Chilean lower classes were, after the election of Eduardo Frei in 1964, even more ready to be actively involved in national life than they always had been. Once the PDC government made it possible for them to do so, they rapidly started joining industrial and agricultural unions. The working class of Chile had never been as "marginal" as those of Peru, Ecuador, and most other Latin American countries. It is highly misleading to use the same terminology to describe their states of consciousness prior to 1965.

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In any case, the political elites—the Marxist parties on the one hand, the Christian Democrats on the other—for once gauged accurately that this rising "tide" of consciousness could be "taken at the flood." The gates were opened, not in 1970, but in 1965, by the assumption of power by the PDC. A flood was released and further stimulated, as immediately manifested by rising union membership and a rising rate of strike activity.

But the flood did not lead on to "fortune," because it could not even be rechanneled, let alone contained. Our second point is that mobilization is likely to accentuate—to raise to a more intense level—whatever divisions existed previously in germinal form by way of structural and attitudinal diversity among those to be mobilized. Unity is not likely to result. If there are long-smoldering political divisions within the working class between "moderates" (Chile's Christian Democrats; Germany's Ebert Social Democrats in 1918?), "centrists" (UP; Germany's USPD in 1918?), and ultra-leftists (MIR; Germany's Spartakists?), then these divisions will become exacerbated. A government representing any one of these currents will be caught in the midst of these divisions. If "selfish" (economist) aims are struggling with more long-term ideologically committed ones, then that struggle will become apparent and more pronounced as mobilization proceeds. A government will certainly not benefit from the economism; it might not even benefit from heightened ideology, if that is divided.

Third, mobilization is likely to take quite unanticipated forms. Still, in the Russian Revolution and in the Paris *Commune*, there are historical precedents which should by now enable us to predict to some degree. The rejection of authority and the "indiscipline" (absenteeism, long meetings) are really forms, respectively, of equalitarianism and the kind of festive holiday atmosphere which are part of many revolutionary or semirevolutionary situations. But they can severely hurt an economy already in difficulties—as an economy is apt to be in such situations.

Fourth, what might on the surface appear as useful channels for mobilized energies (new formal structures for participation in decision making) does not seem to work. Quite apart from several basic questions which one might harbor about the meaning of and assumptions behind "participation" even in "normal" times, at times of hypermobilization, participation is likely to take on the characteristics of that very condition. In other words, within the institutions of participation, heightened political and ideological divisions are likely to play them-

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selves out; the struggle between economism and the long-term commitment to a new order is apt to come to the surface; the rejection of authority and of all rules and regulations will manifest itself in the rejection of decisions made by the newly established bodies. Rather than counterbalancing the above nonfunctional aspects of mobilization ("nonfunctional" for a government friendly to "the masses" and hoping to use mobilization to increase its power), these new institutionalized channels for directing mobilized energies are themselves likely to become engulfed in nonfunctional divisions and emerge as ideological battlegrounds, or the means for satisfying "economistic" motives. In any case, it is doubtful that a new institution, with its inevitable problems, can be anything but a negative factor *in the short run* (where it often counts, as it did in Chile).

Fifth, the case of Chile leads us to speculate that governments who feel that they most need mobilized mass support are likely to be most harmed by its "unanticipated" consequences. The governments or extra-official groups most ardently advocating the cause of the "masses and their mobilization" are those whose existing support is inadequate. They therefore hope that the masses, when mobilized, will give a very high proportion of their support to their defenders. The more precarious a government's present balance of power, the more lopsided the support of newly mobilized groups would have to be to really make a difference.

In Chile, the UP—except for one fleeting honeymoon election six months after the presidential election, in which the UP increased its popular support from 36 to 50 per cent—never came close to gaining the support of even half the voters, let alone the kind of solid majority needed by a government that seeks to embark on highly innovative policies. Voting percentages—which count all heads as equal—are probably a naive way to calculate power. In power-currency other than votes, Dr. Allende's coalition was certainly even more impecunious. It therefore badly needed to mobilize new groups whose support would flow wholly toward itself. But if a group such as the UP is substantially short of having the balance of power in its favor, the chances are not great that newly mobilized sectors will be totally unified in support of it. Even if they were, it might not make enough of a difference. In any case, they are unlikely to give the mobilizing group wholehearted support. In the meantime, other sectors—in the case of Chile, the middle classes—are likely to have been alienated by the process of mobilization. The cost of mobilization is certain, its benefits to the mobilizer are

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dubious. President Frei's Christian Democrats found this to be true in the period 1965–1970; Dr. Allende's UP learned it between 1970 and 1973.

There are other governments which have tried to mobilize unified support, have failed, but have survived nonetheless—often after reversing policy by 180 degrees, and either demobilizing or at least controlling mobilization. The present (1975) military government of Peru (with highly controlled mobilization) is one; so was the Soviet government after 1921—both of them regimes that may be called "left." Both governments survived because they have, or had, plenty of power. But that power is and was quite clearly based on the ability to coerce, in addition to considerable popular support (but probably no more than provided by Dr. Allende's UP). That the Peruvian military should rely on force (as well as substantial popular support) is hardly surprising; that the Bolsheviks maintained themselves in the face of so many enemies, such narrow popular support, and so little coercive power is still something of a mystery—as are all great historical events.

In any case, our central point is that the hope of increasing a government's power through mobilizing previously unmobilized support is in many instances an illusion. New masses are likely to be ambivalent in their support; in any case, the balance of power is probably affected more by the "sub-balance" in the sector "coercion" than in the "subsector" of "mass support." Despite evidence to the contrary, both politicians and academics continue to think that mobilizing the masses is "a good thing," but that it is difficult and in that sense problematic. Historically, mobilization seems to have been more of a hindrance, i.e., a "bad thing" than a help to radical governments, at least after the old centers of power have been weakened with its help. The real problem is then whether "the masses" can be controlled. If the government has enough coercive power to do that (and simultaneously mop up the remnants of its old enemies), it may not need to mobilize the masses in the first place.

The foregoing is probably too flip and facile a generalization, since spontaneous mass action does seem to have been important so often in the early stages of social change, in sweeping away the old system: France in 1789, Mexico in 1910, Russia in 1917, Bolivia in 1952. But that was, indeed, spontaneous action rather than guided mobilization. What the Chilean case seems to show, and other cases do not contradict, is that mass mobilization cannot be channeled in certain highly particular directions (e.g., toward the UP as against the PDC or the MIR). Mass mobilization therefore cannot be expected to change the

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balance of power in favor of a government which has a precarious hold on it, vis-à-vis other groups which have firm holds on their respective sectors. Spontaneous mass action may help to sweep away various already half-disintegrated power sectors, but that is a very different kind of situation. In Chile, there was some, but not a great deal of mass action of this kind—enough to frighten a fairly powerful bourgeoisie, but not enough to destroy it. And if mass mobilization cannot fulfill the function of helping to sweep away the old order, it probably is more of an obstacle than a help even to governments favorable to the masses. It makes the government's life difficult both directly and, indirectly, by frightening others. The problem then becomes one of gaining and exercising control, and a weak government cannot, by definition, accomplish that.

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# A DISSENTING VIEW ON THE GROUP APPROACH TO SOVIET POLITICS

By WILLIAM E. ODOM*

NO model of Soviet politics has been as widely accepted among scholars as totalitarianism. An equally broad group of scholars, however, seems convinced of the model's inadequacy, especially for guiding study of the post-Stalin period. Just as Khrushchev put the Soviet Union through a period of de-Stalinization, Western students of Soviet politics have tried to de-totalitarianize their analytical approaches. In place of the cult of the monolith, we have been offered collectives of models, usually in triads. Rigby suggests that "traditional, market, and organizational societies" coexist in the U.S.S.R.[1] Inkeles adds the developmental and industrial models to the totalitarian, suggesting that the entire troika is useful.[2] As might be expected, the multiple-model approach in Western analysis has proven no more stable than collective leadership in the Kremlin. The struggle for succession to totalitarianism has inevitably included efforts to restore a single-model approach. Notably, Alfred Meyer has made the first strong effort with his "USSR Incorporated," a de-ideologized version of totalitarianism,[3] but factional support for his perspective has remained amorphous. Skilling's introduction of the interest-group approach, however, seems to have gained significant support in a bid to become the new dominant approach—if not displacing the multiple model collective, at least assuming a key position, more or less in phase with the muted neo-Stalinism of Brezhnev's growing grip on the Politburo.[4]

This conflict of models (including the conflict model)[5] is naturally to be welcomed—not least for its promise to end the isolation that has long separated the study of Communist regimes from the more general

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[1] T. H. Rigby, "Traditional, Market, and Organizational Societies and the USSR," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 539-57.

[2] Alex Inkeles, "Models and Issues in Analysis of Soviet Society," *Survey*, No. 60 (1966), 3-17.

[3] See Meyer, *The Soviet Political System* (New York: Random House 1965), and "USSR Incorporated," in D. W. Treadgold, ed., *The Development of the USSR* (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1964), 21-28.

[4] H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1971), 3-18.

[5] Carl Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1966).

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study of politics. But misconceptual approaches can be given currency in the name of abandoning misconceptions. It is indeed a misconception to believe that all power in the U.S.S.R. was ever wholly in the dictator's hands. Sophisticated users of the totalitarian model never really treated the matter so unambiguously. The key question has always been *how* power is dispersed, not *whether* it is dispersed. Yet students of the post-Stalin period have announced in tones of discovery and achievement that "the conception of the Soviet political system as a monolith is a myth,"[6] and that "it has become widely recognized that Soviet officials do not formulate public policy in a vacuum. . . ."[7] If it makes as little sense to overemphasize the diffusion of power as it does to cling to myths about its centralization, it makes no sense to encourage misconceptions about the way in which power is diffused.

Skilling, to be sure, does not advance his application of the group concept as an explanation for the entire Soviet system. Indeed, he stresses that it "does not necessarily involve an interpretation of Soviet politics solely in terms of interest groups."[8] He even tolerates the idea that Soviet cases may point up weaknesses to the group approach. Still, despite all his care, caveats, and delimitations, he may have evoked uncritical enthusiasm among the consumers of the secondary literature on Soviet politics and inspired less caution among the users of the approach. For example, it has been argued that "the evidence is gradually mounting in favor of the group approach," and those who remain dubious about its conceptual appropriateness have been told that their doubts are "based on something of an ethnocentric fallacy."[9] Neither of these assertions, however, is highly persuasive, certainly not self-evident. First, the mounting evidence is not unambiguously on the side of the group theorists. For example, Sidney Ploss is struck by the reversal of some of the power-diffusing tendencies of the Khrushchev era, not by the "institutional pluralism" predicted by Jerry Hough.[10] Second, it may be that the charge of ethnocentrism should more prop-

[6] Milton Lodge, "Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Period," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (September 1968), 839.

[7] J. J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, "Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (September 1968), 840.

[8] Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 4), 23.

[9] David Langsam and D. W. Paul, "Soviet Politics and the Group Approach: A Conceptual Note," *Slavic Review*, xxxi (March 1972), 136-37. It is not clear against whom the argument is directed in this piece. Although Skilling's co-editor, Griffiths, disagrees with Skilling in some respects, there has been little published objection to the group approach to Soviet politics. Andrew C. Janos, "Group Politics in Communist Society: A Second Look at the Pluralist Model," in S. P. Huntington and C. H. Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York: Basic Books 1970), 437-50, is indeed exceptional for challenging the group approach.

[10] Ploss, "New Politics in Russia?" *Survey*, No. 19 (1973), 23-35.

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erly be made against the proponents of the group approach to the study of Soviet politics. Samuel Huntington approvingly quotes Louis Hartz's jibe, "Had the disciples of Bentley tried to apply his analysis to the Dreyfus Affair, as they did to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, they would hardly have found the procedure so easy . . . ," and Huntington adds his own observation that the proponents of the group concept "were thus using a category of limited territorial applicability to analyze American politics, often assuming that the category and analysis could also be applied equally well to other political systems."[11]

The group approach has not reigned unchallenged even as a model appropriate for American politics, Huntington's essay being merely one example of efforts to proceed beyond it.[12] It would be ironic indeed if, as the study of Soviet politics is brought out of isolation, it is introduced not to contemporary concepts in comparative politics, but rather to concepts already losing their relevance to much of Western politics. Perhaps the law of uneven historical development has its inexorable counterpart in the development of conceptual perspectives in area studies.

Even the remote danger that our uninhibited enthusiasm for the group approach is encrusting us in conceptual obsolescence is sufficient reason to pause and reflect critically. That is our purpose here. If our tone is polemical, it is not meant to indict proponents unfairly, but rather to indite problems clearly. As a navigational reference point in this endeavor to gain our bearings, let us be clear about what we should expect of a model of politics. Huntington's criteria for a model, if it is "to be accepted and useful," offer just such a lodestar.[13]

> (a) It should highlight some aspect of social reality; it should distinguish what is of critical importance in the political experience of the society from what is of peripheral significance. (b) It should be comparative; it should call attention to the principal similarities and differences between the politics of the society and those of other societies. (c) It should be dynamic, in the sense that it should account for change (and continuities) in the political experience of the society.

Does the group concept meet these criteria in the Soviet context? Does it make sense in terms of Soviet political experience? Does it

[11] Huntington, "Paradigms of American Politics: Beyond the One, the Two, and the Many," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 89 (March 1974), 7.

[12] For a critique, see Peter H. Odegard, "A Group Basis of Politics: A New Name for an Ancient Myth," *Western Political Science Quarterly*, XI (September 1958), 689-702. For an effort to go beyond it, see Theodore J. Lowi, *The Politics of Disorder* (New York: Basic Books 1971). For a historical perspective, see G. David Garson, "On the Origins of Interest Group Theory," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68 (December 1974), 1505-19.

[13] Huntington (fn. 11), 12.

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highlight the critical and the significant? Is it a valid comparative concept if it is restricted to analysis of a limited diffusion of power among elites? What does it encourage one to believe about change in Soviet society?

## "Critical Importance" versus "Peripheral Significance"

Several scholars, in attempting to view Soviet politics from the perspective of the group concept, have revealed an awareness that they cannot give positive answers to these questions about highlighting the important political reality. Take, for example, Philip Stewart, who prefaces his group approach to the Stalingrad Oblast with the admission that "it may be argued with some justification that it is impossible to describe the Soviet system in these terms because interest groups, in the Western sense, either do not exist or are so controlled that they lack the political resources to translate their claims into public policy. . . ."[14] Yet he insists that at least some groups do "participate in the policy process," presumably meaning that they can "translate their claims into public policy." How does that translation take place? In trying to demonstrate the potential influence of one of his classes of groups, Stewart answers this question in less than compelling fashion. "When a great propaganda campaign is undertaken, normally at the instigation of the central Party authorities, then the potential influence of the propaganda interest groups is increased in relation to other groups." In like manner, if the center focuses on industrial questions, "then the potential influence of industrial interest groups may experience a relative increase." Without challenging the logic of this influence pattern (although a bureaucratic model elucidates it better than the group concept: the staff assistant's potential for influence on organizational policy is greater when he, rather than his competitors, is talking to the boss), one may wonder if it does not run the danger, perhaps unintentionally, of emphasizing the insignificant at the expense of the important. Stewart would surely agree that it is more significant that the central leadership "instigates" a campaign and chooses to place the industrial questions on the agenda. The totalitarian model sins by directing attention mainly to the center's dominating role, to the exclusion of interest in the discretionary power left to the locals. The group approach sins by encouraging one to notice the powerful center only dimly out of the corner of one's eye while focusing on the possibility that, when the propaganda or industrial bu-

[14] Stewart, *Political Power in the Soviet Union* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1968), 3-4.

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reaucrats are given the policy spotlight, they may—if they are shrewd in how they use their stage time—induce the center to shape its policy drama in some small way it had not intended. To meet Huntington's first criterion, the proponent of the group concept must argue that the insinuative role of bureaucratic administrators is of "critical importance in the political experience of the society"; or else, for a limited conceptual relevance, he must contend that the group concept is among the best ways of accounting for this behavior—better than organizational models designed to treat the exercise of local discretion in administration.[15]

A look at the volume of essays on Soviet interest groups edited by Skilling and Griffiths,[16] reveals the same kind of awkward efforts to appear meaningful and relevant. In the lead-off case study, Hough struggles to fit the party *apparatchiki* into the group format, but concludes that he cannot really answer the key questions prompted by the concept.[17] Barghoorn, in his essay on the security police, is so explicitly dubious that one wonders why his piece was included: "There is a certain danger that scholars may be so beguiled by the 'interest group approach' as to lose sight of the broad systemic differences which distinguish Soviet from 'Western' politics."[18] Kolkowicz's treatment of the military shows a complex institution with manifold interests whose access to decision making is poorly understood, and whose "numerical representation in the Central Committee reached greatest strength during periods of distinct political inferiority."[19] Does the group concept help us make sense of what we learn here about the military? Not really. Hardt and Frankel introduce us to the "industrial managers" as an interest group. Yet, they admit that "there is little direct evidence of managerial self-assertiveness in the post-Stalin years. . . ." There is evidence, however, of managerial "desire to achieve operational autonomy. . . ."[20] These statements are fair enough. They report the empirical realities described in Western monographic literature on economic enterprises; an explanation in terms of the group concept provides doubtful implications when these realities are considered in their more textured presentation in the works of Joseph Berliner, David Granick,

[15] In all fairness to Stewart, he is unfailing in acknowledging the theoretical weaknesses and careful in reporting his evidence so that one comes away from his study with a more concrete appreciation of Soviet regional politics even if one finds the group concept superfluous in his work.

[16] Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 4).

[17] "The Party Apparatchiki," *ibid.*, 91-92.

[18] "The Security Police," *ibid.*, 94.

[19] "The Military," *ibid.*, 168.

[20] "The Industrial Managers," *ibid.*, 194.

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and others. We are encouraged to anticipate managerial assertiveness although we know from Berliner's study that such assertiveness is most unlikely.[21] We know the Soviet manager is extremely devious and resisting, and we would be greatly surprised if he made common cause with other managers except in illegal deals on deliveries and supplies. Granted, Berliner's study is aging, but a survey of contemporary Soviet literature on deficiencies in Soviet management does not make its conclusions look irrelevant or out of date.

The last three case studies in the Skilling and Griffiths volume are concerned with economists, writers, and jurists. In relating these socio-professional strata to the group concept, the authors are led to the common conclusion that as "interest groups" these professions have been spectacular failures. We learn that Soviet economists have only a marginal reforming impact on economic policy; writers fail to protect their own interests; and jurists are mobilized to flout the laws which it is in their interest to uphold. Are these studies about interest groups or anti-interest groups? Groups capable of sustaining such anti-interest group behavior call to mind some of the satirical lines from Andrei Voznesensky's poem, *Anti-Worlds*, and the technique of renaming things by the canons of misplaced logic. There are in this world: "No women, only anti-men./ Anti-machines howl in the forests."

## Comparative Categories on the Ladder of Abstraction

Huntington's second criterion is that a concept be comparative and useful in understanding similarities and differences between societies. Appropriately, therefore, we find three essays by Skilling and one by Griffiths in their joint volume devoted to persuading us that, indeed, "interest group" is an adequate category for examining the Soviet polity. Thoughtful reading, nonetheless, does not bring conviction. On the contrary, it feeds skepticism and calls to mind Giovanni Sartori's distinguished essay, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics."[22] Sartori points out that taxonomy—that is, getting the right labels on things—is not an order of intellectual activity lower than quantitative analysis. In fact, it is a tricky matter, beset by numerous pitfalls in logic. He warns that we must be careful to notice what happens to a concept as it is moved up and down the ladder of abstraction. "The rules for climbing and descending along a ladder of abstraction are

[21] Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USSR* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1957).

[22] Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64 (December 1970), 1033-53.

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. . . very simple . . . in principle. We make a concept more abstract and more general by lessening its properties or attributes. Conversely, a concept is specified by the addition . . . of qualifications, i.e. by augmenting its attributes or properties." The "extension" of a term, the class of things it denotes, is greatest at the top of the ladder; the "intention" of a term, the collection of attributes it connotes, is greatest at the bottom of the ladder. If a concept is "stretched" to denote a larger class of things, it inevitably loses something in its connotation.

Precisely this mistake in conceptual stretching characterizes the effort to make the term "interest group" denote certain groups and organizations in the Soviet Union. It can only be done by "obfuscating the connotation," to use Sartori's phrase; by ignoring the key attributes that are lost in the move up the ladder of abstraction; and by arriving at a higher rung on the ladder only with "group," having lost "interest," and perhaps more, on the way up.

The proponents of the group concept, to be sure, have not been able to overlook some of the damage to attributes in their efforts to stretch it to include Soviet groups. They have attempted to explain how a group develops consciousness, to what extent its members "interact," how it aggregates and articulates its demands, and the nature of its access to the policy-making circles. A great deal of the explanation, however, depends on glossing over an error in logic, namely, switching back and forth from "naming" to "measuring," from quality to quantity, apparently without realizing the change in logical position.

To all appearances, proponents of the application of the group approach to Soviet politics take this applicability as a question of taxonomy. Are there interest groups in the U.S.S.R.? That is the question that seems to be asked. To convince the doubters, Langsam and Paul begin by treating it as a question about quality and classification; but they soon transform it to a question about quantity and variation. They speak of group politics being on a continuum of "technique" between democratic and authoritarian poles.[23] Skilling is more careful in avoiding explicit use of the continuum image, but the continuum logic is implicit in his arguments. He consistently implies degrees of difference from the American model. If the system is not totalitarian, then it has at least a small degree of pluralism, which in turn permits some degree of group activity, which in turn leads to a modicum of group demand on policy makers. He describes the position of skeptics as arguing that indeed the Soviet system is "qualitatively" different, implying

[23] Langsam and Paul (fn. 9); also see Lodge (fn. 6), for an example of the continuum idea dubiously applied.

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of course that those less than skeptical see it as a matter of degree (albeit very large), not of kind.[24] Griffiths' essay on "tendency analysis" appears to be an attempt to move cautiously on the continuum toward pluralism, but the esoteric idiom in which it is written makes determination difficult.

Rather consistently, then, the proponents of the group concept have failed to clarify what is variable and what is nominal, thereby burdening their argument with an implicit syllogism that many of them would reject in explicit form. The diffusion of power in politics can vary in degree, and Western pluralist systems are polities where power is highly diffused. It does not follow, however, that every polity where power is diffuse (however moderately) is a pluralistic system (however limited) generically, or that it is tending toward that condition by degrees. There are numerious continua for power diffusion; therefore, if we want to develop a concept with nominal validity, we cannot avoid the problem of finding out which continuum the Soviet polity is on. Until we get the taxonomy straight, talk about quantity and degree makes no sense. The issue, then, is definition of category rather than more or less interest-group activity, and it raises elementary questions. Are Soviet groups sufficiently like Western interest groups to warrant inclusion in the category? What attributes are lost in stretching the concept to include Soviet groups? There is no doubt that it can be made to include Soviet groups; the fundamental question is whether, by making it include them, we strip away some of the category's important discriminating attributes.

## DEFINING THE GROUP

*Are public bureaucracies properly classified as interest groups if only public bureaucracies are to be considered?* In Western democracies, where the dualism of state and society has a long tradition, and where the private and public sectors are legally distinct, the tendency has naturally been to consider interest groups as existing primarily in the private sector but acting on the public sector. Bentley and Truman do not encourage us to treat government agencies as interest groups so much as to regard them as objects of interest group penetration and influence, although their definitions are sufficiently elastic to include them.[25] Earl Latham, however, explicitly identifies official bureaucracies

[24] Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 4), 410.

[25] Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1908); David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (2d ed.; New York: Knopf 1971).

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as within his definition.[26] Joseph LaPalombara, in applying the concept to Italian politics, notes in passing that organizations such as the armed forces could be included, although the set of groups he chose for study excluded the state bureaucracy.[27] This point of definition may seem trivial until we consider what is implied if the entire private sector disappears and only public bureaucracies and strata of state employees are left to be counted as interest groups. Are we dealing here with a quantitative or a qualitative change? Would Latham still find the group concept so appealing if he were studying a society where there are no private groups?

To some scholars the difference seems to be not a matter of degree but a distinction of qualitative importance. Reinhard Bendix, for example, believes that rather fundamental differences in social and political development result from the condition of society in which the heads of economic production units manage those organizations for their own economic ends, as opposed to the condition in which administrative officials manage them.[28] In the latter case, management becomes subordinated to superordinated hierarchies and thus to political rather than primarily to economic considerations. Specifically, Bendix has in mind the contrasting approaches to industrialization in Russia and the West. He credits Lenin with "the most important modern formulation of the conflict between action based upon political as opposed to economic principles."

Another student of comparative politics, Fred Riggs, sees qualitative distinctions between polities depending on who holds the public bureaucracy accountable for administration of policies.[29] In Western democracies, the electorate and private associations hold the administrators to account. In bureaucratic polities, no one but the administrators themselves can call an accounting. In totalitarian states, a cadre party holds the administrative apparatus to task. In this perspective, of course, one can argue that in the Stalinist period, the U.S.S.R. was more aptly described by Riggs's bureaucratic model than by his notion of a totalitarian scheme; today, with a large portion of party members in the upper reaches of the key bureaucracies, the distinction between the party and the bureaucracy tends to become academic. Concerning accountability for policy, are we not, then, dealing with a different

[26] Latham, "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory," *American Political Science Review*, XLVI (June 1952), 389.

[27] LaPalombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1964), 19.

[28] Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry* (New York: Wiley 1956), 1-21.

[29] Riggs, *Thailand: Modernization of a Bureaucratic Society* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press 1966), 181ff.

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order of polity when we move from a pluralist Western state to the U.S.S.R.?

The power of interest groups to make office holders account for policy in the United States is the central idea for Bentley and for Truman. For Lenin, the central idea was to "put the lid" not only on factionalism within the party, but to design a political system that could ignore the kinds of interests characterized by "economism" in the trade-union movement. Stalin's administrative design of the collective farm system implemented this Leninist idea in the agrarian sector. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 demonstrated that the Soviet leaders' affection for this Leninist-Stalinist tradition has not evaporated with de-Stalinization. On the contrary, it could be extended beyond Soviet borders into brotherly socialist states.

Of course, it can be argued that the stifling impact of bureaucracy is hardly a Soviet monopoly. It has grown in the Western democracies to a point where some students of the matter believe the public-private dichotomy has lost its former significance. Karl Mannheim has warned that the old dualism between the public and the private is obsolete because the stifling of freedom is just as great in the large private bureaucracies of modern industrial society as it is in a state bureaucracy.[30] Philip Selznick takes a more optimistic view of the same development when he urges the leaders of large private bureaucracies to realize that they are effectively public leaders with public responsibilities, not purely private individuals pursuing narrow economic interests.[31] This line of analysis, however, does not undercut the argument about qualitative differences. Instead, it calls into question the adequacy of the interest-group concept for understanding American politics today. Indeed, Galbraith's analysis of the American economy and Lowi's critique of "liberalism" are concerned respectively with the passing of the competitive market place and the waning of groups as the dynamic factor in the pluralist polity.

*Are factions interest groups? Are oligarchies interest groups?* If the answer is yes, then the distinction between the elite model of policy making and the pluralist model fades—a fading not convincing to those who see a genuine difference between the view of policy making embodied in C. Wright Mills's *The Power Elite* and in Edward Banfield's *Political Influence*. Banfield reasons that if a small elite of "powerful" men in Chicago, rather than a plurality of "interested"

[30] Mannheim, *Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning* (New York: Oxford University Press 1950), 42-43.

[31] Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (New York: Harper and Row 1957).

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organizations, had made the policies examined in his study, the policies would have been significantly different. One is forced to wonder, therefore, if Sidney Ploss is justified in equating Soviet *gruppirovki*—small factions within the elite—with interest groups.[32]

The distinction is important if it is assumed that interest groups are truly interested in certain policy outcomes. Soviet experience shows us that factions, unlike the presumed interest groups, can be more interested in having the power to make policy than in making particular policies. Once Stalin defeated Trotsky in a factional struggle, he did not hesitate to borrow heavily from Trotsky's policy proposals. In the military department, when Frunze replaced Trotsky, he took up Trotsky's military policies with a zest that surprised and alienated some of his Red Commander factional support. The Khrushchev who condemned Malenkov for increasing the emphasis on light industry was the same Khrushchev who peddled "goulash communism" a few years later. It is almost an article of faith in much of the analysis of Soviet politics that the careers of party leaders and their factional followings are inexorably tied up with the success of certain policies. It is not at all clear, though, that the efficacy of a policy is a valid criterion for success in retaining power. It certainly will not explain key aspects of Stalin's career.

But what about the web of factional linkages that extend from a Politburo member downward in Soviet society? Is it not arguable that such a web is effectively an interest group? Carl Lande, using the anthropological concept of "dyadic groups"—that is, a pair of persons in a social relationship—makes a very interesting case for a typology of groups which draws a clear distinction between the interest group and the group formed as a web of dyadic relationships. His main argument is that "dyadic structures perform tasks differently than do groups described by the 'group theory' of politics."[33] Cliques and personal followings in the U.S.S.R., in Lande's view, are reminiscent of the dyadic structures in pre-modern politics, not simply a special case of interest groups.

How should we classify the "family group" which is so notorious in the lower levels of Soviet administration? Is it best viewed as an interest group, although a very special kind? Is it an inchoate interest grouping? Ada Finifter's examination suggests insights into the dynamics of the family group and why it is perhaps a mistake to see it

[32] Ploss, "Interest Groups," in Alan Kassof, ed., *Prospects for Soviet Society* (New York: Praeger 1968), 76-102.

[33] Lande, "Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the Group Theory of Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 67 (March 1973), 120.

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as an inchoate interest group.[34] Finifter's study, of course, concerns Americans, and it concludes from survey data that strongly knit friendship groups provide members with the kind of emotional support that makes them able to hold deviant political opinions and resist pressures for conformity from the larger community. It is probably less their friendship and more their common vulnerability to legal prosecution that integrates members of the Soviet "family group," but the small grouping does seem to provide the kind of support Finifter has discovered elsewhere. Perhaps it is not so much political deviancy as deviant actions in economic and personnel activities that its members feel more secure about committing. The important point, however, is that deviancy is an unlikely basis for amalgamating clusters of family circles and larger group action. On the contrary, it would seem to stand in the way of such incipient tendencies. If it did lead to aggregation, the regime would consider it either criminal or counter-revolutionary, not lobbyist. In other words, one could argue that the high incidence of family circles in the Soviet system blocks transition toward interest-group activity.[35]

Finally, concerning oligarchies as groups, Robert Michels has told us that oligarchies are a phenomenon of modern organization that prevents political parties from truly representing the interests of mass members.[36] If we treat oligarchies as interest groups, we obscure Michels's insight, one that is related to the general problem of the vanishing dualism of the public and private sectors. Perhaps oligarchies can be analyzed as interest groups, but such analysis will neglect what is of greatest importance about oligarchies.

*Are groups that refuse to pursue their ostensible or apparent interests really interest groups?* This question must be taken seriously if the group concept is to be applied seriously to Soviet politics. There is an axiom of sub-unit organizational behavior that is almost never questioned by students who use either a group or bureaucratic model. Although it has become conventional wisdom, it was developed rather rigorously by Philip Selznick in his study of the TVA bureaucracy.[37] Sub-units tend to develop their own aims at the expense of the organization's goals. In other words, parochial interests are to be ex-

[34] Finifter, "The Friendship Group as a Protective Environment for Political Deviants," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68 (June 1974), 607-25.

[35] See Odom, *The Soviet Volunteers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1973), chap. XVI and the Conclusions, for development of this line of reasoning.

[36] Michels, *Political Parties* (2d ed.; New York: Free Press 1968).

[37] Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1953).

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pected in almost any sub-unit of any organization. Thus, the logic runs, any sensible student knows *a priori* that sub-units of the Soviet polity have interests of this sort. By this reasoning, for example, it is assumed that the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, a sub-unit of the Ministry of Defense, pursues its interest in getting more rockets. Viewed in the same light, the Minister of Agriculture is assumed to be "interested" in getting more machinery for agriculture or some other allocation advantage for his area of responsibility.

It was Selznick, however, who later developed the antithesis to this axiom. In his study of Communist organizational tactics, he concludes that one of their general functions "is that of *eluding the need to win consent* as a condition for . . . wielding power."[38] The general problem of organization that Lenin solved is, in Selznick's view, transforming a voluntary association into a managerial, or paramilitary, structure. Members are turned into agents, and are no longer individuals looking after their own parochial interests. In other words, Communist penetration of an association could lead that association to behave in a way not at all consistent with what one might believe to be its own interests, or what most of its members believed those interests to be. The Communist scheme, taking advantage of what Michels saw as the power of oligarchies to behave dictatorially, makes sure that the key members of a particular oligarchy, as party agents, hold the party's values above the oligarchy's parochial interests. The distinguishing characteristic of a party member is that he can be counted on to subvert the sub-unit's self-interest. In the Soviet experience, to be sure, party members are not always as reliable as desired. Therefore, the agent role is supplemented by the KGB, informer networks, and "specialists." Solzhenitsyn's account of the Soviet camp system provides extremely valuable evidence of the dual and triple system of organization. The author points out how a military commander and a renowned director of a scientific institution alike will reverse policy, even subvert their own institutions, if the "specialist" on their staff suggests that "considerations" warrant such apparently irrational behavior.[39]

These paradoxical groups either press no parochial demands or have their demands rigged from above rather than reflect genuine preferences held by the group members—however imperfect the reflection. Francis Castles cogently calls this a "totalitarian paradox"—the absence

[38] Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1960), 318; emphasis in original.

[39] See Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago* (New York: Harper & Row 1974), 147ff.

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of interest articulation in the Soviet system.[40] As he explains it, the very logic of Soviet organization is aimed at finding out for the leadership the nature of the individual's interests, while at the same time utterly obstructing the aggregation of such interests as are shared by several individuals. Letter writing by individuals venting their demands on editors, political leaders, and officials, is encouraged—as long as it is an individual matter. Petitions, however, or any action that unites the demands of two or more persons, are taboo.

Defining the group in Soviet politics, it should be clear by now, is not a simple task. Skilling, of course, can insist that he has not urged us toward an "attempt arbitrarily to apply to the Soviet system interest-group theories which have been developed in the West . . . ,"[41] but that merely begs the crucial question: can the concept be stretched in a thoughtful way to make it meaningful for the Soviet context without damaging several of its key attributes—the ideas and assumptions that it connotes which make it more than a trivial notion?

### DEFINING INTERESTS AND ISSUES

Bentley dismisses the problem of defining "interest" with a terse tautology: "There is no group without its interest. An interest . . . is the equivalent of a group," and elsewhere, "When groups are adequately stated, everything is stated."[42] For Truman, "Shared attitudes . . . constitute the interests"[43]—a risky definition, he admits, because it requires no action by individuals from which interests can be inferred. If interest groups are viewed as formal organizations, as they are in many of the case studies on Soviet groups, defining their interests is not unlike seeking a workable definition for "organizational goals," a quest by no means ended, and one about which there is a lively literature.[44] Thus the problem of defining "interest" is far from resolved, even in the concept's application to American politics.

Some curious insights turn up when scholars pay special attention to "interest" and to "issues." For example, Mancur Olson's examination of the case in which a group is seeking a collective benefit leads him to the perhaps surprising conclusion that the rational group member will contribute nothing to achieving the object of shared interest.[45] The rational member will contribute only when he stands to receive non-

[40] Castles, "Interest Articulation: A Totalitarian Paradox," *Survey*, No. 73 (1969), 116-32.

[41] Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 4), 21.

[42] Bentley (fn. 25), 211, 208.

[43] Truman (fn. 25), 34.

[44] See Lawrence B. Mohr, "The Concept of Organizational Goal," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 67 (June 1973), 470-81.

[45] Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (New York: Schocken 1968).

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collective benefits. In the case of collective benefits, it makes sense to try to avoid contributions because the benefit, if it is secured, cannot be denied to any particular member. In another example, the authors of a major empirical study of American business and tariff policy report that definition of interest was not always clear to a group's partisans; the partisans might easily have been persuaded that their interest was in the opposite direction![46] The concept of "interest," therefore, is sandy ground upon which to build a model, without even considering the ambiguities introduced by making it a comparative concept.

In a critical review of the above-mentioned study of American business, Theodore J. Lowi suggests that the nature of issues is an important factor in determining the kind of group behavior to be expected; on the whole, he finds the group concept wanting as a means of explaining most pressure-group activity.[47] Making some general distinctions among issues, he classifies them as (a) distributive, (b) regulatory, and (c) redistributive. To be sure, he acknowledges that in the long run all issues are redistributive, but insists that in the day-to-day legislative context they do not all look that way to lobbyists. The "distributive" issue is of the pork-barrel sort, something to be distributed, and something that can be disaggregated. The pluralist group model is not descriptive of the way these issues are resolved. Groups try to avoid conflict on distributive matters; coalitions tend to be weak, to break up as the pork is parceled out. The "redistributive" issue tends to generate not so much a conflict among groups as a class struggle: those from whom something is taken against those who receive it. Welfare programs are an example. The "regulatory" issue, because it is about rules that cannot be disaggregated like pork in the distributive case, does in fact induce group conflict. It alone seems to provide relevance for the pluralist and the group models.

If closer examination of the relation between kinds of issues, interests, and resulting group activity reveals a shrunken utility for the group concept in American politics, what does it mean for the concept's relevance to Soviet politics? The first impression is that redistributive issues predominate in Soviet policy making. The "law of primitive socialist accumulation" is ideological rhetoric meant to justify the kind of sweeping and cruel redistribution witnessed in Soviet collectivization and rapid industrialization. Soviet ideologues would agree

[46] H. A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and L. A. Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton 1963), 398.

[47] Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 677-715.

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with Lowi that the "class struggle" model is appropriate to describe this process, although they would probably disagree about its continuing relevance in the contemporary "classless" Soviet society. Pork-barrel issues are undoubtedly rampant within the Soviet economic planning process and in the administration of the economy, but Lowi tells us that the interest-group concept is not very descriptive of the resolution of this type of issue.

What about regulatory issues? If there is a conflict arena for such issues, it is limited to higher party circles. And if we are to judge by regulatory policies as they issue from the Soviet governmental process, they seldom look as though they had been made for the accommodation of special interests below the top. Rather, they often look like schemes devised by a small elite which is jealous of its authority and fearful of being cheated by its vast army of administrators in the giant bureaucracy. The Soviet decision to abide by international copyright laws might be an interesting case study. What at first appeared to be a compromise move in accepting certain regulatory policies aimed at protecting the rights of Soviet authors from the pirating of their works by foreign publishers turns out to be a scheme for curbing "deviant behavior" such as a dissident writer's decision to send his work abroad for publication without state permission. Philip D. Stewart's analysis of the elimination of production education in the Soviet secondary schools in 1964 may have involved a regulatory issue in Lowi's sense.[48] The new law was not disaggregative. Either all of those interested would be affected or none at all. But the case study remains ambiguous because we cannot be certain that there was truly an issue.

The regulatory issues, nonetheless, remain the ones around which something like group conflict could, in principle, emerge in the U.S.S.R. If it did, it would signal a fundamental departure from the Leninist system. As mentioned earlier, Selznick highlighted the Bolshevik technique of dual power and "eluding the need to win consent." If the group approach is relevant, the "organizational weapon" of Leninism has been neutralized.

In passing, two observations are necessary to punctuate the discussion of the regulatory issue. First, the regime's capacity to elude the need for consent appears sufficiently large to restrict cases of genuine group conflict to a small number of an exceptional nature. Second, the best prospects for this kind of group conflict in the U.S.S.R. can be found in those groups which have established a base of foreign support

[48] Stewart, "Soviet Interest Groups and the Policy Process," *World Politics*, XXII (October 1969), 29-50.

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through religious and ethnic ties, literary renown, and scientific achievement. Such support is maintained through the community of foreign correspondents in Moscow, foreign radio broadcasts, and the Soviet leaders' respect for their sentiments. The regime has chosen in some instances to concede something to the demands of these groups. Seen from this perspective, it is easy to understand why Senator Jackson has sought a Soviet commitment to an emigration quota which would transform what is effectively a distribution issue into a regulatory issue. If the Politburo keeps all these issues—such as the Solzhenitsyn case, emigration, *samizdat*, and many others related to the dissidents—in the distributive class rather than letting them become regulatory, then genuine group activity, even if propped up by foreign support, is unlikely to develop or persist. It is not for nothing that the Democratic Movement has been centrally concerned with Soviet law, and how rights are regulated. Through legal arbitrariness, the regime has traditionally disaggregated even the regulatory issues.

It is not original to call attention to the ambiguities in the idea of "interest."[49] It is important, however, to discover what is lost and what is unintentionally introduced by stretching the notion to embrace Soviet politics.

Ploss suggests that the "special interests" in the effective organs of Soviet government "are ultimately philosophic, with rival ideas about how to govern the society and conduct foreign policy. . . ."[50] The issues of Soviet politics in his opinion are, "What kind of role should be performed by the Communist Party apparatus?" "What is the best way to realize the potential of the economy?" and "What means should be used to gain international advantage?"[51] The essays on specific Soviet groups in the Skilling and Griffiths volume, to be sure, treat issues and interests of the kind Ploss describes. The chapters on the managers, the economists, and the party *apparatchiki* are concerned with the question of economic efficiency, the role of the apparatus, etc. Strangely, however, these issues do not fit into Lowi's three classes—distributive, regulatory, and redistributive. They are too general. They have been pushed up Sartori's ladder of abstraction so far that they have lost the distributive and regulatory connotations except in a very broad sense.

A special danger to analysis arises when one is dealing with issues at that level of abstraction. We have already noticed that Soviet political history is replete with examples of factions implementing the

[49] See, for example, Odegard (fn. 12).
[50] Ploss (fn. 32), 78.
[51] *Ibid.*, 100-102.

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policies of defeated opponents. It is difficult to know, therefore, where factions truly stand on the issues. The analyst is faced with discovering who is married to whom during a scene of changing partners. Perhaps the bourgeois convention of marriage of "interest" to "group" has been cast off in the new proletarian polity! The difficulty particularly confronts the analyst who chooses to treat strata of the intelligentsia as interest groups—scientists, for example, or economists, and perhaps even professionals such as managers. Various sub-sets of these groups tend to get on all sides of the "philosophic" issues identified by Ploss. Gallagher and Spielmann, in trying to account for the leadership's grip on the scientists, show us rather cogently that even where a small faction of scientists sells its schemes to the party chief and brings scientific acclaim to the U.S.S.R., the power of the faction is not necessarily enhanced. On occasion it has led to the party chief's aiding that faction's opponents.[52]

## The Dynamic Character of the Model

Does the group concept help us account for continuity and change in Soviet politics? It certainly encourages us to expect change, but it may mislead our expectations and encourage a mistaken understanding of change and continuity.

Although the proponents of the group concept warn us that it must be skillfully adapted to the Soviet setting, they find it difficult to drop certain inherent assumptions without destroying the concept. For example, the source of policy initiative—the source of preferences and policy impetus—is assumed to reside with groups. Groups, however they are defined, make demands on the policy makers. LaPalombara, in his application of the concept to Italian politics, explicitly excludes groups that make no policy demands.[53] The model's very logic of power distribution prescribes a plurality of power centers, each with a demand posture in its relation to the policy process. One is encouraged, therefore, to anticipate this kind of posture on the part of Soviet groups. It is argued that they may not have it now, but that there are mechanisms which offer potential influence for making group demands effective. Presumably, that influence will grow; surely that must be the prediction if the group concept is to become increasingly relevant. But is that a valid presumption? Is it a compelling prediction about the truly significant currents of Soviet politics?

[52] Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense* (New York: Praeger 1972), 72-73.

[53] LaPalombara (fn. 27), 16.

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Three examples will suffice to indicate the complexities glossed over by such anticipation. First, the logical metamorphosis for this kind of change is from policy initiative originating wholly at the top, in a narrow circle of elites, to a system where policy initiative is in large part taken by intermediate groups and where policy making is a brokerage matter, incremental, and detached from long-range planning. In principle such a metamorphosis could occur, but is it inexorable or highly probable? Could not the change stop at a kind of stalemate in which the intermediate groups are able to obstruct and block central policy, as well as exercise discretion over certain limited matters left to them by default? They may be too frightened and isolated to risk the systemic transition that would be required to reduce the center from a dictatorship to a broker among competing interests. A no-policy impasse seems just as likely as a full transition—perhaps more likely. In that event, it might make sense to speak of "resistance group politics" but not of "interest group politics."

The second example is closely related: how do the nationalities fit into the group concept? Can they be legitimized even tacitly as interest groups, without raising the danger of the dissolution of the Soviet Union? Does not the nationality problem place a severe limit on how far other groups would voluntarily go in securing their own autonomy for influencing policy? Will not the economists, the *apparatchiki*, the managers, and the military—groups identified in the Skilling and Griffiths volume—willingly climb back into their totalitarian fetters rather than invite a civil war over secession by the national republics? Can political development of the kind anticipated in the group concept go very far without inviting a nationality crisis? Is not much of the pro-Stalinist sentiment that one finds here and there in the Soviet press, and which one hears voiced privately in many quarters in the Soviet Union, prompted by the fear of political anarchy that group developments could create?

The third example concerns the legal order of a polity. If group conflict is to develop without leading to anarchy or civil war, then there must be rules—norms of political behavior—which are accepted as self-binding or enforceable on all parties, even on the rulers themselves. In a word, constitutionalism must be an internalized feature of the political culture. The group approach, therefore, encourages us to anticipate the development of a modicum of constitutionalism in Russia. The use of law to achieve administrative coordination in social and economic activity, to be sure, has a long tradition in Russia, but

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the idea of law as a constraint on central authority is distinctly alien to the Muscovite tradition. And it is hardly congenial to the Bolshevik tradition of "democratic centralism." The change we are encouraged to expect, therefore, would have to break some rather pervasive and ancient legal habits.

It is of particular interest, in view of this problem of law, that the single issue uniting several ideological trends within the Soviet dissident movement is constitutional rights. Although A. D. Sakharov, Roy Medvedev, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn disagree on many major issues, they stand united on the conviction that political leaders must be held accountable by certain legal norms, especially where the rights of individual citizens are concerned.

Constitutionalism flickered only briefly in the nineteenth century. After the Decembrists failed in 1825, the idea gradually lost its appeal. Neither spokesmen for the autocracy nor for the revolutionaries defended constitutionalism. The revolutionaries just as much as the autocracy disdained legal restraints on political power. When the door appeared to open slightly to constitutionalism after the Russo-Japanese War, liberal forces failed to rally in sufficient numbers to push it through. Are the chances for constitutionalism better today than they were in the past? The group concept would seem to dictate an affirmative answer. Yet it is difficult to believe that Soviet dissidents in defense of constitutional rights are becoming the mainstream of Soviet political change.

## Aspects of Russian Political Culture

The dynamic character of a model must be in tune with the historical peculiarities and developments of a polity, or it is likely to encourage anticipations that will be out of tune with the polity's future development. This is, of course, the concern we are raising when we begin to look for social forces in the Soviet Union which would and could make the interest-group concept appropriate. Andrei Amalrik, the young dissident Soviet historian, tells us that as he looks around in Soviet society, he sees only one such politically conscious stratum—an amorphous intelligentsia, too small and too weak to impose the rule of law.[54] Taking the longer historical perspective, Henry L. Roberts has observed that in the succession to Khrushchev we are perhaps observing the "re-articulation" of Russian society in important new groups—managers, intellectuals, bureaucrats—the original articulation

[54] Amalrik, "Will the USSR Survive until 1984?" *Survey*, No. 73 (1969), 47-79.

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having occurred in the course of the nineteenth century, only to be disrupted by the destructive and atavistic Stalinist period.[55]

In these two rather different assessments against the backdrop of Russian history, we have, it seems, both a sophisticated defense and a telling prosecution of the model on trial. Roberts, however, is careful to say that processes of rearticulation "are clearly of a long-range nature," and to add that he was "impressed by the persistence of the Stalinist heritage. . . ." In other words, the relevance of the group concept in the short run in the Soviet Union would appear marginal: a concept that does not focus our attention on the essential character of the system, but rather on a vague possibility of long-term evolution.

What, then, is the essential character of the system? What gives it stability if there is no infrastructure of groups? The totalitarian model has the virtue of confronting and answering this kind of question, but it addresses only the postrevolutionary period. Political culture does not alter so quickly. What held the old regime together? Was it "articulation" of Russian society, the groups and institutions growing up after the Great Reforms? Or was it those illegal groups in the revolutionary movement? Although Roberts may be quite right about the extent and importance of this articulation, is it not arguable that precisely that articulation destabilized the old regime and made it so vulnerable in a crisis? If one looks at Russian society through Franco Venturi's eyes, seeking the "roots of revolution," one also sees something of the stability of the regime in the repeated failures of the various revolutionary factions. Let us consider for a moment what reformers and revolutionaries themselves believed they were up against.

Russia, in their perception, had a tradition of positively rejecting interest groups. Herzen, in the 1850's, described the rule of Nicholas I as "preventive Bonapartism." He noted that "Russia is a land of contradictions and extremes. There is Communism below, despotism above, and between them—unsure of itself—is the nobility, fearing a jacquerie from below, and banishment and forced labor from above."[56] Speaking of the intelligentsia after the Crimean War, Kavelin observed to Herzen that they "were certainly no constitutionalists. As far as they were concerned, being liberal meant only the creation of free public opinion, capable of influencing the monarch by means of the press and ideas, but not by means of political organizations. They rejected

[55] Roberts, "Succession to Khrushchev Perspective," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, XXVIII (April 1965), 2-12.

[56] See Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, trans. by Francis Haskell (New York: Grosset and Dunlap 1952/1966), 95.

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not only conspiracies but any legal organization which might give effect to their ideas." The Slavophiles defined this situation even more clearly: "power had always resided in the Tsar, and opinion in the people, and . . . these two forces should be completely independent."[57]

This sharp distinction between opinion making and policy making, however, did not hold the imagination of all the intelligentsia. Chernyshevsky, concerned deeply with mass oppression, could not accept the surrender of reform initiative to the crown. He came to understand that lack of social articulation actually stabilized the autocracy. He was distressed because the peasants' single form of expressing policy demands was anomic behavior—mutiny and revolt.[58] It could be argued that his famous question, "what is to be done?" really asks what is to be done to achieve social articulation. In a sense, therefore, much of the discussion and debate about the socialist nature of the Russian village, the *obshchina* organization, can be interpreted as a debate about how to organize—or aggregate—interests from below in an agrarian society. According to Venturi, Bakunin saw the *obshchina* as "in a position to resist, fight against, and eventually destroy the state."[59] In other words, the *obshchina* was the organizational basis and "anarchy" was the political doctrine in his scheme for taking the policy initiative away from the crown and placing it below, with the peasant masses. Thus he saw as the ideal a "free federation of free *obshchinas*." Bakunin distinctly anticipated what Lipset, Trow, and Coleman discovered about democracy's greater persistence in federations of previously independent union locals, as compared to unions in which the federation has been imposed from above.[60] Bakunin's scheme amounted to a genuine metamorphosis of the Russian political system, and it might be argued that the failure of this idea of using anarchism to give the Russian masses a structured "demand" orientation toward government stands even today as a monument to the failure of pluralism and the survival of the autocratic policy tradition in Russia.[61]

Others, of course, had different answers for the question of what was to be done, but there was surprising agreement on what it was that something must be done *about*: the ability of the regime to hold the

[57] *Ibid.*, 99. [58] *Ibid.*, 145-86. [59] *Ibid.*, 437.

[60] Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow, and James Coleman, *Union Democracy* (New York: Anchor Books 1956), 448ff.

[61] It may seem strange to link Bakunin to the pluralist model until one remembers that pluralism has radical implications for the concept of state and the state's role vis-à-vis groups. See Garson (fn. 12), 1505-19, for a review of criticism of the pluralist model in Bentley's day. Bertrand Russell, W. Y. Elliot, and others recognized "the danger of political power in the hands of undemocratic private groups."

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policy initiative and do nothing. That ability—or stability—derived from lack of mass political consciousness, a lack sustained by an almost religious belief in the virtue of the Tsar, who was thought to be deceived by his vast bureaucracy of landowning officials. Dispute among the revolutionaries arose over how to strike down this false belief and how to generate mass political awareness; that is, how to achieve a demand orientation from below. That problem persisted right down through the rise of Social Democracy in Russia. Lenin's famous pamphlet giving the Bolshevik answer about what was to be done, was, however, a reversal of all the revolutionary tradition of the previous century. He would not tolerate the diffusion of power that was implicit in petty trade unionism. The heresy of "economism" might well have been called the heresy of the "group approach"; the political implications caricatured as economism by Lenin would have meant some kind of competitive arena in which political parties could not dictate public policy, but would have to work as brokers and representatives for diverse and conflicting economic interests. As for the peasants, it was their mutinous mood and lack of articulation in organizations that made them attractive to Lenin as members of the revolutionary coalition. As long as they remained politically amorphous, Lenin could exploit their anomic behavior without falling prisoner to their interests.

After the revolution, when Lenin "put the lid on the opposition" within his own party ranks, he was restoring an important policy tradition of the autocracy.[62] Indeed, the leaders of the various oppositions in the party were not far from the liberals described by Kavelin as believing that they should be free to raise issues and to express differing opinions but that they should, in the final event, leave the policy prerogative with the autocracy—that is, to the dictates of party discipline and democratic centralism.

If the group concept is relevant to any period of Soviet politics, it is the 1920's. But NEP and the independent economic behavior of the peasantry, set in bold relief by the "scissors crisis," vindicated many party members' longstanding fears of the agrarian masses. Once again, policy initiative from below proved unacceptable to key members of the Muscovite oligarchy. Stalin eventually put the lid on this incipient group development with his collectivization scheme, a sort of Bakunin formula in reverse: an unfree association of absolutely unfree village communes, imposed dictatorially from above, designed to retain the

[62] See Leonard Schapiro, *The Origins of the Communist Autocracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1955), for the details of this period and a most appropriate book title.

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broadest policy initiative for the center. Trade unions, mass organizations, and the concept of work collectives in all parts of the nonagrarian sector of Soviet society put the same lid on the urban social strata.

As "socialist construction" succeeded, the new Soviet bureaucracy, like the bureaucratic nobility of the old regime, found itself wedged between the autocratic party peak elites above and a potentially explosive mass of workers—the *kolkhozniki*—plus the national minorities below. There is today a widespread popular faith in the virtues of socialism and the top party leadership not unlike the peasant beliefs about the Tsar in the old regime. At the same time there is popular anger, thinly veiled, at the local and visible ruling bureaucrats, who, it is believed, would be punished if they were only exposed to central party scrutiny. The charge of the Western or Latin heresy, so characteristic of xenophobia in tsarist times, is reincarnated in the capitalist-imperialist heresy of the present age. Finally, the troublesome nationality problem has been exacerbated by Soviet rule, both by a more effective russification policy and by imperial acquisition of new territories during and after World War II.

These perspectives on Russian political culture throw grave doubt on the emergence of even a limited pluralism in the Soviet system in the coming decades. They suggest that the system's stability and dynamism (or lack of dynamism) are centrally related to the weakness of groups, not to inchoate group activity. Formal centralization of power has always been more apparent than real in Russia. The center, down to Soviet times, has always been insecure about that discrepancy between appearance and reality. That insecurity has encouraged leaders to oppose and obstruct every activity or idea that would legitimize divergence—group activity and constitutionalism, for example. Yet power has been and remains dispersed in Soviet society. The indices and contours of power dispersion are visible in the vast amount and variety of deviant behavior: corruption, bribery, *blat*, *tolkachi*, familism, eyewash, and so on. It is doubtful that the Soviet economy could avoid chaos without the informal infrastructure of deviant norms and behavior. The enormous social and psychological tension created by this condition is indicative of a revolutionary, or mutinous, mood rather than regularized social processes moving in a slow but evolutionary manner toward legitimate group activity or constitutionalism.[63]

[63] Taking a historical perspective of the political culture of a society is of course one of the several contemporary efforts to go beyond the totalitarian model. See, for example, Robert C. Tucker, "Culture, Politics, and Communist Society," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 88 (June 1973), 173-90; and Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68 (September 1974), 1171-91.

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## Conclusions

To sum up, the group concept applied to Soviet politics fails to meet at least two and perhaps all three of Huntington's criteria. First, it runs the danger of neglecting the "critical importance" of dictatorship and the center's policy initiative. (Insofar as it emphasizes the nonmonolithic nature of the system—which is important, but hardly a novel insight—it perhaps satisfies this criterion.) Second, as a comparative concept, it introduces errors in logic as well as myriads of ambiguities in definition and taxonomy. Finally, it is more likely to obscure than to clarify the dynamic character of the Soviet system.

There are other reasons for doubting the wisdom of taking the group concept to Soviet politics, the most compelling being its limited utility for studying politics in the United States and other Western societies. Since it can hardly be said to be on the frontiers of political science, it does not promise to bring the study of Soviet politics into the mainstream of comparative politics.

For a critic of an unsuccessful attempt to make the study of Soviet politics more generally comparative, perhaps there is an obligation to offer a better alternative—although failure to meet that obligation does not undercut the validity of the critique. The two tasks are discrete. Nonetheless, this critic has tried to demonstrate, in a narrow monographic study of a Soviet mass organization, that eclectic use of limited Western generalizations about bureaucratic behavior can be a rewarding alternative.[64] Political scientists both within and without the Soviet field have encouraged that approach for several years.[65] It is not highly original, but it does carry certain advantages.

First, there is more flexibility in moving up and down Sartori's ladder of abstraction in choice of categories. Second, it encourages the use of several models for analyzing the same evidence. Scholars like Rigby, who have advocated multiple models for analysis, are persuasive. We really do not have to choose among models in a final sense. Each model, if it is conceptually appropriate—that is, if it meets Huntington's criteria—will reveal valuable insights that are kept in the shadows by other models. Third, "middle range" concepts, especially of organization theory and bureaucracy, help us discover that power can be diffused in a polity in very different ways. Some degree of "plural-

[64] Odom (fn. 35), 323ff.

[65] See, for example, T. H. Rigby, "Crypto-Politics," *Survey*, No. 50 (1964), 192; and H. A. Simon, "The Changing Theory and Changing Practice of Public Administration," in Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., *Contemporary Political Science* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1967), 86-120.

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ism" is not the only alternative to totalitarianism, the extreme in centralized power. Power is diffuse even in concentration camps, but the group concept is hardly the tool for learning *how* it is diffused in that setting. Concepts from organization theory, however, are enlightening about such matters. The major question in the study of Soviet politics is *how* power is diffused. The group concept begs that question by answering it in advance.

In the search for alternative concepts, the totalitarian model should not be dismissed so easily. It has become fashionable to speak with disdain of this excessively monolithic notion of the disposition of Soviet political power. Nonetheless, the model has some fundamental advantages. First, it emphasizes what is truly important in Soviet politics: a high degree of centralized power, with policy initiative wholly reserved for the center. Perhaps it overemphasizes these features, but it does not, as the group concept does, relegate them to secondary importance. Second, it is a comparative concept—not as widely comparative as others, but it was originally conceived as comparative and retains more than a little comparative value for analyzing the systems of all Soviet-style socialist states and people's democracies. Third, it says a great deal about the early dynamics of polities ruled by Communist parties. For later stages, namely post-1953 in the U.S.S.R., it helps focus our attention on key changes that make the system less than totalitarian. In this same connection—and notwithstanding assertions about the unique nature of the totalitarian system—the concept is not ahistorical in the Russian context. Admittedly, some attributes are lost as it is pushed up the ladder of abstraction sufficiently high to give it historical perspective, but on the higher rung it retains a distinctive cluster of original features. In other words, these three advantages mean that it still meets Huntington's criteria better than any rival model to date.

The most persuasive argument for the totalitarian model is to try to imagine the study of Soviet politics without it. We understand contemporary Soviet politics more by the ways in which it departs from the totalitarian model than we do through new models. As time passes, the need arises not so much for a replacement as for supplementary and limited concepts to cover the growing lacunae—concepts developed on the basis of tedious empirical siftings in monographic studies of narrow focus. No less is there a need to accept all the help possible from the historians. Their interpretations of the past can enhance our understanding of the origins and rationale of contemporary Soviet political behavior.

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# DETENTE, EAST-WEST TRADE, AND THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

By ANDRZEJ KORBONSKI*

## Introduction

IN 1975, to write something new or original about East-West trade is a difficult task. One of the byproducts of the U.S.-Soviet détente has been a proliferation of studies dealing with this particular issue. In fact, many of these books, monographs, and articles preceded the détente and paved the way for its acceptance by a significant segment of the American public. Some of the most detailed studies emanated from the Congress;[1] some were commissioned by the White House;[2] others were sponsored by business groups and associations;[3] and still others were written by individuals professionally interested in the expansion of economic relations between East and West.[4] Most if not all of them attempted to provide an *economic* rationale for the *political* rapprochement between the two opposing sides.

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[1] The list of congressional sources dealing with various aspects of East-West trade is by now quite long. Among representative early studies are: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *East-West Trade: A Compilation of Views of Businessmen, Bankers, and Academic Experts*, 88th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1964); U.S., Congress, Senate, Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress for the Committee on Foreign Relations, *A Background Study on East-West Trade*, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1965); U.S., Congress, House, *East-West Trade, Hearings before a Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 90th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1968); U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Basic Documents on East-West Trade*, 90th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1968).

[2] *Report to the President of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade with East European Countries and the Soviet Union* (The White House, April 29, 1965).

[3] American Management Association, "East-West Trade," *Management Bulletin*, No. 51 (1964); Committee for Economic Development, *East-West Trade; A Common Policy for the West* (New York, May 1965), and *A New Trade Policy Toward Communist Countries* (New York, September 1972).

[4] Jozef Wilczynski, *The Economics and Politics of East-West Trade* (London: Macmillan 1969); Samuel Pisar, *Coexistence and Commerce* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1970); Thomas A. Wolf, *U.S. East-West Trade Policy* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath 1973); Zygmunt Nagorski, Jr., *The Psychology of East-West Trade* (New York: Mason & Lipscomb 1974).

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By now the available literature is quite extensive, the arguments tend to be generally familiar, and little if anything can be added without repeating some worn-out clichés and restating some conventional wisdoms. The basic thesis seems to be that the East badly needed Western technology in order to stimulate the lagging growth rate and to raise the standard of living of its population; in order to reach these objectives, it was willing to reduce the level of international tension. On the other hand, the West, faced with growing unemployment, a shortage of raw materials, inflation, and balance-of-payments problems, saw in the East a target of opportunity that would help to alleviate the various crises. The ultimate payoff was to be political rapprochement. Altogether it was a strikingly simple argument; ironically, it appeared that each side had adopted the other's traditional stance. Whereas the United States, despite its denial of the validity of economic determinism, essentially assumed that closer economic relations would lead to better political relations with the Soviet Union, the latter believed that the reverse was in fact true.

The purpose of this article is to take a look at one hitherto relatively neglected aspect of East-West economic relations, namely the impact of East-West trade on the economic integration of Eastern Europe, carried out under the aegis of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Although the history of CMEA since its creation has been examined in a variety of sources, this particular issue has not been widely explored in the literature.[5] Many of the studies of the impact of East-West trade have tended to ignore the existence of the Council. The reason was not difficult to discover: despite the fact that CMEA represented one of the first attempts at institutionalizing economic cooperation on a regional basis, its accomplishments have not been perceived as highly successful by either the East or the West. To be sure, significant progress was made in some areas, and a rather imposing institutional superstructure was erected, but whatever economic gains have been achieved in the region and/or in the individual countries, they were made *in spite* of rather than *because* of the presence of CMEA. There remained a wide gap between promise and fulfillment, and there was no evidence that CMEA members had succeeded in de-

[5] The standard historical account of the first fifteen years of CMEA is M. C. Kaser, *Comecon*, 2d rev. ed. (London: Oxford University Press 1967). The more recent period is analyzed in Henry W. Schaefer, *Comecon and the Politics of Integration* (New York: Praeger 1972). See also Jozef M. van Brabant, "On the Origins and Tasks of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance," *Osteuropa Wirtschaft*, Vol. 19 (September 1974), 182-209; Korbonski, "Theory and Practice of Regional Integration: The Case of Comecon," in Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds., *Regional Integration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1971), 338-73.

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veloping the kind of collective attitude and behavior which are the necessary conditions of viable integration.

However, all this took place in the past. The events of the last few years may well represent a watershed in the expansion of economic cooperation under CMEA auspices. The two major developments were the striking increase in trade between the West and some CMEA members and the relatively sudden emergence of a global shortage of basic raw materials. They were interrelated and were bound to affect the pace, scope, and depth of economic collaboration in Eastern Europe.

There are several approaches that could be used to analyze this process of collaboration. One possibility would be to apply one of the generalized models of regional integration to CMEA, in order to study the impact of East-West trade on the various mechanisms and conditions of integration.[6] Another would be to focus exclusively on the economic aspects of integration, and to trace the effects of a growing volume of trade with non-Communist states on the economic systems of the region.[7] Finally—on the assumption that in the last analysis the movement toward closer economic relations with the West as well as toward closer regional cooperation was above all a political decision—we could concentrate our attention on the national political systems of CMEA members, with special emphasis on the background conditions that influenced the decision makers to move in this or that direction. The last is the general approach we will follow in this paper. In addition, we will examine the proposition that, other things being equal, the continued growth of East-West trade is at the present time incompatible with an increase in the level of economic integration in Eastern Europe.

Before analyzing the problem in greater detail, it is necessary to set straight certain conceptual and definitional issues. First of all, the concept of economic integration is defined broadly as a process by which several countries in a given region develop a common framework that permits them collectively to pursue some goals and implement some policies.[8] In the case of Eastern Europe, the framework was obviously represented by CMEA and its various institutions; the three most frequently mentioned policies were integrated planning, division of labor

[6] Korbonski, "East-West Trade and Integration of Eastern Europe," paper presented at the Conference on International Politics of Eastern Europe (Columbia University, March 1975).

[7] David Pfotenhauer and William A. Welsh, "The Economic Dimension of Integration in Eastern Europe," paper presented at a Conference on Trends in Integration of the East European Community (University of South Carolina, April 1972); David D. Finley, "Some International Pressures and Political Change in Eastern Europe," paper presented at the Western Slavic Conference (San Francisco, October 1973).

[8] Korbonski (fn. 5), 343.

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or production specialization, and intraregional trade. It is difficult to say what the ultimate goals of CMEA were, since they not only have changed over time but have also been interpreted differently by different member-countries. Initially, at least, the main purpose of CMEA was to impose Soviet economic control over the smaller East European countries in order to isolate them from the West and to exploit them for the benefit of the U.S.S.R. Today the rationale for the Council's existence is less clear and reflects a more balanced and complex combination of political and economic demands and interests expressed by all member-states.

East-West trade in this context is defined as embracing all economic transactions between the European members of CMEA (including the Soviet Union), and the non-Communist world. The concept of "economic transactions" includes commodity trade, commercial and investment credits, and industrial cooperation; the term "non-Communist world" denotes the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.

The growth of East-West trade can be measured statistically, but the same is not quite true for the increase in the level of integration, which is difficult to operationalize.[9] Although the expansion of intraregional trade can be relatively easily calculated, the other two CMEA objectives—production specialization and integrated planning—cannot. In neither case is there sufficient empirical evidence to allow us to determine the rate and scope of progress: we have to rely almost exclusively on official pronouncements which more often than not represent wishful thinking on the part of the participants.

Finally, since one of the major foci of this paper concerns the factors influencing the decision-making process in individual East European countries as it related to both East-West trade and regional economic cooperation, we shall also be forced to rely largely on more or less informed guessing and intuition, because our knowledge of the "input" side of the Communist political systems leaves much to be desired.

## East-West Trade and Economic Integration in Eastern Europe: The Early Years

The political and economic processes that occurred in Eastern Europe in the course of the first twenty-five years after World War II have been

[9] For a pioneering attempt, see Joseph S. Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement," *International Organization*, XXII (Autumn 1968), 855-80. See also Roger E. Kanet, "Integration Theory and the Study of Eastern Europe," *International Studies Quarterly*, XVIII (September 1974), 368-92; Cal Clark, "The Study of East European Integration: Method, Madness or Mundanity?" paper presented at the Convention of the International Studies Association (St. Louis, March 1974).

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ably analyzed in the literature; no useful purpose will be served in going over them again.[10] However, from the point of view of the major thesis of this article it may be useful to restate some of the otherwise familiar arguments.

With the sole exception of Czechoslovakia, the East European countries emerged from World War II operating at a fraction of their economic capacity and badly in need of reconstruction aid, which had to come from abroad. Since the region had had minimal contacts with the Soviet Union before the war, and since Germany, the major prewar supplier of industrial goods to the area, was in ruins, the presumption was that the aid, and eventually trade, would come mostly from the West. The rapid increase in trade between Eastern Europe and the West in the early postwar period seemed to strengthen that assumption.[11]

The cold war put an end to the expected expansion of trade and aid. The West gradually imposed its embargo on trade with the East, while the U.S.S.R., using political pressure, succeeded in reducing East-West trade to a trickle, and in diverting East European trade in an easterly direction. The process of trade diversion culminated in the formal establishment of CMEA in January 1949.

During the first half of the 1950's, Eastern Europe went through a process of rapid economic *Gleichschaltung* accomplished essentially without the help of CMEA, which remained largely symbolic and dormant until the end of the decade. The institutional synchronization was achieved by the forced imposition of the Stalinist model of industrialization on the satellite countries, whose ruling elites were appropriately purged and made receptive to innovation diffusion. The overall balance sheet in the mid-1950's showed that the various countries managed, by and large, to lay the foundations for a modern industrial system which could eventually ensure a high rate of self-sustained growth. Despite the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956, the region appeared politically and economically reunited in the 1960's, resting on the two institutional pillars of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and CMEA.

Yet, this otherwise impressive façade contained flaws leading to its

[10] The classic treatment is, of course, Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc*, rev. and enl. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1967).

[11] Van Brabant (fn. 5), 190. In the case of Poland, for example, the United States was the second-largest supplier after the Soviet Union as late as 1948; even in 1949 the shares of imports from the East and from the West (the United States and Western Europe) were almost identical. Thad P. Alton, *Polish Postwar Economy* (New York: Columbia University Press 1955), 278. See also Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, *Western Economic Warfare 1947–1967* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell 1968), 150-66.

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potential disintegration. Some were of an objective or systemic nature, others resulted from contradictory goals, while still others stemmed from major changes in the regional and international environments.

While Eastern Europe on the surface went through the process of industrial revolution with impressive speed, the actual (and future) costs proved to be very high. One of the most significant features—the importance of which became clear only recently—was the fact that the foundations for a modern industrial system were laid on a highly restricted raw materials base. In itself this was not unusual or unique. After all, many other industrialized countries throughout the world had limited natural resources at their disposal. However, the peculiar systemic and political context in which East European industrialization took place made this particular aspect one of crucial importance for the future development of the national economies.

It meant that with one or two exceptions (Poland, Romania), the individual countries were heavily dependent on Soviet supplies of raw materials for their expanding economies. It also meant that, at least for the time being, they were not in a position to develop alternate sources of supply in the non-Communist world. In the final analysis, the Soviet Union would be able to maintain the unity of the alliance through economic means without necessarily resorting to political or military measures. At least that appeared to be the case in the 1960's.

A second interesting feature of East European industrialization, which also was to have far-reaching repercussions, was the growth of autarkic tendencies. The adoption—lock, stock, and barrel—of the Soviet model of development and the subsequent emergence of nearly identical national industrial profiles left little if any room for regional division of labor and growth of regional trade. Construction of parallel production capacities not only inhibited specialization; it also contributed to the strengthening of economic nationalism, which has been the traditional *modus operandi* in the area ever since most of the countries achieved independence or became transformed as a result of World War I.[12] Hence, it was not surprising that in the absence of outside pressure there was little spontaneous movement toward economic cooperation.

That pressure could have come, of course, only from the Soviet Union. For reasons that still remain obscure after more than twenty-five years, the Soviet leadership made no effort to create a formal supra-

[12] For a perceptive discussion, see John M. Montias, "Economic Nationalism in Eastern Europe: Forty Years of Continuity and Change," in Kurt London, ed., *Eastern Europe in Transition* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1966), 173-203.

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national agency that would supervise and guide the process of economic integration in the region. As long as Stalin was alive, CMEA remained essentially on paper; in fact, the political and economic barriers erected among individual countries were probably higher than they had ever been. The consequences of this policy of *divide et impera* were also far-reaching. Despite the apparently area-wide institutionalization of the Stalinist developmental model, control over national economic systems remained largely in the hands of the local elites that were responsible for the actual implementation of policies prescribed by Moscow. As a result, although the basic principles of these policies were followed by all of the countries, there were growing differences in implementation in the areas of collectivization of agriculture, central planning, and foreign trade.[13] Furthermore, the walls separating individual countries from each other not only strengthened autarkic tendencies, but also contributed to the revival of the economic chauvinism that had temporarily been submerged in the name of "one road to socialism." National political and economic elites, largely ignorant of developments in the other countries, pursued their policies independently of each other. There was little serious effort to establish meaningful economic cooperation in the region.

This, then, was the situation in Eastern Europe in the early 1960's when Khrushchev decided to resurrect the CMEA and to transform it into a major integrative instrument in the area. These conditions help to explain the failure of the Soviet initiative, which was eventually abandoned in 1963 in the face of resistance by some of the member-states, led by Romania. For the next decade or so, CMEA showed some progress, mostly in the institutional sphere, but other developments in the individual countries militated against close collaboration. The most important of these developments were the economic reforms undertaken in the mid- and late 1960's, and the gradual resumption of East-West trade.

There is little doubt that both of these policies were products of the process of systemic change that became visible in most Communist societies after the gradual dismantlement of the Stalinist system. It does not matter in this context whether the decision to liberalize the economic systems and to expand trade with the West was principally caused by political or economic considerations. What does matter is that both decisions were closely interrelated, and that both had a major impact on the economic integration of Eastern Europe.

[13] This crucial point has been generally neglected in the literature except by Montias. However, he seems to restrict it to "interstate movement of people and commodities." See his "Obstacles to the Economic Integration of Eastern Europe," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, II (July-October 1969), 41.

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## East-West Trade and Economic Integration of Eastern Europe: The Period of Reforms

It is now a matter of record that during the last few years—especially after the series of treaties involving principally the Soviet Union, Poland, and East Germany on the one hand, and the United States and West Germany on the other—the volume of East-West trade has risen at a very fast rate.[14] Although it still represented a relatively low percentage of the total foreign trade turnover of most Western countries, by 1974 it constituted a substantial share of the total trade of such East European countries as Hungary, Poland, and Romania.[15]

The question to be answered here concerns the reasons which motivated these and other countries in the region to expand their trade with the West. Since, as suggested at the outset, the decision to do so was principally a political one, it will be necessary to examine the attitudes and perceptions of the ruling elites in the different countries—including the Soviet Union which despite the various crises and challenges remained the hegemonic power in the area. In addition it may be useful to investigate the external, non-Communist influences which undoubtedly had an impact on the national decision makers.

In order to simplify the analysis, we should consider the expansion of East-West trade as an integral part of the attempt to modernize and reform the East European economic systems. To be sure, the growth of that trade was not a necessary condition of the economic liberalization that tended to represent the core of the reforms. The examples of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, and Romania showed that a major increase in commercial relations with the West could take place *without* inducing immediate major systemic changes. However, it is likely that these two spheres could be kept apart only in the short run: the effect of Western technology and of the superior quality of imported Western products was bound, sooner or later, to spill over into the Eastern economic system and to induce some, however modest, changes. Here again, the examples of Poland and Romania illustrate this process rather well.

Though one can imagine a short-run "spontaneous" or "autonomous" increase in East-West trade without parallel economic reforms, the reverse does not hold true. It is difficult to think of a major reform

[14] For details, see United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, Vol. 25 (Geneva 1974), 22-74.

[15] For a recent study, see Benedikt Askanas, Halina Askanas, and Friedrich Levcik, "Structural Developments in CMEA Foreign Trade over the Last Fifteen Years (1960–1974)," *Forschungsberichte*, No. 23 (Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, February 1975).

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blueprint which would not emphasize, explicitly or implicitly, the importance of foreign trade in general, and East-West trade in particular.[16] One must assume that the ruling elites which finally approved the reforms realized very well that the implementation of the new rules would result in closer economic contacts with the capitalist world. They must have also been aware of the potential political risks resulting from the economic rapprochement with the West. That the decisions for reform were in fact made by several East European countries could mean one of two things: either the economic situation, in the eyes of the local leadership, necessitated such drastic reversal in foreign economic relations, or the rulers were confident of their ability to handle and contain whatever risks might arise as a consequence of closer economic relations with the ideologically hostile capitalist world.

There is by now a considerable literature discussing the origins and rationale of economic reforms in Eastern Europe.[17] While most of the studies deal either with the background conditions for the reforms or with their content, there are also some attempts to examine the attitudes and behavior of various groups in those countries that decided to overhaul their economies in a more or less comprehensive fashion.[18] It is interesting to note that the two countries that were foremost in making reforms—Czechoslovakia and Hungary—were heavily dependent on foreign trade. Largely without basic raw materials of their own, and yet equipped with a relatively well-developed industry, both countries had to rely on their exports of manufactured goods in order to acquire the necessary raw materials. Both of them, sometime in the early 1960's, had begun to encounter severe problems such as a declining rate of growth, increasing inability to compete with Western products, and the narrowing of the gap between them and the rest of the CMEA members. The answer to these problems in both cases was a far-reaching economic reform, including expansion of trade with

[16] This question is extensively discussed in Imre Vajda and Mihaly Simai, eds., *Foreign Trade in Planned Economy* (Cambridge, England: At the University Press 1971). See also Alan A. Brown and Paul Marer, "Foreign Trade in the East European Reforms," in Morris Bornstein, ed., *Plan and Market* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1973), 153-205.

[17] For an up-to-date account, see Michael Gamarnikow, "Balance Sheet on Economic Reforms," in *Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economies of Eastern Europe* [hereafter referred to as *Reorientation*]. A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, 93rd Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1974), 164-213.

[18] Korbonski, "Bureaucracy and Interest Groups in Communist Societies: The Case of Czechoslovakia," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, IV (No. 1, 1971), 57-79, and "Political Aspects of Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe," in Z. Fallenbuchl, ed., *Economic Development in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger, forthcoming).

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the West. While the Czechoslovak experiment was more or less terminated in August 1968, Hungary, reaping the advantage of being second, has managed to retain the major features of the New Economic Mechanism up to today.

The story of the actual decision-making process leading to the reforms remains yet to be told. On the basis of preliminary investigation, it may be said that the main struggle within the various countries was usually conducted between the bureaucratic and the economic elites. However, the line between the two was not clearly drawn, with large segments of each sitting on the sidelines awaiting the outcome of the contest or ready to join the opposing side.[19] Within the economic elites, the main promoters of the reforms were the professional economists assigned to research institutes and institutions of higher learning, who saw in the reforms a palliative for a variety of economic ills. Foreign trade was perceived as an indispensable instrument of economic modernization. Expanded imports of Western producer and consumer goods were intended to introduce the badly needed element of competition, which would force domestic producers to increase the volume and improve the quality of their output in order to survive. Moreover, the infusion of Western technology and management methods was *ipso facto* expected to contribute to the overall improvement of economic performance on all fronts.

This view was resisted by a significant segment of the managerial elite for reasons that were not difficult to guess. A large majority of the managers had been brought up under the protective umbrella of central planning—which meant that they did not have to worry about management or competition, either domestic or foreign. Now, suddenly, they were to be exposed to both. It was hardly surprising that their attitude toward reforms and expanded East-West trade was, to say the least, lukewarm.

The posture assumed by party and government bureaucrats concerning the reforms was also largely hostile. On the one hand, they resented having their authority diluted in favor of greater managerial autonomy; on the other, some of them feared that increased economic contacts with the West might turn out to be a kind of Trojan horse by means of which the Western powers could penetrate the perimeter of the Communist camp.

This traditional, rigid, and conservative view was counterbalanced to some extent by the more progressive attitude of the younger bureaucratic cadres which had either infiltrated into, or become co-opted

[19] Korbonski, "Bureaucracy . . ." (fn. 18), 67-79.

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by, the ruling establishment.[20] These new elites were not only better educated and hence more open-minded and receptive to expert advice, but, perhaps more importantly, they were much more confident in the ability of the political system to pay the "price of openness" without suffering major shocks. They were far less concerned with capitalist encirclement than with capitalist technology and managerial skills, and they were clearly ready and willing to accept all potential risks.

In the final analysis, of course, the ultimate approval of the reforms rested with the top political leadership which, in Czechoslovakia and Hungary for example, had to arbitrate among competing elites and sub-elites, and which finally agreed to the reforms in the mid- and late 1960's.

The key role played by the top leadership was also illustrated by the examples of Poland and Romania. Following the October 1956 upheaval, the Gomulka regime had embarked on an increasingly conservative policy. The bold plans of economic reforms articulated in the late 1950's were never implemented and the Polish economy entered a decade of stagnation terminated only by Gomulka's ouster in December 1970. It is a matter of record that Gomulka and his immediate entourage had distrusted professional advice and preferred to follow the traditional course which eschewed economic experimentation. This had been particularly true with respect to East-West trade, which was perceived as being harmful and destabilizing, and a major source of political risks. As a result, the performance of the Polish economy throughout the 1960's provided a fitting background for the workers' riots of December 1970.

The assumption of power by Gierek was followed almost immediately by a drastic reversal of Polish economic policy, especially in the realm of East-West trade. Considered as practically the root of all evil only a short time earlier, foreign trade was now proclaimed as the engine of progress which would not only put the economy back on the track, but would also propel it on the path of rapid growth. In the absence of information to the contrary, it must be assumed that this rather striking change was ultimately approved by Gierek himself—further testimony to the continuing importance of top leadership in the

[20] For an interesting discussion, see R. Barry Farrell, "Top Political Leadership in Eastern Europe," and Carl Beck, "Career Characteristics of East European Leadership," in Farrell, ed., *Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Chicago: Aldine 1970), 88-107, 157-94. See also Carl Beck, "Leadership Attributes in Eastern Europe: The Effect of Country and Time," in Beck and others, *Comparative Communist Political Leadership* (New York: David McKay 1973), 86-153; Zygmunt Bauman, "Twenty Years After: The Crisis of Soviet-Type Societies," *Problems of Communism*, XX (November-December 1971), 45-53.

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face of incipient or actual pluralistic tendencies emerging in several Communist societies.

Romania's situation was somewhat different, although it too reflected the crucial role played by the top leadership. The background of the Romanian declaration of economic and partial political independence has been thoroughly examined by John M. Montias; there is nothing that can be added to his perceptive analysis.[21] From our point of view, it is interesting to observe that the decision to weaken the connection with CMEA and to seek economic rapprochement with the West appears to have been the outcome of a mixture of rational and irrational considerations. Romania's refusal to submit to the grandiose CMEA-decreed plan of international division of labor contained elements of both. On the one hand, it might be argued that specialization could be economically justified as giving rise to economies of scale and other advantages. On the other hand, the decision to industrialize on a broad front might have appeared costly and inefficient, and hence not completely rational in the circumstances.

The decision to proceed with the latter through the aid of imports of Western technology was clearly identified with Ceausescu. He quickly imposed his domination over the Romanian political system, and eventually established himself as a traditional nationalistic and autocratic ruler whose roots went back deep into Balkan history and whose connection with Communism appeared to be almost incidental. In this sense, he resembled more the typical leaders of developing countries than his colleagues in the Communist camp. His anti-CMEA and pro-Western stance seems to replicate similar attitudes exhibited by some leaders of the Third World countries.

East Germany, economically the linchpin of CMEA, is possessed of the highest GNP per capita in the region. Chronologically, the German Democratic Republic was the first country to announce a reform of its economic system. At a closer glance, however, it proved to be more shadow than substance, with little or no influence on the reform blueprints adopted by Czechoslovakia and Hungary. At the same time, however, despite its official hostility, East Germany cultivated its trade with the German Federal Republic. The latter not only supplied it with scarce, technologically advanced imports and other commodities, but also assured it of an indirect entry into the European Economic Community, thereby providing an expanded market for East German exports. This connection, although never highly publicized, was the

[21] John Michael Montias, *Economic Development in Communist Rumania* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1967), chaps. 4 and 5.

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object of considerable envy on the part of the other CMEA members who realized quite well the advantages of the arrangement.[22]

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the period of the 1960's and early 1970's was characterized by two sets of major decisions on the part of most members of CMEA: to reform their economic systems and to expand economic relations with the West. We must now examine the attitude of the Soviet hegemon toward both of these decisions on the one hand, and, on the other, discuss the impact of it on the process of economic integration in the region.

## The View from Moscow

The initial attitude of the Soviet Union toward economic reforms in the smaller CMEA countries and toward the increase in East-West trade can only be termed ambivalent. Although a thorough investigation of it is clearly beyond the scope of this article, one may speculate that the overall objective of the reforms—the modernization of the national economies and the resumption of higher rates of growth—were not intrinsically opposed by the Kremlin. Throughout his rule, Khrushchev expressed considerable interest in reforming the Soviet economy; and one of the first major measures passed by the Brezhnev-Kosygin duumvirate shortly after its takeover in 1964 was a half-hearted stab at introducing elements of the so-called Libermanism into the Soviet economic system.

Thus there is no evidence that the U.S.S.R. was particularly concerned about the economic reforms in Czechoslovakia, the first country in the region to engage in them seriously. That may have been due primarily to their essentially noncontroversial nature. The Czechoslovak rulers made a sincere effort to confine the reforms to the economic sphere and, at least until early 1968, largely succeeded in preventing a spillover into the political arena. At the same time, they were most careful to emphasize their country's faithful adherence to WTO and CMEA. There were also signs that in the early stages of the Czechoslovak reforms, the Soviet leadership was not greatly interested in them, and that Soviet scholars and professional economists appeared to be largely ignorant of the meaning and content of the changes.[23] Only in the later stages were the reforms officially attacked as repre-

[22] Schaefer (fn. 5), 34, 75-76. See also John Dornberg, "East Germany: The Special Case," in Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean, eds., *East European Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation* (New York: Praeger 1974), 106-9.

[23] This was my impression, based on several conversations with Soviet economists and government officials during my stay in Prague and Warsaw in 1966–67 and a visit to Moscow in 1970.

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senting a return to capitalism and a destruction of the socialist system.

As suggested earlier, Hungarian reformers learned a lesson from the Czechoslovak experience and succeeded in implementing the changes without incurring Soviet displeasure. On the contrary, Soviet comments regarding the Hungarian NEM were generally laudatory, especially with respect to agriculture, which had attracted particular attention. The highly publicized Soviet-Hungarian economic disagreement did not take place until later.[24]

The post-1970 reforms in Poland and the rapid expansion of that country's trade with the West also found no hostile reception in the Soviet Union. One possible explanation might be that the workers' riots on the Baltic coast, correctly interpreted as reflecting popular dissatisfaction with the dismal economic performance, had caused serious reverberations throughout the region. The Soviet leadership, fearful of a possible chain reaction in the other CMEA countries, therefore did not oppose rapid modernization of the Polish economy, even at the price of closer economic relations with the West.

The Soviet attitude toward Romania has been the object of speculation among Western observers who even today remain puzzled at the continued Soviet tolerance of Ceausescu's independent stance. Whether the reason was the maintenance of strict party controls and the absence of internal liberalization or the lack of support for the Romanian position in the rest of the region, thus far at least Moscow's policy has largely been one of benign neglect.

It appears that East Germany—probably the most important supplier of investment goods to the Soviet Union—enjoyed a kind of special status within CMEA; it may be presumed that the U.S.S.R. did in fact encourage the D.D.R. to maintain and cultivate its special relationship with the Federal Republic and the rest of the Common Market, thereby providing a convenient channel through which modern Western technology could reach the Soviet Union.

That reasoning also tends to explain the essentially benevolent Soviet attitude toward the increase in East-West trade embarked upon by the other CMEA members. The basic pattern of Soviet-East European trade throughout the 1960's and early 1970's consisted of the U.S.S.R. supplying the raw materials in exchange for East European exports of producer and consumer goods.[25] Although for various reasons Moscow became concerned about the growing technological gap vis-à-vis the

[24] *New York Times*, April 9, 1972.

[25] For details, see John M. Montias, "The Structure of Comecon Trade and the Prospects for East-West Exchanges," in *Reorientation* (fn. 17), 664, 667.

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West as early as the late 1960's, the Soviet Union was as yet unwilling to enter Western markets on a large scale. Eastern Europe therefore continued to play the role of an important intermediary and conduit between the West and the U.S.S.R. Polish ships imported by the Soviet Union contained machinery and equipment built under Western licenses; by procuring Hungarian transport equipment, East German precision tools, and Czechoslovak engineering products, Moscow was able to acquire sophisticated technology without the expenditure of scarce hard currencies or the necessity of having to sell gold.

How did the Soviet tolerance of East European reforms and expanded East-West trade square with Moscow's attitude toward economic integration under CMEA auspices? Here again, space does not permit a thorough examination; but there is sufficient evidence to indicate that closer regional economic cooperation was not very high on the Kremlin's list of priorities. A good case can be made that the last time the Soviet leadership was seriously interested in CMEA was in 1963, when Khrushchev attempted to establish a regional planning agency. Since then, the Soviet Union has paid lip service to the importance of collaboration, but the record shows that it has done little to push integration forward despite its ability to do so.

One of the reasons for the Soviet lack of enthusiasm for CMEA may have been the low rate of progress demonstrated by that organization. Although some cooperation was achieved, especially as illustrated by the growth in the number of joint projects (pipelines, freightcar pools, electricity grids) and the expansion of the institutional superstructure, the basic goals were either not met or were being implemented at a snail's pace.

While it would be relatively easy to pinpoint the various causes of the unimpressive performance of CMEA, there is little doubt that its roots can be found in the early stages of the Council's development, discussed at the outset. Although the autarkic tendencies began to show signs of decline, they did not disappear entirely. Even though national industrial profiles gradually became more differentiated, they still offered relatively little opportunity and scope for the expansion of specialization and intraregional trade. Perhaps most importantly, economic nationalism did not decline over the years; if anything, it increased, contributing to a growing antagonism among CMEA members. The barriers established by Stalin to keep the various states apart largely survived their creator, and the degree of ignorance about the situation in the respective countries continued to be as high as ever.

As a result, there was little real regional cooperation: no country

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had much confidence in the ability and willingness of the others to fulfill their plans and to deliver the amounts of goods specified in trade agreements. The effect of this lack of trust was cumulative and provided added fuel to economic nationalism. In the final analysis, it was often easier for CMEA members to cooperate with Western countries than with each other; at times the situation resembled that of the interwar period, when East European economic relations were characterized by a "beggar my neighbor" policy.

National interest always took precedence over collective interest, and support for regional integration came only from those countries that were bound to gain from it at the expense of others.[26] Thus the idea of an international division of labor was strongly advocated by Czechoslovakia and East Germany, the two most advanced countries in the region, which aspired to the dominant position in CMEA. A policy of partial or total convertibility was supported by Hungary and Poland, which for the most part enjoyed surpluses on their balance of payments vis-à-vis the rest. While Romania resisted specialization of production, Bulgaria favored intergovernmental over intersectoral cooperation, since the former gave it some guarantees that were absent from the latter. The Soviet Union, which was clearly in a position to arbitrate and to impose a compromise solution, chose not to intervene for reasons best known to itself, and was apparently satisfied with letting CMEA stagnate. By 1973, it seemed that economic integration in Eastern Europe, faced with persistent economic nationalism, spreading economic reforms, expanding East-West trade, and apparent Soviet indifference, was bound to show little if any progress.

## East-West Trade and Economic Integration of Eastern Europe: The Era of Détente and the Energy Crisis

Future historians are likely to engage in lengthy speculations in an attempt to pinpoint the exact ending of the cold war and the beginning of détente between East and West. From our point of view it is largely immaterial whether the watershed in East-West relations will prove to have been the Geneva Summit Meeting of 1955, the Bonn-Moscow Treaty of 1970, or the SALT I Agreement of 1972. The most important event was, of course, the death of Stalin in March 1953, and it may be argued that détente in its conventional meaning of "reduction of

[26] Schaefer (fn. 5), passim. See also Vaclav Holesovsky, "The Conflict of Integration Concepts and National Self-Assertion in Eastern Europe," paper presented at the National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (Dallas, March 1972).

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international tension" began on that day, bringing about significant changes in the Communist and international environments. For the purpose of our analysis, détente itself is important only insofar as it provided the background for one of the two recent developments that ultimately may prove to have been far more important than the widely hailed rapprochement between the superpowers. These events are the global shortage of basic fuels and raw materials, and the Soviet decision to enter the arena of East-West trade in a massive way as a major supplier of raw materials in exchange for Western technology. It is clear that both are exerting (and will continue to exert) a major influence on the process of economic integration in Eastern Europe.

The problems encountered by both the Soviet Union and the rest of the CMEA countries as a consequence of the raw-materials squeeze have been conclusively discussed by Marer and by Montias.[27] Having decided to become a full-fledged participant in East-West trade, the U.S.S.R. had to face the dilemma of whether to continue supplying its East European allies with increasing quantities of oil and other raw materials at relatively low prices, or whether to divert some of these shipments to the West, charging much higher prices in hard currencies which could then be used to acquire Western technology.

For their part, the smaller East European countries had to decide whether to continue expanding their trade with the West (which necessitated the earmarking of the most efficient sectors of their economies for the production of exportable commodities that could be sold on the highly competitive Western markets), or whether to divert some of these exports to the Soviet Union in return for guaranteed supplies of raw materials at reasonable prices.

This was hardly a zero-sum game; the only winner was bound to be the Soviet Union. The options faced by most of the East European countries were not enviable. A decline in the volume of East-West trade would mean a reduction in the imports of Western technology which, at least in some countries (Hungary, Poland, Romania), formed the basis for ambitious plans of industrial modernization. On the other hand, a decrease in the Soviet deliveries of fuels and raw materials would seriously hurt countries such as Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary, which had few if any natural resources of their own and no alternate sources of supply. Whatever the final outcome was to be, the smaller CMEA members could envisage a slow-

[27] Paul Marer, "Has Eastern Europe Become a Liability to the Soviet Union—The Economic Aspects," paper presented at the Conference on the International Politics of Eastern Europe (Columbia University, March 1975); Montias (fn. 25), 676.

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down in their rate of economic growth and a probable decline in their living standards.

Although the Soviet Union appeared to be in a favorable position, it chose not to take advantage of it, at least for the time being. Its most highly publicized measure was the recent decision to adjust upward the price level of major raw materials traded within CMEA.[28] Interestingly enough, the increase—especially in the case of oil—although substantial, still left the price considerably below the level of the world market, which implied that the U.S.S.R. was in fact willing to subsidize its exports to CMEA countries. Additionally, there is evidence of Soviet insistence on receiving higher quality East European commodities. That represented a major departure from the past, when the smaller countries tended to treat the Soviet market as a dumping ground for inferior products that could not be sold in the West. Finally, there have been signs of increased East European involvement in the development of new sources of raw materials and new transport facilities on Soviet territory. The construction of the Orenburg gas pipeline, with its cost being shared by the seven CMEA countries, is a case in point.[29] Although the Soviet Union had urged its allies for some time to provide investment capital for the development of natural resources, the smaller East European countries managed to resist that pressure until the early 1970's; it is clear that only the global shortage of raw materials forced them to give in to Soviet demands.[30]

By and large, however, the Soviet reaction to the new circumstances in which the U.S.S.R. found itself as a result of détente and the energy crisis can only be described as restrained. Considering the range of options available to Moscow, this is a testimony to the growing political sophistication of the Soviet leadership which was apparently will-

[28] Marer (fn. 27), 16-21. See also Zygmunt Szeliga, "Nowa formula cenowa" [The New Price Formula], *Polityka* (Warsaw), February 22, 1975.

[29] The agreement to develop the Orenburg gas deposit and to build a 2,750 kilometer-long pipeline connecting it with the western border of the U.S.S.R. was signed at the 28th Session of the CMEA Council in Sofia, June 18-21, 1974. *Pravda*, June 22, 1974.

[30] Soviet attempts to take advantage of its role as main supplier of raw materials to CMEA in order to extract price and other concessions from its junior allies go back to the mid-1960's. See O. Bogomolov, "Khoziaistvennye reformy i ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo sotsialisticheskikh stran" [Economic Reforms and Economic Cooperation of Socialist States], *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 2 (1966), 76-86; and "Aktualne problemy ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva sotsialisticheskikh stran" [Current Problems of Economic Cooperation of Socialist States], *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia*, No. 5 (1966), 15-26; V. Ladygin and Y. Shirayev, "Voprosy sovershenstvovania ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva stran SEV" [Problems of Improving the Economic Cooperation of CMEA Countries], *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 5 (1966), 81-89. See also Paul Marer, "Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe," in *Reorientation* (fn. 17), esp. 149-50 and 154-59.

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ing to pay the price of being the leader of a political, military, and economic alliance.[31] In contrast to the earlier post-World War II period, Eastern Europe no longer represented an economic asset that could be exploited for the benefit of the U.S.S.R., but a burden that had to be carried by the hegemonic power.

How did the new situation affect the prospects of East European economic integration? A case can be made that, on balance, the chances of closer cooperation are today somewhat better than they were in the past. To be sure, one might argue, like Montias, that CMEA will be supported by its East European members only for as long as it is able to satisfy their basic needs—which at the present time means receiving sufficient supplies of raw materials at reasonable prices.[32] Once this proved to be impossible, the raison d'être of CMEA would largely be gone as its members would be forced to seek other suppliers either in the West or among the Third World countries.

That supposition is based on the assumption that the East European countries would be in a position to pay for their imports from non-Communist sources. The available evidence shows that they are not likely to be. The balance-of-payments deficit vis-à-vis the West of such countries as Hungary, Poland, and Romania has been growing by leaps and bounds. It seems to be only a matter of time before the hitherto liberal credit policies will stop.[33] Until now some of the Western countries, especially France, Germany, and to some extent the United States, have been willing for political reasons to grant rather generous credits to selected East European countries, but the difficult economic situation in the West may put an end to it.[34] If that happens, it may also dampen the chances of expanded European exports. Moreover, per-

[31] See Marer (fn. 27), 2-3.

[32] Montias (fn. 25), 676. Although estimates differ, Western observers believe that by 1980 the Soviet Union will not be able to supply all the oil needs of the CMEA countries, and that the smaller East European countries will be forced to import between 50 and 100 million tons from non-Soviet sources, placing a heavy burden on their balances of payments. See J. Richard Lee, "Petroleum Supply Problems in Eastern Europe," in *Reorientation* (fn. 17), 417; Harry Trend, "Comecon Oil and Gas Crisis by 1980," Radio Free Europe Research, *Eastern Europe/7*, April 13, 1973.

[33] By the end of 1975, CMEA countries including the Soviet Union had run up a debt in the West of some $32 billion, up $7-9 billion from the end of 1974. The increase was due to the growing trade deficit which amounted to $12 billion in 1975, half of it incurred by the smaller East European countries. *New York Times*, December 15, 1975.

[34] Good examples of "political" credits are provided by those granted to Poland. A credit of 7 billion francs was announced by President Giscard d'Estaing on the occasion of his visit to Warsaw in May 1975, and a credit of 1 billion marks was made public following a meeting between Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and First Secretary Gierek at Helsinki in August 1975.

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sistent inflationary pressure may in fact widen the gap in the balances of payments of the East European states. Finally, some of the recent institutional changes in Western Europe, such as the introduction of a common tariff and a common negotiatory mechanism by the European Economic Community, are also likely to reduce the volume of East European exports to the West.[35]

The situation with regard to the Third World countries is no better. Judging from the experience of the past two years, the OPEC countries, for example, are determined to achieve the greatest possible gain from their exports, regardless of who the buyers might be. If the East European countries entertained hopes of obtaining preferential treatment because of ideological considerations or on account of their anti-Israel stance, the example of the African and Asian countries being forced to pay world market prices for oil must have disabused them of that notion.[36] Moreover, there is evidence that the raw-materials producing countries are eager to obtain the most up-to-date technology, which is simply unobtainable as yet in Eastern Europe. The only commodities the region has to offer that could be of interest to many developing countries are weapons—but, apart from the U.S.S.R., only Czechoslovakia is capable of supplying their needs to any significant extent.

Thus it appears that most of the smaller East European countries have little choice but to look toward CMEA for the solution of their raw-materials problem. Reference has already been made to increased East European participation in the development of new sources in the Soviet Union, and in the construction of new joint production and transportation facilities on Soviet territory. There is also evidence of a growing number of other joint industrial enterprises, greater activity

[35] For a background discussion, see Hans Bräker, "Die wirtschaftliche Öffnung der Sowjetunion und des RWG nach Westen" [The Economic Opening of the Soviet Union and CMEA Toward the West], *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, No. 56 (1974), 27-28. The embargo on the import of beef cattle imposed by the EEC between July and October 1974 was estimated to have cost Hungary alone the equivalent of $100 million. Radio Free Europe Research, *Situation Report, Hungary/3*, January 21, 1975.

[36] The only two oil-producing Arab countries that showed interest in Eastern Europe were Kuwait and Libya. Kuwait granted a credit of $40 million to Hungary in November 1974 (Radio Free Europe Research, *Situation Report, Hungary/47*, December 3, 1974), and another one of $125 million to Yugoslavia in August 1975, for the construction of the so-called Adria pipeline which was to serve Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and possibly other CMEA countries. Libya's contribution to the construction of the pipeline was $75 million. Zdenko Antic, "Financing for Yugoslav-Hungarian Oil Pipeline Arranged," Radio Free Europe Research, *RAD Background Report/125*, August 12, 1975.

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of CMEA banks, increase in intraregional trade and even in integrated planning—all of them testifying to a revival of the idea of closer cooperation.[37]

Although the main reason for the renewed trend toward integration was clearly economic necessity, other factors probably contributed as well. First of all, one may speculate that the new generation of political elites in Eastern Europe understood the potential advantages of regional economic integration better than its predecessors did. Whereas the latter may have considered it as a necessary evil or a price to be paid for being a member of the Soviet-led alliance, the former—possibly impressed by the success of EEC—tended to look at CMEA with greater pragmatism and to treat it as an economic rather than a political organization. Moreover, the absence of strong Soviet pressure in the direction of closer conformity and cooperation must have gone a long way toward improving the image of CMEA. Finally, there are signs that the traditional economic chauvinism, which represented a major obstacle on the path to closer cooperation, may also be on the wane.

Observing the outside world from their regional vantage point, the East European leaders most likely could not help being impressed with the growing importance of economic if not of political blocs. Despite the recent period of relative stagnation, the European Economic Community continued to play a major role in international economics. The OPEC countries dominated the oil market; it was only a matter of time before other raw-materials producing countries would jump on the bandwagon, establishing international cartels of their own. Recent moves by the Third and Fourth World countries have also reflected the worldwide belief in the efficacy of collective action. The examples of Yugoslavia which chose to remain an outsider, and of Romania which made an attempt to "go at it alone," did not inspire much confidence. The European Summit Meeting at Helsinki in August 1975 did little if anything to dismantle the barriers separating both parts of Europe, and any potential formal link between EEC and CMEA appeared a long way off.[38] Finally, the persistent depression and inflation

[37] For an excellent discussion of the centripetal forces stimulating closer CMEA integration, see Paul Marer, "Economics and Integration," paper presented at a conference on "Eastern Europe: Stability or Recurrent Crises?" (Airlie House, Virginia, November 1975), 16-19.

[38] The February 1975 visit of EEC representatives to Moscow, where they met with their CMEA counterparts, apparently proved inconclusive although further meetings were being planned. *New York Times*, February 8, 1975.

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in the key Western countries made them increasingly less attractive as partners for potential collaboration, or, for that matter, trade.

In these circumstances, closer economic cooperation if not integration in Eastern Europe appears to make good sense. Success will ultimately depend on several factors: the attitude of the Soviet Union, the internal political situation in the various East European countries, the global economic situation, and the position taken by the West. So far at least, Moscow has decided not to seek maximum advantage from the existing situation, and its policy may be characterized as one of wait-and-see. Internally, the new political and economic elites in most East European countries appear to be less dogmatic and nationalistic, and more pragmatic and realistic. Globally, the shortage of basic raw materials is likely to persist for an indefinite period. The West, which only relatively recently considered Eastern Europe as a target of opportunity, is, because of its own economic difficulties and other problems, well on the way of treating the area once again as a forgotten region.[39] In light of all this, we should not be surprised if economic integration in Eastern Europe were to show some progrèss in the near future, albeit at the expense of East-West trade.

[39] For an interesting discussion of current U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, see Charles Gati, "The Forgotten Region," *Foreign Policy*, No. 19 (Summer 1975), 135-45.

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# LINKAGE POLITICS IN CHINA: Internal Mobilization and Articulated External Hostility in the Cultural Revolution, 1967–1969

By KUANG-SHENG LIAO*

THE purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between some aspects of China's internal politics and certain characteristics of her behavior toward foreign countries during the Cultural Revolution. Specifically, I will examine the relationship between internal mobilization and articulated hostility to foreign countries as expressed by mass media and mass protests.

## I. General Theories and Conceptual Framework

The linkage between internal politics and external behavior suggests a meeting place for the fields of international and comparative politics. External behavior is the result of domestic as well as external factors. The current state of knowledge on the subject of linkage politics is far from satisfactory. As Rosenau has pointed out, the overwhelming weight of historical evidence supports the general proposition that domestic and international processes are inextricably intertwined. "Despite their abundance, however, the relevant data have never been organized and examined systematically";[1] there is a shortage of adequate theory to account for the dynamic linkages between the national and international system. External conflict may stimulate as well as subdue internal dissension. Robin Brooks maintains that involvement in foreign wars has consistently resulted in protest movements.[2] But there are a number of historical cases that suggest the opposite. For example, the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1939 resulted in an anti-Japanese senti-

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[1] James N. Rosenau, ed., *Linkage Politics* (New York: Free Press 1969), 4-5.

[2] Brooks, "Domestic Violence and America's Wars: An Historical Interpretation," in Hugh D. Graham and Ted R. Gurr, eds., *Violence in America* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office 1969), 407-21.

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ment in China powerful enough to make negotiations between the Nationalists and Communist possible.[3]

The impact of internal politics upon external behavior has been similarly ambiguous. A number of cases suggest that internal situations have been the source of external conflicts. For example, in his study of the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation of 1962–1965, Bernard K. Gordon has found a strong relationship between Indonesia's hostile attitude toward Malaysia and her domestic dissention.[4] China's conflict in 1900 with the eight powers has also been explained as the result of internal events: it was the Ch'ing Government's support of the domestic anti-foreign activities by the Boxers that triggered the attack by a united force of eight powers.[5] Other historical cases demonstrate that internal factors may inhibit external conflict. An example is Russia's early withdrawal from World War I following the Revolution of 1917.[6] In that case, domestic problems suspended or inhibited external conflict.

Finally, there are a number of instances where external conflict has resulted exclusively from international interaction. The conflicts between Argentina and Chile in 1967–1968 and the 1962 Cuban Crisis are examples.[7] Thus, arguments exist to support different propositions. As the brief examination of historical cases suggests, relationships between internal politics and external behavior will vary according to the nature of internal and external conflicts. Such variations preclude any simplistic general theory of the relationship. Most cross-cultural quantitative research indicates little or no correlation between internal and external conflict. In his time-series analyses, Sorokin found only a slight relationship between internal politics and external conflict.[8] Rummel's cross-national correlational analyses suggest that internal conflict and external conflict are independent of each other.[9]

[3] Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, *Republican China* (New York: Vintage 1967), 148-49.

[4] Gordon, *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1966), 86-96.

[5] O. Edmund Clubb, *Twentieth Century China* (New York: Columbia University Press 1972), 24-33.

[6] Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1963), 90-91.

[7] Robert N. Burr, "Argentina and Chile," in Steven L. Spiegel and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., *Conflict in World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop 1961), 155-76; Ole R. Holsti and others, "Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction Models: Empirical Materials from the 1962 Cuban Crisis," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press 1969), 679-96.

[8] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York: American Book Co. 1937), iii.

[9] R. J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Foreign and Domestic Conflict Behavior: A Review of Empirical Findings," in Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder, eds., *Theory and Research on the Causes of War* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1969), 219-28.

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Raymond Tanter, in his cross-national studies, finds little relationship between domestic and foreign conflict behavior. However, he suggests that there may in fact be a causal relationship that is obscured by other phenomena, such as the personality characteristics of national decision makers.[10]

In *The Functions of Social Conflict*, Lewis Coser hypothesizes a stronger, more direct connection between domestic and foreign conflict in countries with rigid sociopolitical structures than in those with flexible systems, on grounds that the former generate greater needs for activities such as scapegoating, witchhunts, and the search for external enemies.[11] Jonathan Wilkenfeld, in following up Tanter's untested hypothesis, divides nations into three groups: personalist, centrist, and polyarchic. His conclusion is that when one controls for the type of political system, the more rigid types (centrist and personalist) exhibit higher correlations between domestic and foreign conflict than do the more flexible types (polyarchic).[12]

Wilkenfeld's findings confirm the importance of political structure as an influence upon external behavior. In his research, China is classified in the centrist group of nations. His results thus indicate that China's internal conflict may be correlated with external conflict behavior. However, the correlation between aggregate characteristics of nations does not elucidate the particular phenomena in which we are interested. In order to explore a more specific relationship between internal politics and external behavior, one must narrow down the political system and environmental factors. I will explore the hypothesis that in China, during periods of authority crises, internal mobilization has resulted in increased articulated external hostility.[13] Conversely, periods of consolidation of authority have resulted in decreases in articulated external hostility.

## II. Problems under Investigation

Between January 1967 and February 1969, China was preoccupied with her internal political struggle. Mao and his associates were engaged in a nationwide mobilization of support to defeat their domestic

[10] Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Within and Between Nations, 1958-60," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, x (March 1966), 48-64.

[11] Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press 1969), 87-94.

[12] Wilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations," in William D. Coplin, ed., *A Multi-Method Introduction to International Politics* (Chicago: Markham 1971), 109-204.

[13] Articulated external hostility in this study indicates the hostility as expressed by mass media and mass protest.

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opponents. Externally, China was experiencing unprecedented tensions with the Soviet Union which resulted in a bloody border clash. She also articulated strong hostility toward U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam.

Various internal factors have been identified as major influences in the development of China's foreign policy: geography, historical heritage, xenophobia, ideological commitment, and national interest. Undoubtedly, such elements have shaped the fundamental principles of China's foreign behavior.[14] Dutt points out a close connection between domestic politics and foreign policy: "An intimate relationship has always subsisted between domestic policy and foreign policy; the one can seldom be divorced from the other. In the case of Communist China the interplay between the two has been so very close that changes in foreign policy can be directly related to those in the internal situation."[15]

Examining the relationship between internal politics and foreign policy before 1960, Dutt continues: "The change in the external posture from 1956 to 1958 was no more marked than a corresponding change within the country for the same period. In fact, domestic changes in mid-1957 presaged the forthcoming changes in foreign policy; they were like the advance shadows cast by the coming events. It was no mere coincidence that the 'big leap,' the people's communes, and the antirightist struggles led to a renewed insistence on a 'relentless struggle' against the 'paper tigers' of the world."[16]

Two characteristics of China's articulated external hostility are worthy of special attention. First are her attacks in the mass media on foreign enemies. Attacks on U.S. imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek, and U.S. collaborators have filled the pages of major newspapers. In the early 1960's, such attacks were extended to India; China began to formulate the image of "Indian reactionaries."[17] Meanwhile, because of Japan's pro-American foreign policy, Japanese leaders were accused of being "reactionaries and collaborators" with U.S. imperialism.[18] By the middle of the 1960's, the Soviet Union was added to the list when

[14] Allen S. Whiting, "Foreign Policy of Communist China," in Roy C. Macridis, ed., *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1972), 289-319.

[15] Vidya Prakash Dutt, *China and the World: An Analysis of Communist China's Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger 1966), 1-2.

[16] *Ibid.* Also see Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, *Communist China and Arms Control* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1965), 21-22. The authors argue that there was a close relation between a hardening foreign policy line and a similar domestic policy line in 1958, perhaps even into 1960.

[17] See Kuang-sheng Liao and Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Press Perceptions of Threat: The U.S. and India, 1962," *China Quarterly*, No. 53 (January-March 1973), 80-97.

[18] "New Victory for the Japanese People," *People's Daily*, editorial, June 24, 1960.

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China began to denounce her as revisionist. During the Cultural Revolution, the Soviet Union was accused of "socialist imperialism," and Japan of "reactionary militarism."[19] Attacks on foreign targets occupied a remarkable portion of the coverage in daily newspapers and major Party magazines such as *Peking Review*.

The second important characteristic of China's articulated hostility has been her antiforeign mass protests. Since the beginnings of the People's Republic of China, a great number of mass demonstrations and meetings have taken place to protest and denounce foreign rivals. These events sometimes were limited to a few of the major cities, while at other times they occurred over all of China. To the best of my knowledge, such movements were organized or at least sanctioned by the central government. Conceptually, these antiforeign mass protests may be seen as the manifestation of China's ability to mobilize hostility toward external issues.

The concurrence of articulated external hostility and internal mobilization between January 1967 and February 1969 leads me to hypothesize a relationship between these events. However, the exact nature of this relationship is unclear. Does internal mobilization result in articulated external hostility or vice versa? During this period, the Chinese elite was deeply divided over questions of domestic policy. The significance of these internal struggles makes it appear plausible that external issues were instrumental to domestic purposes. As Richard N. Rosecrance points out,

> A society in the agonies of domestic transformation is not likely to regard international determinants as decisive. . . . In such circumstances, the government cannot usually afford independent preoccupation with external conditions. Most often, external policies are merely instrumental to internal purposes and rarely are internal programs fashioned in response to the international environment. Only after a measure of internal stability is attained can internal influences be expected to work.[20]

Thus, during periods of authority crises, the leadership may be expected to manipulate external issues for internal ends.

Haas and Whiting suggest that groups seeking self-preservation may be driven to a foreign policy of conflict in order to defend themselves against the onslaught of internal enemies. They explain: "In times of extreme domestic tension among elites, a policy of uniting a badly

[19] "The Ugly Face of Socialist Imperialism," *People's Daily*, October 22, 1968; "The Soviet Revisionist All-out Collaboration with Japanese Reactionaries," *People's Daily*, December 20, 1968.

[20] Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown 1963), 298-99.

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divided nation against some real or alleged outside threat frequently seems useful to a ruling group."[21]

## III. Internal Mobilization and External Hostility in Chinese Communist History

A brief examination of Chinese Communist history will help to elucidate the relationship between articulated external hostility and internal mobilization in China. Mobilization is extremely important in domestic Chinese politics. The Chinese Communists mobilized the poor peasants on issues of social and economic injustice as early as the Kiangsi Soviet period (1931–1934). In order to win support from the majority of the peasants, Mao confiscated land from the rich and redistributed it to the poor.[22]

The mass line was more fully developed in the Yenan period. Tens of thousands of new cadres were recruited from among the peasants by carrying out campaigns for the reduction of rent and agrarian reforms.[23] It was with such peasant support that the Communists were able to resist the militarily superior Nationalist forces for several years. Due to a skillful manipulation of social contradictions, Mao was able to mobilize the peasants in support of his border government.

Another approach to mobilization was made by promoting the sentiment of resisting and fighting Japan. After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, that became an important basis upon which peasant support could be built. Once Mao established his leadership at the Tsunyi Conference in January 1935, he made increasing efforts to identify his movement as one of resistance to the Japanese invasion. In "On the Strategy to Oppose Japanese Militarism," he asserted that the Japanese ambition was to occupy the whole of China rather than Manchuria alone. In order to concentrate resistance against the Japanese, he urged that a national united front be formed.[24] In January and February 1936, Mao and his comrades dispatched an expedition from Yenan to fight the Japanese.[25] The slogan, "unite to fight Japanese militarism," attracted widespread support in those north-

[21] Ernst Haas and Allen S. Whiting, *Dynamics of International Relations* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1956), 62.

[22] Ilpyong J. Kim, "Mass Mobilization Policies and Techniques Developed in the Period of the Chinese Soviet Republic," in A. Doak Barnett, ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action* (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1969), 78-98.

[23] Mark Selden, "The Yenan Legacy: The Mass Line," *ibid.*, 99-215; Chalmers Johnson, "Chinese Communist Leadership and Mass Response," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis*, I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1968), 397-473.

[24] *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, I (Peking: Foreign Language Press 1964), 162-65.

[25] For the Japanese role in peasant mobilization, see Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1962), 21-70.

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ern provinces that faced direct Japanese attack. Sympathy with Mao's determination to resist the foreign enemy resulted in the Sian incident in late 1936, a major turning point in the history of the Chinese Communist movement. A "united front" was agreed to by the Nationalists in September 1937. The Communists profited not only by the termination of Chiang's attacks but also by a valuable chance to rearm themselves in the name of Chinese resistance to the Japanese. Since the early days of the Chinese Communist movement, Mao has been well aware of the uses of external enemies for internal purposes. As he stated in 1939: "To be attacked by the enemy is not a bad thing, but a good thing."[26]

Once the Chinese Communists defeated the Nationalists and established their government in Peking, a whole series of nation-wide mass movements was launched. For example, in pushing the Party's economic program during the 1958–1960 "Great Leap Forward," the masses were mobilized to participate in production work in order to reach official targets. Since China was involved in a serious crisis in the Taiwan Straits during 1958, it has been suggested that this international tension was indeed used by the Chinese for domestic goals. As Richard Solomon puts it: "As the Strait crisis thus entered a diplomatic phase, Mao emphasized the turning of this confrontation with "U.S. imperialism" into a context for motivating still greater "leaps in the areas of production and social reorganization by promoting a nation-wide campaign to make 'everyone a soldier.'" Mao thus sped the militarization of the rural work force and the implementation of his new national defense line which called for large militia units."[27]

In suggesting that China's antiforeign mass-media hostility and mass protests between January 1967 and February 1969 may be explained by domestic considerations, I propose two hypotheses: (1) Chinese articulated external hostility increases when the degree of mobilization is high; (2) Chinese articulated external hostility should decrease when the degree of consolidation of authority is improved.

## IV. Internal Mobilization and Articulated External Hostilities during the Cultural Revolution

During the Cultural Revolution, China's internal political scene was characterized by campaigns to seize power and to denounce the "top

[26] *Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Language Press 1967), 130-32.

[27] Richard Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1971), 388.

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capitalists in authority." In the area of foreign policy, China became less active in maintaining relations with African and Asian countries; in fact, relations with a number of countries deteriorated rapidly. Hostility between Peking and Moscow rose to an unprecedentedly high level, creating tensions which were exacerbated by the Cultural Revolution.[28] It is remarkable that a country so deeply engrossed in internal political struggle and in the reconstruction of its political system allowed itself at the same time to engage in an external dispute of such ferocity. What was the major factor, or factors, stimulating China's external hostility? Was there any relationship between internal political problems and external hostility? These questions are the major concern of this study.

Mao Tse-tung and his supporters initiated a painstaking struggle to remove completely those who followed the "capitalist line" in the Party and the government; in mid-1966 they had still firmly dominated the top-level Party organs, the Political Bureau and Central Committee. After the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee in August 1966, Lin Piao appeared to be second in line to Mao. Liu Shao ch'i and certain of his supporters had been downgraded.[29]

In January 1967, through their command of the Party, Mao and his supporters undertook to reorganize the Propaganda Department and enhance their control over such essential press organs as *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*. It is clear that between 1967 and 1969, *People's Daily* was in Maoist hands.[30] In order to help destroy Liu Shao-ch'i's power and public prestige, *People's Daily* triggered a mass-media campaign to expose Liu's opposition to Mao. Obviously, this denunciation was

[28] On China's foreign relations, see Melvin Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs during the Cultural Revolution," *China Quarterly*, No. 40 (October-December 1969), 65-102.

[29] On internal political struggles, see Edward E. Rice, *Mao's Way* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972).

[30] In 1966, when Mao began to intensify his control, power struggles were taking place in the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee and in the institute of *People's Daily*. The first reorganization of the Propaganda Department took place in June 1966, when Lu Ting-i was replaced by Tao Chu as Minister. However, this change in the staff of the Propaganda Department did not put the Department under Mao's control. Tao Chu was reported to have close links with the Liu-Teng group and resisted Mao's direction. Consequently, Mao launched a second reorganization of the Propaganda Department in January 1967, in which he replaced Tao Chu and put Wang Li in charge. But this new arrangement lasted only about three months. In April 1967, Mao dissolved the Propaganda Department and put its affairs under the direct control of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, led by Chiang Ch'ing and Ch'en Po-ta. Consequently, all mass media have been under the direct supervision of Mao and his close associates in the Central Group since April 1967. After seizing control of the Propaganda Department and the mass media, the Maoists lost no time in utilizing the media as a powerful weapon to arouse support for their programs and opposition to the Liu-Teng group.

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intended to help Mao and his supporters seize power from the "capitalist roaders." Amidst such severe internal political turmoil, the escalation of hostility in the mass media against external enemies had a twofold impact on internal mobilization. (1) As in the Yenan period, Mao's supporters identified themselves as patriots during the Cultural Revolution by attacking foreign enemies and championing national independence. (2) There are also similarities to the accusation of Chiang Kai-shek as a national traitor in the earlier period, collaborating with the United States during the Civil War of 1945–1949. *People's Daily* condemned Liu Shao-ch'i as having betrayed the Chinese revolution in attempting to collaborate with Soviet revisionists. The condemnation of an internal enemy as a traitor was carried out by a public denunciation in the mass media. It was through the media that Mao's own enemy was linked with an external enemy. Mass media hostility to external targets was used to strengthen popular opposition to Liu.[31] If, in fact, the mass media were manipulated for internal purposes, then this hostility should correlate positively with internal mobilization campaigns.

The consolidation of authority during the Cultural Revolution, indicated by the establishment of provincial revolutionary committees, may also have affected China's hostility toward external targets. Haas and Whiting suggest that groups seeking self-preservation may be driven to a foreign policy of conflict in order to defend themselves against the onslaught of domestic enemies.[32] In studying the relation between China's domestic problems and her articulated external hostility, perhaps some significant correlation can be found to verify that theory. Following Mao's directives, committees were formed in all provinces to provide the major link between the local and central governments. The creation of these provincial revolutionary committees naturally met with some resistance from anti-Mao elements. Establishment of the committees can be seen as an indication of the degree of consolidation of authority achieved by the Maoists at any one time.[33] Following Haas's and Whiting's theory, we would expect the degree of internal consolidation to affect China's external hostility. When authority is weak, external hostility should be expected to be high; when consolidation of authority is strengthened, external hostility

[31] It may be argued that serious disputes among Maoists existed. However, there is little evidence that they concerned foreign policy problems.

[32] Haas and Whiting (fn. 21), 62.

[33] See *People's Daily*, editorial, February 10, 1967; also Parris H. Chang, "The Revolutionary Committee in China, Two Case Studies: Heilungkiang and Honan," *Current Scene*, VI, No. 2 (June 1, 1968), 1-22.

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should decrease. Accordingly, the greater the success in the formation of provincial revolutionary committees, the less external hostility should be articulated.

Antiforeign mass protests were an important aspect of the Cultural Revolution. Despite the domestic authority crisis and the political struggles among and between Maoists and anti-Maoists, such campaigns occurred throughout the country. How could these nation-wide mass protest movements have been organized? We may consider the antiforeign mass protests to have been organized by the Maoists themselves, instead of the regular cadres in the government and the Party.

The next question is why the Maoists organized so many antiforeign mass protests while they were heavily engaged in political struggle. Mao ordered the People's Liberation Army to provide support for his campaign to seize power. With PLA backing, the "revolutionary leftists" could oust their foes in the Party and the government at all levels. However, there were still many problems which the army seemed unable to resolve. By the middle of 1967, six months after the entry of the PLA into the power-seizure campaign, only six provincial revolutionary committees had been formed. This probably indicates that the PLA could not provide much help to the "revolutionary leftists" in their efforts to gain support from the masses, to convert recalcitrant cadres and administrators, or even to solve the problems of factionalism among Maoists. In this difficult situation, antiforeign mass protests probably would not have been undertaken unless they were considered helpful to the Maoist cause. First among their useful functions was the fact that they could bring Mao's supporters together on the basis of their common antiforeign nationalistic spirit. These antiforeign mass rallies provided a chance to work together and perhaps mollify conflicts and differences. Second, they could be used to improve the image of Mao's supporters' leadership among the masses. Through mass protests against foreign enemies, Mao's supporters demonstrated their determination to oppose imperialism and revisionism and promote the greatness of China. Third, these activities, by rallying the masses, could provide a public forum for promoting Mao's cause and condemning that of his opponents.

When political authority had been reconsolidated, the Maoists could exert authority through formal channels; antiforeign mass campaigns would no longer be necessary. Therefore, another hypothesis can be advanced to suggest that the frequency of antiforeign mass protests should decrease with improvement in the consolidation of authority.

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## V. Research Design and Indicator Construction

### A. FACTORS CONSIDERED

China's articulated external hostility may be divided into attacks in the mass media and antiforeign mass protests. During the period under study, hostility in the mass media focused mainly on the Soviet Union and on U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The degree of this hostility will be measured by the frequency with which these two issues were mentioned in *People's Daily*. Antiforeign mass protests will be measured by the frequency of mass demonstrations, rallies, and meetings protesting the behavior of foreign countries.

An adequate test of our hypotheses requires that the research take into account all plausible factors affecting China's external hostilities. During the Cultural Revoution, there were three important external stimuli: the Soviet Union's anti-Chinese activities (SUACT), U.S. military activities in Vietnam (USVIET), and U.S. military activities in Asia outside of Vietnam (USMOT).[34] The three internal factors to be considered are the reconsolidation of authority (RECON), the campaign of power seizure (POWER) and the campaign of denunciation against Liu Shao-ch'i (DENUN). The research design includes two dependent variables and six independent variables. They are shown in the Variable Index of Table 1.

### B. MEASUREMENT

Data for mass-media hostility were collected through a content analysis of *People's Daily*. Information on antiforeign mass protests was also obtained directly from *People's Daily*. Data on mass protests were gathered according to the frequency of rallies and mass meetings taking place at each location, rather than the frequency of reports. The data on external independent variables were also obtained from *People's Daily* and are considered as articulated rather than actual activities.[35]

[34] This includes U.S. military activities in Thailand, the Philippines, Laos, Cambodia, Taiwan, and Japan.

[35] There were two practical difficulties that prevented me from obtaining data for the actual activities of the Soviet Union and the United States. First, these actions were not completely disclosed by the two governments. Reports in Soviet and American newspapers are clearly conditioned by governmental suppression of news and by editors' interests and prejudices. Second, Soviet and U.S. activities varied substantially in nature. The great variety of these activities and the lack of detailed material make it extremely difficult to use any single criterion of measurement. To avoid these problems I used reports in *People's Daily*, treating them as perceived rather than actual external factors.

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TABLE 1

INDEX OF VARIABLES

*Dependent Variables*:

MEDIA: Reports hostile to the Soviet Union and U.S. involvement in Vietnam

PROTEST: All antiforeign mass protests

*Independent Variables*:

A. External Factors:

SUACT: Soviet Union's anti-Chinese activities

USVIET: U.S. military activities in Vietnam

USMOT: U.S. military activities in Asia outside of Vietnam

B. Internal Factors:

RECON: Reconsolidation of authority

POWER: Campaign of power seizure from the "capitalist roaders" (five factor scores)

DENUN: Campaign of denunciation of Liu Shao-ch'i (six factor scores)

The reconsolidation of authority was measured by the accumulated number of provincial revolutionary committees established. As to the campaigns for power seizure and denunciation of the "top capitalists in authority," the frequency of reports in *People's Daily* is taken as an indicator for measuring the intensity of mobilization conducted by the Maoists. A higher frequency of the reports on a particular province indicated a higher intensity of the campaigns in that province. The data were organized on a monthly basis. Factor analysis enables us to reduce the involvement of these twenty-nine provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions in each campaign into several clusters of provinces. The factor scores for each cluster were utilized to measure the intensity of involvement of each group of provinces in each campaign.[36] There were five major clusters in the campaign for power seizure, and six in the campaign for denunciation of the "top capitalists in authority."[37] These factor scores for each cluster represent the pro-

[36] Reports by *People's Daily* might be biased due to the geographical distance, the nature of communication between the local region and *People's Daily*, and the emphasis of the editor. Because of these possibilities the data are not considered as factual; instead, they represent the attitude and the encouragement of the press in these local struggles.

[37] In the power-seizure campaign, the factor analysis reveals five important groups of provinces. The first group is best represented by Ninghsia and includes Tientsin, Hopei, Kirin, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hupei, Kwantung, and Kansu. The second group includes Shansi and Heilungkiang. The third group is best represented by Szechwan and includes Shensi, Kwangsi, and Honan. The fourth group includes Shanghai and Peking. The fifth group consists of Kweichou alone.

With reference to the denunciation campaign, the factor analysis reduces 29 provinces

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portional weight of a group of related provinces in each campaign over time. The five major provincial clusters in the campaign to seize power, and the six clusters in the campaign to denounce the "top capitalists in authority," represent different patterns of provincial reactions to the campaigns. In examining the possible impact of these campaigns on external hostility, factor scores of the major clusters became indicators of the involvement of each group in each campaign. Therefore, the five sets of factor scores in the campaign for power seizure and the six sets in the campaign to denounce Liu Shao-ch'i are treated as eleven independent variables in this research.

## VI. Findings and Analysis

The statistical methods employed in this study are correlation, partial correlation, and regression analysis.

### STAGE 1: CORRELATION ANALYSIS

Although a more complex analysis will be presented in the next section, a quick glance at Tables 2 and 3, where the results of correlation analyses are displayed, will serve to indicate some preliminary findings.

The coefficient of correlation indicates the degree of association between two variables. Preliminary relationships between all independent and dependent variables are shown in Table 2. Some relatively high correlations do emerge. Mass media hostility (MEDIA) correlates with articulated Soviet anti-Chinese Activities (SUACT) and articulated U.S. involvement in Vietnam (USVIET) at .42 and .59 respectively, indicating that mass media hostility was positively associated with SUACT and USVIET. Mass media hostility also correlates at — .47 and — .79 with the Kweichou cluster (DENKWEI) and the Hopei cluster (DENHOPE) in the denunciation campaign, indicating the opposite relationships. The antiforeign mass protests (PROTEST) correlate at .48 with the Kwangtung cluster (DENKWAN) in the denunciation campaign, indicating a positive relation. No other high correlation is found. However, correlation analysis provides only preliminary information on the relationship between independent and dependent

into six major groups. The first group is best represented by Shanghai and includes Peking, Shansi, and Inner Mongolia. The second group is best represented by Kwangtung and includes Kirin, Shantung, Honan, Szechwan, and Kiangsu. The third group is best represented by Liaoning and includes Kiangsi and Hupei. The fourth includes Kansu and Tsinghai. The fifth includes Kweichou and Heilungkiang. The sixth includes Hopei and Hunan. My paper, "China's Internal Power Struggle and Articulated Hostility Toward the Soviet Union, 1967–February 1969" (unpub.), provides a detailed discussion of these groups.

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variables. It cannot explain any more about the data, and it is not sufficient by itself for us to derive definitive statements about the relationships that are under study here. Further analysis has to be undertaken by multiple regression analysis. The above results may be viewed as an initial exploration.

TABLE 2

CORRELATION MATRIX AMONG INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES

| *Variables* | MEDIA | PROTEST |
|---|---|---|
| SUACT | .42 | .24 |
| USVIET | .59 | — .17 |
| USMOT | .00 | — .11 |
| RECON | — .17 | .06 |
| POWNIN | .31 | .31 |
| POWHEI | — .27 | .00 |
| POWSZE | — .11 | .10 |
| POWSHAN | .24 | .08 |
| POWKWEI | — .20 | — .16 |
| DENSHAN | — .38 | — .10 |
| DENKWAN | — .32 | .48 |
| DENLIAO | — .16 | .15 |
| DENKANS | .19 | — .02 |
| DENKWEI | — .47 | — .13 |
| DENHOPE | — .79 | — .06 |

Note: The correlation coefficient between MEDIA and PROTEST is .06.

As shown in Table 3, correlation analysis indicates some relationships among the independent variables. Reconsolidation of authority correlates with the Kwangtung and Hopei clusters of the denunciation campaign, at .46 and .49 respectively. A relationship is also found between the power-seizure and denunciation campaigns. The Ninghsia cluster of the power-seizure campaign has a .58 correlation with the Kwangtung cluster of the denunciation campaign. Three external independent variables correlate moderately with internal independent variables. First, articulated Soviet anti-Chinese activities correlate positively with the Heilungkiang cluster of the power-seizure campaign at .45, and negatively with reconsolidation of authority at — .47. Second, articulated U.S. military activities in Vietnam correlate with the Kweichou cluster of the power-seizure campaign at .39. Third, articulated U.S. military activities in other areas correlate with the Szechwan cluster of the power-seizure campaign and the Kwangtung cluster of

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the denunciation campaign respectively at .48 and .41. No high correlation is found among these independent variables; thus there should be no problem with multicolinearity in the multiple regression analysis.

TABLE 3

CORRELATION MATRIX AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

| *Variables* | *1* | *2* | *3* | *4* | *5* | *6* | *7* | *8* | *9* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. RECON | | | | | | | | | |
| 2. SUACT | — .47 | | | | | | | | |
| 3. USVIET | — .36 | .00 | | | | | | | |
| 4. USMOT | .09 | .02 | — .10 | | | | | | |
| 5. POWNIN | .14 | — .11 | .19 | .23 | | | | | |
| 6. POWHEI | — .01 | .45 | — .02 | .10 | .00 | | | | |
| 7. POWSZE | .23 | — .05 | — .25 | .48 | .00 | .00 | | | |
| 8. POWSHAN | .29 | — .33 | .10 | — .19 | .00 | .00 | .00 | | |
| 9. POWKWEI | — .07 | — .08 | .39 | .02 | .00 | .00 | .00 | .00 | |
| 10. DENSHAN | — .08 | .32 | — .14 | — .09 | — .09 | — .20 | .07 | — .08 | — .11 |
| 11. DENKWAN | .46 | — .13 | — .28 | .41 | .58 | .01 | .21 | — .27 | — .09 |
| 12. DENLIAO | .31 | — .26 | — .11 | — .07 | .01 | — .10 | .13 | .07 | .10 |
| 13. DENKANS | — .21 | .14 | .10 | — .04 | .02 | — .02 | — .20 | .25 | .26 |
| 14. DENKWEI | — .22 | .25 | — .11 | .00 | — .22 | — .14 | .17 | .06 | — .14 |
| 15. DENHOPE | .49 | — .17 | — .23 | .05 | .05 | — .15 | .04 | .34 | .00 |

Note: The coefficients of correlation among 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 are zero.

STAGE 2: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

As discussed above, China's mass-media hostility and antiforeign protests may have been affected by certain internal and external factors. To test this possibility, it is necessary to utilize multiple regression analysis. A great many variables have been mentioned, and an attempt has been made to identify those that have the most important effects. From the enormous number of possible equations we should select one on which substantive explanations can be focused. We then need to form a model which will maximize explanatory power and minimize the number of variables. In order to find such a model, a stepwise regression program is used.[38] The criterion adopted for deciding upon the final equation is that of a 5 per cent increase in $R^2$ resulting from the addition of a variable. In order to assure that procedural errors are avoided, forward and backward stepwise programs are used. In the following section, both the hypothetical equations (original equations) and the final equations (select equations) are presented.

[38] Stepwise Regression Program in MIDAS package of the Statistical Research Laboratory of the University of Michigan.

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*Articulated External Hostility in Mass Media.* Two hypotheses regarding China's mass-media hostility are to be tested in this study: first, articulated mass-media hostility will increase in times of greater activity in the campaigns of power seizure and denunciation; second, articulated mass-media hostility will decrease following an increase in the degree of reconsolidation of authority. The results of multiple regression analysis, taking three external variables and three internal variables into consideration, are shown in Table 4.

The fifteen independent variables correlate with the dependent variable at .94, and explain 88 per cent of the total variance in mass-media hostility. The final equation consists of three independent variables correlated with the dependent variable at .91, and can explain 83 per cent of the total variance. The other 12 independent variables altogether

TABLE 4

REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S ANTIFOREIGN MASS-MEDIA HOSTILITY, JANUARY 1967–FEBRUARY 1969

| | *Hypothetical Equation* | | *Final Equation* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Variable* | *Partial r* | *b* | *Partial r* | *b* | *B* |
| SUACT | .06 | .86 | | | |
| USVIET | .54 | 2.98 | .63 | 3.42 | .36 |
| USMOT | .22 | 1.20 | | | |
| RECON | — .57 | — 1.64 | — .83 | — 2.05 | — .67 |
| POWNIN | — .03 | — .53 | | | |
| POWHEI | .41 | 8.20 | .61 | 10.14 | .31 |
| POWSZE | — .21 | — 3.38 | | | |
| POWSHAN | .05 | .90 | | | |
| POWKWEI | .24 | 3.23 | | | |
| DENSHAN | — .26 | — 4.22 | | | |
| DENKWAN | — .07 | — 1.56 | | | |
| DENLIAO | — .11 | — 1.60 | | | |
| DENKANS | — .11 | — 1.39 | | | |
| DENKWEI | .30 | 5.04 | | | |
| DENHOPE | — .19 | — 3.33 | | | |
| | $R = .94$ | $RSQ = .88$ | $R = .91$ | $RSQ = .83$ | |

contribute to only 5 per cent of the total variance. This means that the explanation of variance increases only marginally when any of the other twelve independent variables is added to the equation. It is thus appropriate to identify the three independent variables, which appear in the final equation, as the most important.

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The three most important variables are: articulated U.S. military activities in Vietnam, reconsolidation of authority, and activities of the Heilungkiang cluster in the power-seizure campaign. They correlate with the dependent variable at .63, — .83, and .61 respectively, and their standardized regression coefficients ($B$) are .36, — .67, and .31. That indicates that activities in the power-seizure campaign had a positive impact on China's mass-media hostility, while greater consolidation of authority was associated with decreasing hostility. The findings sustain the hypothesis that China's mass-media hostility would increase when power-seizure activities were high.

The hypothesis that mass-media hostility would decrease when the degree of reconsolidation of authority increased is also confirmed. However, the denunciation campaign is shown to have had no important impact on mass-media hostility. Articulated U.S. military activities are the only external factor demonstrated to have had an important impact on mass-media hostility: the latter increased with greater articulated U.S. military activity in Vietnam.

*Antiforeign Mass Protests.* According to Table 5, the fifteen independent variables correlate with the antiforeign campaign at $R = .84$, explaining 70 per cent of the total variance in the dependent variables. Using stepwise regression, we selected six major independent variables, each of which contributed at least 5 per cent of the variance in the dependent variable, including two of the three external independent variables and four internal variables. The important internal variables are reconsolidation of authority (RECON), activities in the power-seizure campaign by the Ninghsia and the Heilungkiang (POWNIN and POWHEI) clusters, and participation in the denunciation campaign of the Liaoning cluster (DENLIAO). These six major independent variables correlate with the antiforeign protests at .77, and together could explain 60 per cent of the total variance in the dependent variable. In other words, the other nine independent variables contribute only an additional 10 per cent of the variance. Therefore, it seems clear that these six independent variables in the final equation are those most important to antiforeign mass protest.

The reconsolidation of authority correlates negatively with antiforeign mass protests, at $r = -.52$. Two clusters in the activities of the power-seizure campaign correlate positively with the antiforeign mass protests. The $r$ is .40 for the Ninghsia cluster, and .57 for Liaoning cluster. Therefore, we can say that there was a positive relationship between the antiforeign mass protests and these two internal movements.

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TABLE 5

REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ANTIFOREIGN MASS PROTESTS, JANUARY 1967–FEBRUARY 1969

| | *Hypothetical Equation* | | *Final Equation* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Variables* | *Partial r* | *b* | *Partial r* | *b* | *B* |
| SUACT | .25 | 3.48 | | | |
| USVIET | — .52 | — 2.65 | — .43 | — 1.96 | — .35 |
| USMOT | — .31 | — 1.63 | — .26 | — 1.19 | — .18 |
| RECON | — .38 | .92 | — .52 | — .91 | — .49 |
| POWNIN | .42 | 7.09 | .40 | 6.34 | .33 |
| POWHEI | .26 | 4.64 | .57 | 8.53 | .44 |
| POWSZE | .20 | 2.89 | | | |
| POWSHAN | .07 | 1.18 | | | |
| POWKWEI | .16 | 2.03 | | | |
| DENSHAN | — .38 | — 5.87 | | | |
| DENKWAN | — .06 | — 1.37 | | | |
| DENLIAO | .70 | 12.46 | .69 | 12.59 | .66 |
| DENKANS | .15 | 1.89 | | | |
| DENKWEI | — .20 | — 3.07 | | | |
| DENHOPE | .06 | 1.01 | | | |
| | $R = .84$ | $RSQ = .70$ | $R = .77$ | $RSQ = .60$ | |

The hypothesis that antiforeign mass protests would decrease with improvement in reconsolidation of authority is also sustained. As for the impact of external factors, we find that articulated Soviet anti-Chinese activities were not related to increases in antiforeign mass protests, and that articulated U.S. military activities in Vietnam and in other areas exerted a negative impact on the campaigns.

## VII. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

The findings of our multivariate analysis (Tables 4 and 5), which took both internal and external factors into consideration simultaneously, should furnish more reliable results than the simple bivariate analysis (Table 3). They suggest strong support for our argument that the leadership did manipulate mass-media hostility and antiforeign protests for internal purposes. More concretely, the regime utilized the denunciations of external enemies and the mass protests to generate support for internal mobilization during a time when the ordinary political system was disrupted.

As to provincial activities in the power-seizure campaign, there is correlation with mass-media hostility only for the Heilungkiang cluster, which includes Heilungkiang, Shansi, and part of Shantung and

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Chekiang. This indicates that those who controlled *People's Daily* utilized accusations against external enemies for mobilizing support in these provinces. Mobilization for power seizure in Shanghai and Peking, where there was overwhelming Red Guard support, does not correlate with mass-media hostility. The activities of the power-seizure campaign in Peking also do not correlate with the antiforeign mass protests. Instead, the protests only correlate with the clusters of the Heilungkiang cluster. Antiforeign mass protests increased greatly when activity in the power-seizure campaign increased in these clusters.

Activities in the denunciation campaign also correlate with antiforeign protests. The Liaoning cluster correlates with the dependent variable positively, $r = .69$.

With regard to external factors, Soviet anti-Chinese activities seem to have had no impact on the antiforeign mass protests. However, articulated U.S. military activities both in Vietnam and in other areas are shown to have had negative impact on antiforeign mass protests, with $r = -.43$ and $-.26$ respectively.

Based on the findings above, we are able to evaluate the accuracy of our initial hypotheses. The proposition that antiforeign mass protests would increase when activity in the power-seizure campaign increased is supported. The hypothesis that antiforeign mass protests would increase with greater activity in the denunciation campaign is also supported when we examine the Heilungkiang and Ninghsia clusters, which include Heilungkiang, Shansi and Tientsin, Hopei, Kirin, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Hupei, Kansu, and Ninghsia. Our examination of both mass-media hostility and antiforeign mass protests therefore suggest that these external hostilities were manipulated in order to mobilize support in areas where local Maoists were fighting for leadership. Mobilization in Peking and Shanghai, which were areas already controlled by the Maoists, had little correlation with external hostility.

The denunciation campaign, as discussed above, was aimed at denigrating the reputation of Liu Shao-ch'i and his associates in order to carry out Mao's campaign of power seizure. As in the power-seizure campaign, we would expect that Mao's supporters might have utilized external hostilities to further the denunciation campaign. Accordingly, both mass-media hostility and antiforeign mass protests would have increased when the degree of participation in the denunciation campaign was high. In examining the antiforeign mass protests, we find a positive correlation with participation by the Liaoning cluster, which includes Liaoning, Kiangsi, and Hupei. However, there is little correlation with the Shanghai and Kweichou clusters, areas where Mao's

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supporters occupied a predominant position. This indicates that anti-foreign mass protests also were utilized to activate participation in the denunciation campaign only in areas where the Maoists' position was rather weak.

Our research shows little correlation between antiforeign mass-media hostility and the denunciation campaign. However, this finding may be due to the intervention of a third factor which obscures the correlation, i.e., the space limitations in *People's Daily*. We measured mass-media hostility and the denunciation campaign by the frequency of news items that appeared in *People's Daily*. Since antiforeign mass protests were measured by the frequency of *activities* taking place in each province rather than the frequency of the *reports* themselves, space limitations did not present a problem here. However, they were a confounding factor when both dependent and independent variables were measured by the frequency of reports in the same paper. Because of the limitations of space, coverage of a key issue would naturally lead to a reduction in coverage of a secondary issue. During the Cultural Revolution, the frequency of accusations of both internal and external enemies increased sharply. Thus, space limits in *People's Daily* may have obscured the correlation between mass-media hostility and the denunciation campaign. A measurement of the denunciation campaign which could somehow avoid the problem of space might expose a clearer relation between the two campaigns.

## VIII. Suggestions for Research on the Linkage of Internal Politics and External Behavior

The main purpose of the preceding research has been to explore the relationship between China's internal political problems and articulated external hostility during an authority crisis. Periods in which the Chinese Government was not absorbed in authority crises were not researched.

Since it is essential to begin with a careful analysis of the particular domestic situation and foreign behavior of the nation under consideration, cross-national research—which is based upon common indicators of internal politics and external conflict behavior—is not necessarily able to expose the significant relationships within individual countries. Possible relations between internal politics and external behavior are not limited to situations of physical conflict. Thus, the examination of verbal hostility and its link to internal politics should not be ignored in future research.

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Furthermore, since some external conflicts are independent of internal conflicts, some are related to them, and some can even subdue them, an overall generalization of international conflict without distinctions will inevitably lead to confusion. The exploration of the relationship between internal and external conflicts requires a close examination of the internal political phenomena.

Wilkenfeld has suggested that rigid political systems exhibit higher correlations between domestic and foreign conflict than do more flexible types.[39] Our research supports Wilkenfeld's theory by showing that during authority crises in China, there has been a close relationship between internal problems and external hostility. In times of extreme domestic tension, elites may be expected to manipulate external hostility in order to displace domestic discontent. Thus, it is highly likely that utilization of external issues for internal purposes will occur more frequently during authority crises than in times of domestic tranquility. Comparisons of internal political environments constitute another important avenue for researching the generalized relationship between internal politics and external conflict.

[39] See fn. 12.

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# *Research Note*

## ALLIANCES VERSUS ENTENTES

By ROBERT A. KANN

THE question raised in this article is a simple one, although the answer to it may be complex. Do alliances[1] invested with the strength of ironclad commitments serve the interests of peace better than more flexible associations between states, such as ententes, nonaggression pacts, or consultation pacts, in which the consequences of acting against the partners' common interests are far less rigidly defined?[2]

Whenever an alliance with airtight commitments is negotiated, the contracting states will usually try to define their own obligations as narrowly as possible; at the same time they will try to define those of their partners as widely as possible. When a crisis arises in international relations—that is, when the *casus foederis*[3] is invoked by the ally whose interests are directly threatened—his partners may attempt to use any loose wording in the alliance treaty as an escape clause.[4] In order to avoid losing prestige, they will usually make the attempt in an underhanded way; even more frequently, they will rationalize their unwillingness to honor their obligations. Such behavior does not, of course, void the commitment.

[1] For a definition of alliances, see L. Oppenheim–H. Lauterpacht, *International Law*, I (8th ed., New York: McKay 1951–55), 959 ff.; K. Strupp, ed., *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechtes und der Diplomatie*, I (Berlin: De Gruyter 1924); R. E. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1968), 17-22; B. Boutos-Gali, *Contribution à une théorie générale des alliances* (Paris: Pedone 1963), 18 ff., and the references by P. Fauchille and H. Lauterpacht quoted there.

[2] Friedrich Ruge, *Bündnisse in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von UNO, NATO, EWG und Warschau Pakt* (Frankfurt: Bernard & Graefe, Verlag für Wehrwesen 1971), 33; George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1962), 69-86.

The concept of entente, taken from the Franco-British Entente Cordiale of 1904 and made more specific in 1912, is usually referred to as the classical case of a flexible agreement of cooperation between two sovereign powers. By intent far more loosely defined than an alliance, "entente" is a more meaningful term than "consultation" or "nonaggression pact." In many instances, either of the latter may serve the same purpose as an entente.

For a not entirely successful attempt to define an entente, see Helge Granfelt, *Alliances and Ententes as Political Weapons: From Bismarck's Alliance System to the Present Time* (Lund: Fahlbeck Foundation 1970), 11.

[3] Oppenheim–Lauterpacht (fn. 1), I, 963.

[4] There are, however, exceptions to this attitude, as when the partner or partners of an alliance not directly threatened believe the time is ripe for a general confrontation. On this point, see the copious literature on Germany's interpretation of her commitments to her Austrian ally in the July crisis of 1914.

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It seems fair to say that, important exceptions notwithstanding, an alliance with rigid commitments leads to an attitude in which each state tries to minimize its own obligations and to maximize those of its partners. Consequently, in most alliances there exists a built-in centrifugal tendency toward weakening the ties—a trend found throughout the history of alliance systems, whether or not the binding commitments are eventually honored. It can be seen as clearly in the Grand Alliance against Prussia in the Seven Years' War and the coalition system of the Napoleonic era as in the classical cases of the Austro-German-Italian Triple Alliance of 1882 or the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1893.[5] The treaties that followed World War I, in which the basic trust between the allies was weakened by increasing ideological rifts, compounded this tendency. The Locarno treaties of 1925, and the Czech alliance system which led to the disaster of Munich, are ample evidence.

One can argue that the situation is entirely different in the case of ententes or consultation pacts, such as the Franco-British Entente Cordiale of 1904 (tightened in 1912),[6] or the looser Franco-British-Russian Triple Entente of 1907.[7] Where no firm commitments exist between the partners, there should be simple recognition of the fact that agreements between them will make sense only if they serve common interests. Assuming mutual reasonableness to be the raison d'être of accords, one can argue that the partners of an entente or consultation pact will be interested in strengthening their ties. The inherent trend of an entente is therefore in precisely the opposite direction from that of an alliance.

It would be rash, however, to conclude from these simple deductions that ententes or flexible agreements in general are, from the standpoint of the mutual security of the signatories, preferable to alliances. Many examples of workable alliances and meaningless ententes can easily be adduced, but this in itself proves little. The decisive issue is whether an entente can really serve the same purpose as an alliance. If it can, the issue raised at the beginning of this essay becomes a question of practical politics rather than one of speculation.

Historical evidence is of course weighted heavily in favor of the alliance and, at certain times, of the secret alliance. The reason may not exclusively lie in the fact that the concept of entente is a relatively mod-

[5] This observation refers to the whole course of this alliance from 1894 to 1914 (particularly the Russian hesitancy in the two Moroccan crises of 1905/1906 and 1911 and the French faltering in the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908/1909). Mutual obligations were eventually met by both powers in August 1914.

[6] Ruge (fn. 2), 33-35, 70.

[7] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1965), 412-47.

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ern one. One may argue that the predominantly nonideological alliances concluded between the Westphalian Peace Treaty of 1648 and the French Revolution of 1789 already contained seeds of the entente system. Eighteenth-century diplomacy before 1789, although characterized by the phenomenon of the "diplomatic revolution" and the "reversal of alliances," excelled in the conclusion of secret alliance treaties which, if made public, would have patently lacked popular appeal. The character of the commitment offered the only—however limited—security to the contracting parties that treaty obligations would be honored. Yet the very secrecy of the commitment opened a back door that was frequently used by the allies to get out of oppressive commitments and to enter new ones. This does not mean that brittle eighteenth-century covenants were entered by the signatories with the clear intent to void them at their own convenience. Treaty negotiations of this kind would have made little sense. It does suggest, however, that the attitude of the contracting parties was more often than not ambivalent, and *arrière pensées* on how to get out of a commitment—just in case—were not absent. Thus, when an ally in the age of the diplomatic revolution wanted to reverse his position concerning a previously signed treaty, the very secrecy of the alliance protected him from a loss of credibility. The entering of new commitments could be brought about by the novel factor of flexibility. Accordingly, the secret alliances of the eighteenth century in a way served as forerunners of the entente concept.[8]

Analyses and enumerations of the meaning and objectives of alliances are plentiful; there is no need to cover this ground again in these pages.[9] The texts of most alliance treaties include statements about the mutual interest of the partners in the preservation of internal and external security and in the restraint of aggression, usually linked to a pious claim that the alliance serves the cause of world peace. There is little new to be found in these statements since the Congress of Vienna. What did change during this period, however, was that after the eighteenth century territorial gains were rarely cited as the open objective of a treaty. Although the openly offensive alliance was clearly

[8] This kind of diplomacy is discussed in Max Immich, *Geschichte des europäischen Staatensystems von 1660 bis 1789* (Munich-Berlin: Oldenbourg 1905); see in particular 254-55 and 344-49. Also see Edmond Préclin, with the collaboration of Victor L. Tapié, *Le XVIII siècle*, I, *La France et le monde de 1715 à 1789* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1952), 49-93, 456-78.

[9] See, for instance, Osgood (fn. 1), 19-21, 60-115 passim; Boutos-Gali (fn. 1), 18 ff.; Julian R. Friedmann, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen, eds., *Alliance in International Politics* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon 1970), Introduction by J. R. Friedmann, 5, and "Alliances" by Hans J. Morgenthau, 80-92.

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on the way out, offensive purposes did not cease to be the actual objective of many alliances. Offensive goals were simply rationalized as stratagems in the service of the alleged goal of peace. The point is illustrated by various treaties concluded among European powers in the years between the Crimean War and the First World War. Their wording expressed the desire to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire by way of domestic reforms. The true intent usually was precisely the reverse, namely, to relieve the Empire of parts of its territory if the opportunity for such action availed itself. One can go back even further: regardless of the differences between Castlereagh and Metternich, they were on common ground in recognizing that the existence and operation of a Concert of Europe required different political semantics from those prevalent in the era of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.[10] Whether the emergence of these rationalizations represents progress, whether one can speak here in Schopenhauer's terms of the bow of vice before virtue, remains open to question. Certainly the diplomatic maneuvers of the Great Powers from 1814 to 1914 were too complex in motivation to be classified simply as either aggressive or peaceful.

One must recognize that a change in political semantics may gradually lead to a subtle change in intent. For instance, the so-called Holy Alliance of 1815 and the Anti-Comintern Pact between the Axis Powers and Japan of 1937 were outstanding examples of broad, strictly ideological agreements. Yet, although the psychological thrust of these covenants and their intended impact on public opinion was clear, the obligations of the signatories were extremely vague. The reverse is true for alliances concluded after World War II. The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, as well as almost all the postwar pacts concluded by the Soviet Union with the countries of Eastern Central Europe, have been to a large degree ideological alliances entailing much firmer commitments, but little by little the ideological aspects of these alliances have become less ostentatious. The concern not to increase tension has led, in East and West alike, to a technique of playing down the ideological intent of alliances.

The desire to decrease tension is also incompatible with the concept of the secret alliance. The secret alliance—much overstressed in Wilsonian political theories about the causes of World War I—was already on the way out at the time of the French Revolution of 1789, that is, with the end of the age of enlightened absolutism in Europe. The concept has been further weakened by an intrinsic feature of the modern

[10] See also Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace 1812–1822* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1957), 306-310.

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alliance: the deterrent effect, which exists only if the alliance has been made public.[11]

The great alliance systems that went into operation in 1914 were well known to all the European powers; no one any longer believes the charge voiced by some minor, politically motivated German scholars in discussing the question of war guilt, that Germany was subject to a British surprise attack based on purported longstanding secret commitments to France and possibly even to Russia.[12] The idea that binding secret alliances could drag countries into major wars was not a post-1918 revelation of the age of the masses; it had already been recognized in the era of the Concert of Europe beginning in 1814, and was widely accepted in the era of representative government, at least after 1866. In democratic countries it is no longer debatable; even in other countries, popular sentiment would make the indiscriminate application of secrecy far more risky than it was a century ago.

A comparison between alliances and ententes based on the rather controversial trinity of secrecy, ideological issues, and the at least formally defensive character of the association does not lead us very far. These issues are relatively well delineated in alliance treaties, but not in ententes or consultation pacts—concepts which by necessity are far less succinct. The discussion of the subject in the literature is therefore less than clear. This matters less than it seems. Inasmuch as ententes entail no definite commitments, there seems to be little need to camouflage aggressive designs where legal obligations do not exist.[13] Nor is the ideological factor of great importance. To be effective, ideologies have to

[11] There also exists an in-between category, the public alliance in which only specific clauses are secret. An example is the Plombières agreement between Napoleon III and Cavour in 1858, which was a secret part of the generally known French-Piedmontese alliance of 1859. The Prussian-Italian alliance of 1866 is another example: it secretly stipulated a time limit of three months within which it would become operative. Meanwhile the existence of the alliance itself, though not proclaimed, was definitely assumed by Austria. After 1918, such mixed, partly public, partly secret alliances would have seemed to the general public to be even more deceptive than outright secret alliances.

[12] One may be able to argue that the British-French naval understanding prior to World War I concerning the concentration of the bulk of the British Navy in the North Sea and the French Navy in the Mediterranean represented a British moral commitment; it is certain that it did not represent a legal one. That assumption was ruled out by the exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, and Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador, on November 22 and 23, 1912. See also S. B. Fay, *The Origin of the World War*, I (2d rev. ed.; New York: Macmillan 1938), 192-213; Frederick L. Schuman, *War and Diplomacy in the French Republic* (New York: Whittlesey House 1931), 173-94.

There were, of course, exceptions to the rule of the declining momentum of secrecy, particularly in regard to Italian diplomacy; to take just one example, the secret treaty of London of April 26, 1915, between Italy and the Entente Powers was concluded at a time when the Triple Alliance treaty with Germany and Austria was nominally still in force.

[13] See the literature cited in fn. 2.

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be proclaimed as loudly as possible, and the effect of such public-relations jobs depends on the ability to make the binding commitment to the ideologies appear believable. Seemingly very important ideological associations, as noted, lacked precisely such firm commitments and were thus not genuine alliances in the strict sense of the word. However, their impact should not be underrated. The Holy Alliance of 1815, even though it did not include Great Britain, must be considered a major instrument of the Concert of Europe which emerged from the Congress of Vienna and the renewed Quadruple Alliance of 1815. The Anti-Comintern Pact was the foundation of the German-Italian alliance of 1939—the so-called "pact of steel"—and of the genuine tripartite German-Italian-Japanese alliance pacts of 1940 and 1941. This type of exhibitionist ideological declaration, which precedes or accompanies genuine alliances, is not found in the modest frame of entente agreements. The cause of peace certainly does not suffer from the lack.

Inasmuch as the entente is a far less conspicuous form of association than the alliance, it must be admitted that secrecy may play a greater role in it than in the formal alliance. Italian diplomacy, for example, excelled in this use of secrecy; witness the Franco-Italian and the Russo-Italian agreements of 1902 and 1909.[14] Neither of these agreements changed the course of history; nevertheless, until World War I the entente system was better able to use secrecy than was the formal alliance. After 1918, there is little evidence that secrecy was more important in informal agreements than it was in formal ones. The decisive difference between the two kinds of agreements must be looked for elsewhere.

A major function of an alliance—indeed *the* major function in the opinion of some—is its supposedly deterrent effect, which is generally believed to be completely lacking or at least much weaker in even widely publicized ententes. The conspicuous deterrent effect of the alliance system can be interpreted in two ways. In general, it is understood to make the action of a sovereign state predictable to the whole community of states. The public announcement of the text of an alliance makes it obvious that in the case of a more or less clearly defined action by another sovereign state or states, which conflicts with the interest of international order and peace, the *casus foederis* would arise, and counteraction would be taken. In the broadest sense, this means the

[14] The Franco-Italian understandings of 1902, which ran counter to both the spirit and the letter of Italy's alliance with the Central Powers and the agreement of Racconigi with Russia of 1909, ought to be mentioned here. In these cases one can justly speak of ententes which were meant to weaken Italy's obligations as an ally and to offer her the opportunity to switch sides in case of necessity.

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operation of the integral raison d'être of any system of law, which makes the consequences of human action by individuals or groups predictable. Interpreted thus, predictability is bound to strengthen any system of international law, just as it strengthens the system of civil law within a country. It does not convey a threat; it merely affirms the operation of the rule of law in international relations.

In regard to our problem, however, the deterrent element in an alliance system has an additional, specific meaning beyond the general idea that anyone who breaks the rules of international law has to face certain consequences. Although the alliance may in theory—in order to rationalize certain particular interests—be addressed to the whole community of states, in practice it is only directed against a specific state or states, whether named in the alliance treaty or not. In other words, the most common type of alliance may say simply that if the interests of partners A and B of the alliance are violated by anybody, counteraction will follow. However, at least by implication it states that if C or D interferes with the interests of partners A and B, then A and B will resort to hostile counteraction. In this way the deterrent becomes operative, not primarily as a consequence of a violation of the system of international law in general, but in order to guard specific interests; in many cases these interests have been arbitrarily staked out by individual states against other individual states. Thus, predictability means that counteraction, which can produce the threat of armed conflict, serves specific interests, whether justified or not. It is at this point that the basic issue arises of whether an alliance offers better protection to the contracting parties than a looser arrangement. This of course begs the further question of whether an alliance offers better chances for the preservation of peace in general than more flexible understandings would.

It is clear that predictability is of foremost importance. Friends and foes are put on notice that actions against the interests of the alliance will lead to grim consequences. As noted, such announcements by one partner may frequently frighten another partner and lead him to act evasively if his own interests don't seem to be directly threatened. Doubtless, this widely observed phenomenon must be placed among the factors weakening the deterrent effect of the alliance. On the other hand, the alliance may act as a kind of straitjacket. It could force the allies into actions that seemed essential when the alliance was concluded, but that no longer serve the purpose of one or several of the allies at the time the *casus foederis* is proclaimed by one of them. As sinister examples of this kind, one can adduce the fate of the Triple

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Alliance in 1914–1915, of the Locarno Pact[15] at the time of the German occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, and of the Franco-Czech alliance in 1938. In all three cases, but particularly in the last two, a false sense of security created by the alliances and general guarantee systems aggravated the consequences of the breaches of agreements.

In a facile answer to this argument against binding commitments, one could suggest the possibility of scrapping alliance treaties from time to time, or of revising their contents to take account of changes in external circumstances. There are examples of both of these actions in diplomatic history. The first, the outright termination of an alliance or other binding agreements by one of the contracting partners, is generally considered a signal of impending war. Thus, the formal Italian withdrawal from the Triple Alliance preceded the declaration of war on Austria by a mere three weeks. Hitler's cancellations of previous agreements with Great Britain and Poland in 1939 had a similar effect: outright German aggression followed in just four months.[16]

Revisions of alliance treaties, which usually take place when the treaty is due to be renewed, generally imply changes of two kinds. They may strengthen the bonds of the alliance for all parties, or they may strengthen the commitments of one or more allies in favor of another ally. The Triple Alliance, for instance, was changed in Italy's favor in the course of its history, though to no avail. However, in an alliance whose terms have been made public, changes are generally not made in the direction of loosening previous commitments.

Why, then, are alliances usually terminated only when war seems inevitable? Why are their mutual commitments not loosened if the terms appear oppressive to the contracting parties? The answer to the first question is that, in addition to the war-scare atmosphere generated by the official termination of an alliance, such action destroys the credibility of the ally who asks for the cancellation. As for weakening the commitments of the alliance—an action that in line with the demands of the modern age would have to be made public—the threatened impact of a loss of credibility would be sufficient to prevent such action.

Any ally, particularly a great power, would understandably fear the loss of his standing and weight in international relations if he were no longer considered "alliable." He may in effect become a political pris-

[15] This was technically a system of mutual international guarantees; but in certain contingencies, such as the arbitrary remilitarization of the Rhineland, it was meant to stand for an alliance system as well.

[16] It is of course true that neither the British-German naval agreement of 1935 nor the German-Polish nonaggression pact of 1934 represented alliances, but they were nevertheless binding agreements of sorts. Both agreements were denounced by Hitler in a Reichstag speech of April 28, 1939.

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oner of the credibility factor. In order to preserve a kind of international credit rating, he has to honor alliances that have outlived their usefulness. Cases of this kind have occurred ever since the demise of secret alliances, and they may well continue to occur. The danger of such a contingency clearly increases when a power suffers a diplomatic defeat, as the United States did in South Vietnam. Such concerns should obviously not be construed either as a plea for secrecy in international relations or as a plea for the withdrawal from essential international commitments.

There are other potential dangers in alliances. R. E. Osgood raises a point that is well worth considering. He lists as the principal functions of alliances "accretion of external power, internal security, restraint of allies and international order."[17] Although one might well focus on other functions or define Osgood's differently, the third point he raises is particularly interesting.

> Next to accretion [of external power] the most prominent function of alliances has been to restrain and control allies, particularly in order to safeguard one ally against actions of another that might endanger its security or otherwise jeopardize its interests. This function may be accomplished directly by pledges of nonintervention or by other reassurances that one ally will not contravene the interests of another, or it may be the byproduct of commitments that limit an ally's freedom of action and provide its partners with access to and influence upon its government.[18]

The phenomenon noted by Osgood is common, and it is frequently misunderstood. It formed one of the most characteristic features of Bismarck's foreign policy. His Three Emperors' League, like his pseudo Three Emperors' Alliance, tried to maneuver two potential enemies, Austria and Russia, into a coalition with Germany, using grounds of monarchic solidarity as motivation. By 1887 these efforts had clearly failed; they were not taken up again. The use of the same device to placate the antagonism between Austria and Italy by means of a genuine alliance—the Triple Alliance of 1882—failed even more conspicuously. By 1914 Austria and Germany found themselves at war with Russia; by 1915 Italy had declared war on Austria, and by 1916 she was at war with Germany as well. An underlying motive of this major weakness of the Bismarckian alliance strategy—preventing hostile powers from fighting by means of "shotgun weddings"—was of course the intention to secure for Germany a commanding position as arbiter. True, no major power is bound to accept this only seemingly attractive

[17] Osgood (fn. 1), 21.
[18] *Ibid.*, 21 ff.

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role in an alliance. Nevertheless, the present as well as earlier difficulties in NATO prove convincingly that alliances may strain relations between allies severely, particularly between allies of unequal strength. This factor must be added to the built-in tendency for partners in alliances to move surreptitiously away from stringent commitments.

The impact of the three factors sketched here—escape from the rigidity of an alliance, bondage to the pressure of credibility, and resistance to the true or assumed pressure by a major ally on its contracting partner—seem to weigh heavily against alliances and in favor of more flexible, entente-like agreements. The deterrent factor alone, in itself a somewhat controversial device, cannot outweigh the impact of the three issues listed above.

The question may be raised whether there exists a clear difference between the approaches of democratic and totalitarian states to the issue of rigid or flexible agreements. It is difficult to find a clearcut answer. As already noted, secret diplomacy can still play a limited part in totalitarian countries, whereas actions based on secret commitments are likely to be repudiated by the majority of the electorate in democratic countries. This does not mean, however, that totalitarian powers are willing to forego the deterrent effect of publicly announced alliances. The Warsaw Pact of 1955 and the 1950 treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union and China are examples. Yet the latter treaty, scheduled to be in effect for not less than thirty years, proves that totalitarian powers with their closely controlled systems of internal communications do not have to worry about problems of credibility or the outward consequences of terminating treaties to the same extent as democracies. At least in domestic politics such states do not face any appreciable risk. To a substantial degree these countries are in the comfortable position of being able to let people forget about a publicly announced obligation by simply ignoring it. This means that the problem of choosing between alliances and ententes does not exist in totalitarian countries in the same form as it does in democratic countries.

A final observation should be added: what has been said must be protected against two possible misinterpretations. First, the dilemma which the alliance presents should not be interpreted as an argument in favor of any kind of neo-isolationism, however camouflaged. At issue is the *form* of agreements between friendly countries, not the *necessity* of such agreements. Second, the choice between rigid and more flexible systems must not be construed, either directly or by implication, as an argument for a return to secret diplomacy.

Recent American experiences, from NATO to the controversial com-

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mitments to South Vietnam, certainly do not answer the question of rigidity versus flexibility unequivocally. If, on the other hand, one looks at United States policy toward Israel, where even entente-like agreements do not exist, two points come clearly into focus. Flexible understandings between countries, whether in the form of mutual agreements or of unilateral but previously negotiated announcements, do not necessarily lack the aura of predictability which conveys to the community of states the serious intentions of the parties involved. Furthermore, the possibility, or even the probability, remains open that an understanding might be tightened into a more definite accord. At the same time, the restraining effect of an understanding that does not give one party a free hand, like the famous blank check given Austria-Hungary by Germany in July 1914, should be obvious. Such less-than-formal agreements, if they are concluded in full publicity, may serve two purposes by at the same time providing assurance for and restraint of the potential ally. They may thereby preserve the deterrent effect of the alliance and curb its dangerous consequences as well. To be sure, the more frequent use of this device will not remove the concept of the alliance from the international community, nor should it do so. In order to dispense entirely with a design whose conceivably more limited application has been discussed here, we would have to live in a very different world of comprehensive and impregnable collective security.

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*Review Article*

# THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR

By WILLIAM STUECK

Robert R. Simmons, *The Strained Alliance: Peking, P'yŏngyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War*. New York, Free Press, 1975, 285 pp., $10.95.

THE precise role of the Soviet Union in the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950 has always been a puzzle to scholars. Although to most Western observers it seemed probable that Russia knew of and approved the North Korean attack, evidence to support that view was sparse for many years.[1] Indeed, expressions of uncertainty were not difficult to find among historians.[2] Even today there remains room for debate. Although to Adam Ulam it is "inconceivable"[3] that the North Koreans "moved on their own," it seems both conceivable and likely to others.[4]

The traditional view of deep Kremlin involvement in planning the offensive frequently is part of a larger conception of the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin as an expansive power which generally exerted tight control over foreign Communist governments.[5] In contrast, the

[1] I assume that North Korea did attack South Korea and that the attack was not a direct response to specific South Korean military action north of the 38th parallel. For a dissenting view, see Karunker Gupta, "How Did the Korean War Begin?" *China Quarterly*, XIII (October-December 1972), 699-716; rebuttals by Chong-sik Lee, W. E. Skillend, and Robert Simmons in *China Quarterly*, XIV (April-June 1973), 354-68. Recent revisionist writers are inclined to concede this point; see Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power* (New York: Harper & Row 1972), 578. Authentication of the memoirs of former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev should close the question for all but the most extreme doubters. Khrushchev makes it clear that large-scale hostilities were initiated by North Korea; see *Khrushchev Remembers*, ed. Edward Crankshaw, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown 1970), 367-70; for evidence of the volume's authentication, see Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown 1974), xi-xix. For further evidence, including orders for the North Korean army to attack across the 38th parallel, see Far Eastern Command, "Documentary Evidence of North Korean Aggression," RG 6, Box 4, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Va.

[2] See, for example, Max Beloff, *Soviet Foreign Policy in the Far East, 1944–1951* (London: Oxford University Press 1953), 183; Alvin Rubinstein, *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House 1960), 251.

[3] Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence* (New York: Praeger 1968), 518.

[4] Kolko and Kolko (fn. 1), 585-87.

[5] See David Dallin, *Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin* (Philadelphia: Lippincott 1961), 60.

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revisionist view is that the North Korean attack surprised Russia. The broader framework here often includes a belief in the conservative nature of Soviet aims abroad, "the phenomenon of autonomous polycentric Communist states which guide their own destinies on important questions," as well as American culpability for the cold war.[6]

Eclecticism has been ever-present. Traditionalists and revisionists have adopted each other's views on specific events.[7] With the growth of literature on twentieth-century Korean politics, new syntheses on the origins of the Korean War undoubtedly will emerge.[8] It will become increasingly difficult to place these works within old categories.

Robert Simmon's book, *The Strained Alliance*, offers a case in point. Simmons argues that "[a]lthough the Russians certainly armed the North Koreans, and did expect a war, . . . the timing of the war . . . can best be understood in terms of the indigenous conditions on the Korean peninsula" (p. 103). The attack of June 25 probably upset the Soviet timetable. The Kremlin, Simmons concludes, had approved of and anticipated an invasion for August. But North Korea "jumped the gun," thereby surprising its ally (pp. 119-24).

This hypothesis is developed on several levels. Simmons first analyzes politics in North Korea. A struggle was in progress, he contends, for influence within the dominant Workers' Party between Premier Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon Yong. This struggle developed after the Communist Party had been suppressed south of the 38th parallel by President Syngman Rhee. As a result, Pak and other party leaders fled north. In 1949, the North and South Korean Communist Parties merged into the Workers' Party. Kim continued as top man in the north, but Pak "enjoyed widespread support." Simmons asserts that "as a symbol of the repression in the south and as a respected spokesman voicing the view that the Rhee government could be easily overthrown, Pak encouraged" an early military campaign to unite the peninsula (p. 104).

According to Simmons, the timing of the attack probably was a re-

[6] See Kolko and Kolko (fn. 1), and D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins*, II (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1961), 604-8.

[7] In 1951 Wilbur Hitchcock argued that North Korea surprised Moscow by invading South Korea in June 1950, but he offered a decidedly traditional view of Soviet foreign policy in "North Korea Jumps the Gun," *Current History*, xx (March 1951), 136-44. On the other hand, Walter LaFeber, whose survey of Russo-American relations in the cold war qualifies as revisionist, offers a traditional interpretation of the Kremlin's role in the outbreak of war in Korea in *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1966* (New York: Wiley 1967), 96-97.

[8] Among the most important works on Korean politics are Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1968), and Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea*, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972).

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sult of one of two factors. A few weeks before the invasion, Kim sent to the south some personnel from the Kapsan faction of the Communist movement, which was under his control. The move may have been designed to wrest control of the southern party from Pak, a goal that could be best accomplished if North Korea seized control in the south before Pak's forces could "coalesce to form an active opposition" to Kim there. Thus Kim moved up the invasion date arranged with Moscow (p. 107).

A second possibility was that Pak's pressure for an early invasion gained so much support within North Korean party organs that Kim gave his "reluctant consent." This interpretation emphasizes the nationalist sentiment within the Workers' Party and the resulting need for Kim to demonstrate his willingness to act independently of Moscow (p. 108).

Simmons bolsters the rationale for advancing the invasion date with evidence of the rapid expansion of Rhee's armed forces. Although the South Korean Air Force was not "a potent force" on June 25, 1950, it probably would have become one soon, Simmons argues. Moreover, 21 combat police battalions had been created in April. Although two months later they had not been operationalized, "it seemed only a matter of time before they would be." Moreover, in March the U.S. Congress had granted $10,970,000 in military aid to Seoul. Not much equipment had arrived by June, but sizable shipments might have reached Korea soon. Rhee's aggressive intentions against the north increased concern in Pyongyang regarding the apparent South Korean buildup (pp. 113-14).

To demonstrate that North Korea acted hurriedly, Simmons presents evidence that the People's Republic was less well prepared militarily in June than it would have been a few weeks later. Its forces were not fully mobilized on June 25, its armament program was incomplete, and only a small percentage of the Korean Communist troops that had fought in the Chinese People's Liberation Army had returned to the peninsula. Furthermore, few Soviet officials surfaced in Seoul during the months of North Korean control of that city. When the invasion occurred, the Chief of North Korean Military Intelligence was in Moscow. Had Russia known the attack was coming, Simmons reasons, more of its personnel would have been involved to assure success, and the intelligence chief would have been in North Korea, "monitoring data on the rapidly changing situation" (pp. 117-19).

Simmons notes that some "fairly highly placed North Korean officers . . . had only the barest presentiment of the coming of hostilities, and . . . were given no concrete indication of their onset until approxi-

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mately one week before the invasion took place" (p. 121). This fact, in addition to the small number of Soviet advisers reported in North Korea in June 1950 (p. 120), indicates to Simmons that the attack *might* have been launched prior to Moscow's expectations.

That the attack came earlier than originally planned is suggested by a statement, in April, by the (Communist) Korean League in Japan, which pointed to an August invasion date (p. 118). In early June, North Korea, with Soviet support, launched a political offensive for the peaceful unification of the peninsula, which was to culminate two months later. It must have been known that this campaign would be frustrated by Rhee; it smacked of a Soviet design to legitimize the impending North Korean military campaign. With the program's clear failure by August, uprisings could be arranged in the south as a prelude to an attack from the north (pp. 121-22).

Simmons also draws attention to the situation outside Korea by emphasizing two factors. First, when North Korea attacked, Russia was boycotting the United Nations Security Council in protest of that body's failure to seat Communist China. Second, the Kremlin was slow to respond to the crisis. Thirty-six hours passed before a statement appeared on the outbreak of war. No full expression of Soviet attitudes appeared until July 4. The Soviets made no immediate protest to the United Nations to help maintain "the fiction of the action being a South Korean invasion." If Russia knew the attack was coming, Simmons asserts, its delegate would have returned to veto any American initiative in the Security Council. Certainly the Soviet response would have been more rapid and decisive (pp. 122-24).

Simmons concludes by suggesting that the commencement of hostilities in Korea prior to the impending Communist Chinese assault on Taiwan must have displeased Peking. The North Korean move led to American action to protect Taiwan. Communist China's chances for admission to the United Nations, which had been excellent before the North Korean attack, diminished thereafter. Since Soviet leaders must have been aware of Peking's desire to capture Taiwan and to gain admission to the U.N., they were not likely to approve a North Korean offensive until those goals were achieved. To do so, Simmons reasons, would have been to risk a deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations (pp. 124-28).[9]

[9] Simmons does not use the Hitchcock-Kolko argument that the North Korean attack was contrary to Soviet interests because it "mobilized the United States Congress and advanced the many bottlenecked military programs that the Truman administration had on paper, thereby reversing the narrow gap between Soviet and American military power." See Kolko and Kolko (fn. 1), 585; Hitchcock (fn. 7), 537. For a detailed

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The foregoing hypothesis integrates the arguments of both traditional and revisionist writers. Simmons concurs with the former that Russia approved of and expected an attack in the summer of 1950. He acknowledges Soviet involvement in North Korean preparations. But he leans toward the revisionist camp by emphasizing the North Korean initiative in conceiving the move, and ultimately in choosing the date contrary to the Kremlin's desires and expectations. By suggesting that the invasion was originally planned for August, and that political factors within Korea were crucial in changing this plan, Simmons breaks new ground.

The larger implications of this interpretation are more revisionist than traditional. The picture drawn of the Soviet-North Korean relationship suggests that Kremlin control of international communism was shaky at an earlier date than traditionalists admit. Simmons's view encourages criticism of American policy on the peninsula prior to and during the Korean War. If nationalism was as strong within the Communist movement in Korea as this account indicates, Washington's fears of Soviet domination of that country were overblown. America's dependence on corrupt and reactionary forces to keep half of Korea in non-Communist hands may have been unnecessary.[10]

Simmons's work is also revisionist in another sense. He argues that the conflict was essentially a civil war. Since "the P'yŏngyang government was neither a passive 'gun' for an itchy Soviet trigger finger, nor a monolithic political system totally subservient to Moscow," the causes of the war must be sought largely on the Korean peninsula itself (p. 103). The proper title for the conflict, Simmons contends, is "the Korean Civil War" (p. xv).

Although he displays great ingenuity in places, Simmons is open to criticism on both conceptual and empirical grounds. The validity of the concept of the Korean conflict as a civil war must be determined partially by one's definition of the term. Simmons appears to emphasize origins: if a conflict is rooted largely in divisions within a nation and among its people, that conflict merits the label civil war. But this labeling ignores the course of the war itself. Can the event be understood without giving a major role to foreign powers both before and

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critique of the Kolko presentation, including rebuttals from the Kolkos, see Stueck, "Cold War Revisionism and the Origins of the Korean Conflict: The Kolko Thesis," and Kolko and Kolko, "To Root Out Those Among Them," in *Pacific Historical Review*, XLII (November 1973), 537-60 and 560-66, respectively.

[10] For Simmons's criticism of American intervention see "The Korean Civil War," in Frank Baldwin, ed., *Without Parallel* (New York: Pantheon Books 1973), 537-75.

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after hostilities began? What would have happened if American and Soviet forces had withdrawn from Korea in 1945 after accepting the surrender of Japanese forces there? What if the withdrawal had taken place without the establishment of opposing governments by the occupying powers? A conflict among domestic factions undoubtedly would have accompanied an early foreign withdrawal. In addition to the timing, however, the methods and scale of combat would have been different than they actually were between 1950 and 1953. Foreign forces would not have been involved, and the peninsula probably would eventually have been united politically. In sum, the conflict of 1950–1953 cannot be understood without giving major attention to the policies of and relationships between the United States and Russia, both within and outside Korea, after World War II. Although domestic factors deserve more attention than they have been given in traditional accounts, the title "Korean Civil War" is too restrictive to encompass the broad nature of the conflict, even if we accept the view that North Korea "jumped the gun" in June 1950.

The Soviet role in the commencement of hostilities must be determined on more specific empirical grounds. Although the question cannot be definitively resolved, most of the evidence undermines Simmons's hypothesis.

The most important documentation that has appeared is the memoir of Nikita Khrushchev. He recalls that at the end of 1949, Kim approached Stalin with the idea to attack South Korea. The Soviet leader "persuaded" Kim "to think it over, make some calculations, and then come back with a concrete plan." When the North Korean ruler returned to Moscow with a plan, Stalin hesitated. He feared American intervention. But other Soviet leaders were confident that this could be avoided if the North Korean victory was rapid. After consulting with Mao Tse-tung, who favored the North Korean plan and thought that American intervention was unlikely, Stalin gave the go-ahead. Despite his approval of North Korean designs, he insisted that Soviet advisers withdraw from the invading forces before the attack. He wanted to be certain that the Soviet role in preparing the attack was not uncovered.[11]

This account emphasizes the North Korean initiative in conceiving of and planning the invasion. On timing, however, Khrushchev is definite: "The designated hour arrived and the war began."[12] This

[11] Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (fn. 1), 368-70.
[12] *Ibid.*, 369.

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flat statement contradicts the revisionist argument that Moscow was surprised on June 25.

Khrushchev's book is not, of course, an unimpeachable source on all points. Despite the volume's authenticity, some materials were removed before it left Russia. An accusation that Kim "jumped the gun" might have had negative repercussions on Soviet-North Korean relations; it is therefore not implausible to argue that the secret police may have eliminated such material before allowing the tapes on which Khrushchev dictated his memoirs to leave the country. One may wonder, nonetheless, if the deposed Soviet leader was ordered to give a false account.[13]

Pawel Monat, a Polish military attaché to both China and North Korea from 1951 to 1954 who defected to the West in 1959, corroborates Khrushchev on several points. He agrees that the Russians approved the attack, were confident of a quick victory (although concerned that their role would be discovered by the West), and gained Mao's approval. Both assert that the Russians and North Koreans expected widespread uprisings against the regime in the south to accompany the invasion. In contrast to Khrushchev, Monat emphasizes Soviet initiative in conceiving and planning the attack. He also asserts that Soviet personnel accompanied North Korean troops south of the 38th parallel.[14] On the first subject, Khrushchev's account is more persuasive, as he was in a better position than Monat to know about such matters. On the latter subject, Monat is probably correct, as his story is confirmed by other evidence.[15]

Two American sources reinforce Monat's and Khrushchev's stories. The first, a report by a State Department mission sent to Korea in October 1950 to study the government of North Korea prior to the commencement of hostilities, appeared in 1961 after a decade under classification. The research team spent "approximately 3 months in

[13] See Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (fn. 1), xiv, for evidence of the withdrawal of some materials from the tapes. No evidence has appeared, however, of the intentional fabrication of stories.

[14] Pawel Monat, "Russians in Korea: Hidden Bosses," *Life*, XXXXVIII (June 27, 1960), 76-102 passim.

[15] Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, who interviewed many North Koreans who had defected or had been captured, state that Khrushchev's account is, in this case, "at variance with numerous Korean accounts." See Scalapino and Lee (fn. 8), II, 399n. A captured North Korean officer, Second Lieutenant Pae Chun Pal, reported in interrogation that Russian advisers were in several of the attacking units; see Far Eastern Command (fn. 1). A C.I.A. report of July 27, 1950, indicates that a South Korean refugee stated he had seen "about 50 Soviet officers" in Seoul on July 6. The source was marked "Usually Reliable." (The report is available in the Records of the Occupation of Japan, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.)

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Korea," in which time it interrogated many North Korean officials and private citizens, and studied Russian and North Korean documents captured by United Nations forces.[16] The report is not footnoted and the evidence behind it has never been made available to scholars. The team's level of expertise in Korean affairs is uncertain. Compiled at a time when cold-war tensions were at a peak, its objectivity may be open to question. Nevertheless, the report's initial secret classification suggests that it was done primarily for internal use rather than for propagandistic purposes. And some of its findings are corroborated by other evidence.

The report is most significant in dealing with the question of North Korea's ability to act without Soviet foreknowledge in June 1950. It offers evidence of extensive Soviet influence in North Korea. Russian officials "were attached to the Defense Ministry in Pyongyang, and evidently possessed the authority to review all decisions and see all information." In addition, some Soviet-Koreans, people with long backgrounds in Russia before 1945, "linked the Soviet Embassy directly to the more vital military commands." They held crucial positions in the Defense Ministry and "key service commands," including leadership of the First Army which represented one-third of the "spearhead divisions" in the North Korean offensive. North Korea's dependence on Russia "for training in critical military skills and supplies" further enhanced Soviet oversight of the smaller power's armed forces.[17] It is difficult to imagine, therefore, that a large-scale North Korean military operation could have taken place without prior Soviet knowledge.

American intelligence reports are another source that bolsters this description of Soviet influence. Of special interest is a C.I.A. review of the situation in North Korea dated June 19, 1950.[18] Like the State Department study, the report emphasizes Soviet control by means of the presence of its personnel "throughout the government, economy, and political organizations" and through "Korean Communist leaders whose primary qualification for high office is loyalty to the U.S.S.R. . . ." Its estimate of the number of Russians with the North Korean armed forces (over 2,000) conflicts with the State Department report and appears excessive. Still, given the extensive South Korean intelligence

[16] Department of State, *North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1961), 1.

[17] *Ibid.*, 114.

[18] See Central Intelligence Agency, "Current Capabilities of the North Korean Regime," June 19, 1950, Records of the Occupation of Japan, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md. Since this report was not declassified until late 1974, Simmons had probably not seen it when he submitted his manuscript for publication.

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network north of the 38th parallel and the corroboration of the overall picture by the State Department study, it would be risky to discount the C.I.A. view entirely.[19]

Such evidence lends more weight to the argument that Moscow was not surprised by the action of its ally in June 1950. Simmons may be criticized for using these sources selectively. He cites Khrushchev's memoir as evidence for North Korean initiative, but ignores it in other instances. He uses Monat's account (pp. 185 and 204), but not in his chapter on the outbreak of war in Korea. He refers to the State Department study in noting the number of Soviet advisers with North Korean divisions in 1950 (between three and eight) and the apparent lack of awareness of some high-level North Korean officers of the invasion plans until a week prior to their implementation (pp. 120-21 and 134). He omits, however, all other material regarding Soviet influence in North Korea.

There is additional information, which Simmons ignores, relating to the number of Koreans who crossed the Yalu from Manchuria prior to June 1950, after serving in the Chinese Communist army. He uses the figure 12,000 (p. 118), but other sources put the number between 23,000 and 40,000.[20] The fact is that we do not know how many soldiers returned from China in 1949 and early 1950, and whether more were supposed to return in the weeks following June 25. Two authorities on Korean communism note, however, that those who did return were carefully screened, probably "to prevent any Maoist enclave from being established within the North Korean Workers' Party."[21] Pyongyang may not have desired the return of all Koreans who had served in Manchuria.

North Korean forces may have been engaged in an expansion program at the time of the invasion.[22] But the expansion of the armed

[19] See Democratic People's Republic of Korea, *Facts Tell* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House 1960), for documents relating to South Korea's intelligence operation in the north.

[20] The State Department study states that "perhaps 40,000" of these troops had entered Korea by the time of the attack and "accounted for at least one-third of the spearhead divisions of the North Korean army." Department of State (fn. 16), 117. The official U.S. Army history puts the number at 28,000. See Roy Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1961), 9. Far Eastern Command Intelligence Headquarters in Tokyo reported that "[c]umulative evidence indicates that, as of 24 June 1950, the total strength of Korean-Manchurian troops in Korea who formerly served with the Communist Chinese Forces amounted to at least 23,000; and it is possible that this total has been augmented considerably." Far Eastern Command, *Intelligence Summary*, July 6, 1950, Records of the Occupation of Japan, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.

[21] Scalapino and Lee, I (fn. 8), 401.

[22] Central Intelligence Agency (fn. 18), 11.

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forces is an ongoing process for any nation preparing for large-scale military operations. Simmons presents no concrete evidence of a plan for the completion of such a program in July or August. Yet he does show that North Korea feared a rapid expansion of South Korea's armed forces. This concern would help explain why North Korea may have attacked before the completion of its own program.[23]

The argument that the political offensive of early June was aimed at preparing the way for military action in August may be countered with the point that the former campaign could just as easily have been intended as a prelude to an attack in late June. After all, it could be anticipated that Rhee would immediately repress—as he did—any leftist effort for peaceful unification. And, as Khrushchev notes, uprisings in the south were expected to coincide with the outbreak of war.[24] Alleged Soviet concerns for legitimacy might have been satisfied thereby.

The April statement of the Korean League in Japan does suggest that the date for the attack *might* have been changed. That point is separate, however, from the matter of Soviet foreknowledge of the date on which the attack did in fact occur.

The evidence does justify Simmons' emphasis on North Korean initiative in conceiving of and planning the attack. The conception of a "weaker ally" drawing "larger powers into an essentially local conflict by making it a 'test' of the larger power's belief system" appears relevant. As Simmons notes, the situation is especially likely to arise "in a loose, bipolar world, where the international system is permeated with ideological perceptions and jargon." In such circumstances, "the weaker state can often take the large-scale patterns of the international system for granted and use the stronger power's own ideology as a bargaining counter in seeking aid. . . ." (pp. 258-59).

The view that Russia was not surprised by North Korean action is strengthened further by the availability of plausible answers to a series of questions raised by Simmons and the revisionists. The desire to surprise the enemy is a reasonable explanation for withholding the date of the attack from some important officers until the last moment. Such security precautions are understandable in light of the South Korean intelligence system in North Korea, the existence of which must have been known to Pyongyang. If South Korea had received evidence of

[23] It should be noted, however, that a major buildup of North Korean forces had taken place in the months before the invasion. See Appleman (fn. 20), 10-12.

[24] Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (fn. 1), 369.

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an impending attack, military preparations could have been made and a diplomatic offensive launched, perhaps with American support. The desire for surprise also helps to explain North Korea's decision to attack before its forces had been fully mobilized.

Two interrelated hypotheses are crucial to an understanding of why the Soviet Union was boycotting the U.N. Security Council when North Korea moved, why the Soviet response to the crisis was so sluggish, and why North Korea attacked before Communist China had been able to take Taiwan. The first is that the American response had not been anticipated; the second, that Russian and Chinese leaders wanted to minimize their role, in order to decrease any chance of direct confrontation with the United States and to forestall any propaganda offensive by the West.

Khrushchev's report of Communist confidence in a quick victory sustains the first hypothesis. The likelihood of decisive American action appeared remote. The United States had failed to intervene on a large scale to prevent China from falling to communism; in statements by top U.S. officials, South Korea had been omitted from the American defense perimeter in the Pacific; in January 1950, a minor aid bill for the Republic of Korea had been defeated in the House of Representatives; and in May 1950, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had publicly observed that the fall of the entire peninsula to communism was all but inevitable.[25]

Khrushchev also notes Stalin's desire to conceal Soviet involvement.[26] The presence of Soviet advisers within the attacking forces, as well as a propaganda offensive by Moscow and Peking and a return of the Soviet delegate to the Security Council, was likely to be interpreted as

[25] Adam Ulam makes the point about the impact on Soviet thinking of America's failure to "save" China; see *The Rivals* (New York: Viking Press 1971), 170-71. General MacArthur and Secretary of State Acheson both made public statements that left South Korea out of the American Pacific defense perimeter. For MacArthur's, see *New York Times*, March 2, 1949, p. 5. For Acheson's, see Department of State, *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1957), 2529-31. The defeat, in the House of Representatives, of the Korean aid bill is noted in Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton 1969), 358. Senator Tom Connally's statement about the probable fall of South Korea was made during an interview; see *U.S. News and World Report*, XXVIII (May 5, 1950), 30.

Since it was not unreasonable to interpret Article 27 of the U.N. Charter as barring Security Council action on substantive matters in the absence of a permanent member, Moscow may have seen its boycott as advantageous in June 1950. (Paragraph 3 of Article 27 reads as follows: "Decisions of the Security Council on all other than procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. . . .") Stalin may have been surprised not only that the United States took any decisive action at all, but especially that the action taken was through Security Council auspices.

[26] Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (fn. 1), 370.

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evidence of an international Communist conspiracy. Such evidence would increase the chances of American intervention and undermine the Soviet position with neutral nations, turning a low-risk operation into a dangerous one. As a good Communist, Stalin may have approved the North Korean venture, but as a prudent statesman he sought to avoid jeopardizing larger Soviet interests.

But, Simmons would reply, Russia had not hesitated to take aggressive postures in the United Nations and the press during the Iranian crisis of 1946, the Greek crisis of 1947, or the Berlin crisis of 1948 (pp. 122-23). Why should Moscow become timid over Korea in 1950? The answer may be simply that a nation's tactics may differ from crisis to crisis. Soviet tactics had not been notably successful in these earlier crises. If anything, they appeared to stiffen American resolve. Therefore, a less direct approach may have looked attractive in June 1950. The likelihood that the American response to the Korean crisis took the Russians by surprise makes this explanation even more persuasive. After the sharp U.S. reaction, Moscow may have been inclined toward caution more than ever, at least until the situation became clarified.

Simmons offers an interpretation of the Soviet walk-out from the Security Council in January 1950, which inadvertently suggests why Russia might have approved a North Korean offensive before the Chinese Communists were able to capture Taiwan. He notes that in 1949 and early 1950 a Sino-American rapprochement was not out of the question, and Moscow's relations with Peking were far from intimate. Nevertheless, revolutionary China, feeling threatened by the West, had leaned, hesitantly, to the Soviet side. Since this was advantageous to Russia, the Kremlin, according to Simmons, may have sought to narrow Communist China's contacts with the United States. The Soviet boycott of the Security Council could serve to harden an initially flexible U.S. position on Communist China's admission, thereby sealing off a possible setting for Sino-American rapprochement (p. 83).

That interpretation has a superficial attractiveness, even though the boycott would have been risky unless first approved by the Chinese.[27] But if we accept the argument, a similar one emerges for the timing of the North Korean attack: it purposely came before Communist China was able to conquer Taiwan, because that might lead to a reversal of the American hands-off policy toward the island. Such a reversal would further exacerbate U.S. relations with the regime on the mainland.

[27] Mao was in Russia from December 1949 through mid-February 1950, when a Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance was concluded.

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Simmons, however, seeks the best of both worlds. He sees Russia's tactics for closing off Communist China's contacts with the United States as underlying the Soviet boycott of the Security Council, but not the timing of the North Korean attack.

Whatever interpretation we put on the boycott, the Sino-Soviet relationship may be crucial to an understanding of Stalin's willingness to accept a North Korean move despite the possibility, however slight, of American intervention. As long as war in Korea did not result in a direct Soviet-American confrontation, Moscow may have felt it had little to lose. An enlarged American presence in Korea could only increase China's dependence on Russia. A perpetuation of the U.S. military presence in Japan would have the same effect. American intervention on Taiwan would further alienate China from the West. Moreover, increased involvement in Asia might distract American attention from the critical European theater.[28] In sum, many developments could grow out of the North Korean offensive, and most were likely to work to Soviet advantage. And one possibility was Peking's increasing dependence on Moscow.[29]

Such arguments, while convincing to some, will be rejected by others. In fact, although a consensus on the Soviet role in the origins of the Korean War is unlikely to emerge soon, revisionism probably will be on the offensive for some time. If the view that the Kremlin was caught off guard by North Korea's offensive is ultimately to prevail, however, certain pitfalls must be avoided and new evidence mustered. Traditional sources, if used at all, must be employed less selectively than they have been by Simmons. If they are not used, their unreliability should be demonstrated. This task could best be accomplished through the uncovering of direct evidence of the Soviet Union's being surprised.

With the advance of revisionism, critical judgments on American intervention in the Korean conflict certainly will accompany many future analyses of the origins of that event. In the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle, analogies will inevitably be drawn. A plea for caution is appropriate here. At least two considerations should be kept in mind. First, in most crises actors are forced to make decisions on the basis of incomplete and imperfect information. Reports available in Washington during the last week of June 1950 indicated that North Korea was

[28] See Ulam (fn. 25), 171.

[29] Stalin also may have seen the North Korean conquest of South Korea as a means of neutralizing the American position on Japan. See George Kennan, *Memoirs 1950–1963* (Boston: Little, Brown 1972), 41-45.

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largely a puppet of Russia. Furthermore, powers friendly to the United States (such as Japan and the nations of Western Europe) tended to see the North Korean attack as a test of American resolve to uphold its commitments.[30] Perceptions of Russia, of the international balance of forces, and of the requirements for the security of individual states were, after all, different in 1950 than they were a generation later.

Second, although the Government of the Republic of Korea, like the succession of governments supported by the United States in South Vietnam between 1954 and 1975, was corrupt and reactionary in nature when the Korean War began, analogies must necessarily be inexact. Despite Rhee's obvious shortcomings, he—unlike Ngo Dinh Diem and others in Vietnam—enjoyed considerable stature in his homeland when his rule began in 1948. Although his support had narrowed substantially by 1950, his government had shown far greater ability to contain civil disorder than the future governments of South Vietnam were able to muster. Moreover, the United States was in a better position to exert pressure on Rhee than on the Vietnamese despots of later years. American impatience with the Nationalist regime in China was clear and fresh in mind. Thus, Rhee's susceptibility to American advice was far from negligible. In the spring of 1950 this fact was borne out when, following a warning by Secretary of State Acheson, Rhee dropped his threat to postpone the elections scheduled for May, and instituted a program aimed at controlling runaway inflation.[31] The Korean War changed all this, but in the crisis of June 1950, the Truman Administration had more pressing matters to consider than what might happen to Rhee's receptivity to outside advice once America had intervened. Scholars will do an injustice to the complexity and diversity of historical events if they fail to take such matters into account.

[30] The response of the Japanese press to the North Korean attack was reported in the intelligence summaries of the Far Eastern Command during the last week of June. These reports are available in the Records of the Occupation of Japan, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md. Western European support for American intervention in Korea is best demonstrated by the favorable votes of France and Great Britain on the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and June 27. For other evidence of Western Europe's support of the strong American response, see Glenn Paige, *The Korean Decision* (New York: Free Press 1968), 192, 200-201, 213-14.

[31] For Acheson's warning, see *Department of State Bulletin*, XXII (April 17, 1950), 602.

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

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